UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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In the Matter of:
RESIDENTIAL CAPITAL, LLC, et al.,
Main Case No.
$12-12020-\mathrm{mg}$

BURNETT,
Plaintiff,
-against-
RESIDENTIAL CAPITAL, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

-     -         -             -                 -                     -                         -                             -                                 -                                     -                                         -                                             -                                                 -                                                     -                                                         -                                                             -                                                                 -                                                                     - -x

In the Matter of:
GMAC MORTGAGE, LLC,
Debtors.

-     -         -             -                 -                     -                         -                             -                                 -                                     -                                         -                                             -                                                 -                                                     -                                                         -                                                             -                                                                 -                                                                     - -x

HEYWARD,
Plaintiff,
Main Case No.
$12-12032-\mathrm{mg}$

Adv. Proc. No.
14-01778-mg

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Hearing RE: Order to Show Cause Why Court Should Not Impose Sanctions Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 Against Pablo E. Bustos, Esq.
(CC: Doc. No. 8208) ResCap Liquidating Trust's Eighty-Fourth Omnibus Objection to Claims (I) Reducing and Allowing Claims and (II) Redesignating, Reducing, and Allowing Claims Filed by Joseph A. Shifer on Behalf of ResCap Liquidating Trust.
(Doc. No. 8343, 8349, 7736, 7817, 7824, 7967) Telephonic Status Conference RE: Claim(s) of Maria M. and Elda Thompson.
(CC: Doc\# 7990) Adjourned Hearing RE: Motion for Objection to Claim(s) Number 2397.
(CC: Doc\# 8042) ResCap Borrower Claims Trust's Eighty-Second Omnibus Objection to Claims (No Liability Borrower Claims).
(CC: Doc\# 7760) Pre-Trial Conference RE: Objection of the ResCap Borrower Claims Trust to Claim Number 5067.

15-01044-mg: Pre-Trial Conference.

14-01778-mg: (CC: Doc\#15) The ResCap Liquidating Trust's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Adversary Complaint.

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BY: PABLO E. BUSTOS, ESQ.

ALSO PRESENT:
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HEROLD GAY, Party Pro Se (TELEPHONICALLY)
DEANNA HORST, Senior Director of Claims, ResCap (TELEPHONICALLY)

KATHY PRIORE, ESQ., Associate Counsel, ResCap Liquidating Trust (TELEPHONICALLY)

JOHN E. SATTERWHITE, Party Pro Se (TELEPHONICALLY)
KENNETH C. THOMAS, Party Pro Se (TELEPHONICALLY)
ELDA THOMPSON, Party Pro Se, Maria M. Thompson
(TELEPHONICALLY)
Steven D. RIGEL, Party Pro Se (TELEPHONICALLY)

PROCEEDINGS
THE COURT: You may be seated. We're here in
Residential Capital, number 12-12020.
Mr. Rosenbaum.
MR. ROSENBAUM: Good morning, Your Honor. Norm
Rosenbaum, Morrison \& Foerster, for the ResCap Borrower Claims Trust and the ResCap Liquidating Trust.

Your Honor, the first matter on the agenda is at page 6, num -- excuse me, II. It's the order to show cause why the Court should not impose sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 against Pablo E. Bustos, Esquire. That's docket number 8207. I'm not sure if Mr. Bustos is in the court or --

THE COURT: Mr. Bustos, are you present?
Mr. Bustos is not present in court. Mr. Bustos called my chambers several days ago, said he's moved to Arizona and asked permission to appear by telephone. He was directed -- the answer to that was no.

The order to show cause in this matter was entered on February 26th, 2014. I won't read the entire order, but it was an order to show cause why Court should not impose sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 against Pablo E. Bustos, Esquire. The last paragraph of the order on page 4 provide that -- ordered that -- "ordered that Bustos and counsel for the Trust shall appear in person at the hearing on

March 31, 2015".
The order to show cause also, on page 4, reads as follows: "Ordered that on or before 5 p.m., March 13, 2015, Bustos shall file a response to this order explaining why cause exists such that the Court should not impose sanctions against him. Bustos' response shall address, as this Court has done in this order and its opinion, each of the eleven affirmative defenses asserted in the opposition, explaining why each affirmative defense does not constitute a violation of Bankruptcy Rule 9011."

Bustos filed a response. It's dated March 13, 2015. He failed to address, as directed by the -- the Court had directed him to address each of the affirmative defenses to establish why he didn't violate Rule 9011 . With respect to each one, he failed to do so. He's also failed to appear today.

On February 26th, 2014, the Court entered its memorandum of opinion and order sustaining, in part, and overruling, in part, the ResCap Borrower Claims Trust's objection to claim numbers 345 and 3743, filed by Conrad B. Burnett, Jr. That memorandum of opinion addressed the Trust's objection to Burnett's claims, specifically addressed each of the eleven affirmative defenses that Bustos asserted in his opposition to the objection to Burnett's claims.

In page 16 of that opinion, the Court stated as
follows: in any event -- "In any event, Burnett or, rather, his attorney fails to establish that any of the affirmative defenses actually support the claims; not one provides even an inkling of a viable form of relief. The Court concludes that the affirmative defenses are frivolous, untimely, unsubstantiated by the evidence in the record before the Court and/or unsupported by current or applicable law, existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification or reversal or existing law or the establishment of new law.
"It is evident that Burnett's attorney did not adequately research these defenses and has attempted to throw anything at the wall in the hopes that something may stick. Needless to say, nothing sticks." And obviously, the opinion goes on from there.

So the argument to show cause incorporated the opinion from which I've just quoted. Bustos' response to the order to show cause -- I should say, in addition to his response, which is the "Affirmation of Pablo E. Bustos in Support of Dismissal of Sanctions Motion", he also provided a declaration of Dennis J. Huelbig, H-U-E-L-B-I-G-, Jr., in support of dismissal of an order to show cause as to Attorney Pablo E. Bustos, Esq.

In addition, filed on the docket is a letter from Mr .
Burnett, dated March 25th, 2015. If Mr. Bustos was here, I would be inquiring, because Mr. Burnett indicated that he retained a firm called New Research Services out of Las Vegas
to create and process the claims and necessary paperwork. This firm is a paralegal firm that claims to be familiar with Federal Bankruptcy procedure. New Research Services is owned and operated by one person, Dennis Huelbirg, Jr. (sic).
"I was told in August by New Research Services that I needed an attorney specialized in bankruptcy to collect and process the proofs of claims. I agreed to the suggestion and paid New Research Services for an attorney in the pleadings required under the Federal Bankruptcy procedure. I have spent over 11,000 dollars for paperwork and attorney services to date. I have requested from Mr. Bustos an invoice for services rendered and, to date, have not received an invoice with billable hours. Mr. Bustos claims he has not been enough money by New Research Services yet, yet I was billed for over forty hours of legal work."

That's on the docket as well.
The Court finds and concludes that Pablo E. Bustos has violated Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 (b) of 9011. And 9011 (b) provides that the Court may, on its own initiative, enter an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate (b) and directing an attorney, law firm or party to show cause why it has not violated (b) with respect thereto. That's what the order to show cause did. The order to show cause incorporated the opinion that I've referred to.

Bustos' response failed to do what he was directed to
do, namely address each of the affirmative defenses that were asserted in the opposition to the objection to the -- the -- to Burnett's claims. The Court finds and concludes that Bustos has violated Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 (b). His failure to appear today, as ordered by the Court, also violates the Bankruptcy Rules and is subject to sanction.

The Court will enter an order imposing sanctions in the amount of 1,000 dollars for each of the eleven affirmative defenses that were improperly asserted, so that's a total of 11,000 dollars. In addition, the Court will enter an additional sanction in the amount of 2,500 dollars against Bustos for failure to appear today, as he was ordered today. So in total, sanctions in the amount of 13,500 dollars payable to the clerk of the Court will be entered against Bustos with an order that he pay the clerk within fourteen days from the entry of the order.
(Pause)
THE COURT: All right. That's going to be the Court's disposition of the order to show cause and an additional sanction as a result of Bustos' failure to appear today.

MR. ROSENBAUM: Thank you, Your Honor.
Your Honor, the next matter on the agenda is at page
7. It's III. This is a pre-trial -- scheduled pre-trial conference in adversary proceeding 15-01044. It's Burnett v. Residential Capital, LLC. That was also filed by --

THE COURT: Mr. Bustos.
MR. ROSENBAUM: -- Mr. Bustos on behalf of Mr.
Burnett.
Your Honor, as we addressed in our response to the order to show cause, this is an entirely frivolous complaint. We did invoke the supplemental adversary procedures. We have had at least phone calls to Mr. Bustos, but we have not heard back from him. Once --

THE COURT: Were you aware he moved to Arizona?
MR. ROSENBAUM: I wasn't. I don't know if Mr. Wishnew was.

MR. WISHNEW: I can only say -- Your Honor, Jordan Wishnew, ResCap Borrower Claims Trust -- I received a voicemail from Mr. Bustos last evening indicating he was coming back from Arizona. I wasn't aware that he had actually moved to Arizona, so the answer being no, Your Honor.

MR. ROSENBAUM: Thank you.
In any event, had he spoken to us, we would have asked him to just voluntarily dismiss this complaint. If he's not prepared to comply with the adversary procedures, then we could move to dismiss it as well. We'd obviously prefer not to incur that expense.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Rosenbaum, you'll decide how the Trust wishes to proceed. I would certainly point out that Rule $9011(c)(1)(A)$ sets forth the procedure to be followed. If a
party wishes to seek sanctions, I won't comment about the substance of the adversary proceeding complaint that's been filed. If you wish to proceed under $9011(\mathrm{C})(1)(\mathrm{A})$, in part, the motion for sanctions may not be filed with or presented to the Court unless -- within twenty-one days after service of the motion or some other period as the Court may prescribe the challenge paper claim defense, contention, allegation or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. I won't read on. So there's a procedure. The matter was set for a case management conference today. Mr. Bustos has failed to appear for it. Was he notified that the conference was going forward?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. An additional sanction will be entered against Mr . Bustos in the amount of 2,500 dollars for failure to appear for the case management conference in -- what's the adversary proceeding number?

MR. ROSENBAUM: 15-1 -- 15-01044.
THE COURT: A separate order will be entered on sanctions and that it will be incorporated into the same order.

Mr. Bustos is not having a good day.
MR. ROSENBAUM: Thank you, Your Honor. We'll decide how to proceed on the adversary.

Just lastly, Your Honor -- I mean, we are, obviously, cognizant of your -- of the order that you did enter on the claims objection, and we would like to have a dialogue with Mr.

Burnett.
THE COURT: He's represented by counsel.
MR. ROSENBAUM: Thank you.
THE COURT: I can't help you on that one. I -- you undoubtedly saw the letter that Mr. Burnett filed with the Court.

MR. ROSENBAUM: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: "I would ask the Court to keep Pablo Bustos as my attorney of record to finish the case for the timely proofs of claim 245 and 3743."

MR. ROSENBAUM: We'll respect his decision, and we'll try to reach out to Mr . Bustos, Your Honor.

Your Honor, the next matter of agenda is IV. It's the ResCap Liquidating Trust's eighty-fourth omnibus objection, and I'll cede the podium to Kramer Levin.

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. ALLARD: Good morning, Your Honor. Nathanial Allard of Kramer Levin Naftalis \& Frankel for the ResCap Liquidating Trust.

I'm here on the eighty-fourth omnibus objection to claims, which --

THE COURT: Eighty-fourth or eighty-second?
MR. ALLARD: Eighty-fourth. We're at page 7 of the agenda --

THE COURT: Sorry.

MR. ALLARD: -- IV.
THE COURT: All right, go ahead.
MR. ALLARD: Sure. It's the eighty-fourth omnibus objection to the claims, which the liquidating trust filed on February 26th, 2015, and it can be found at ECF number 8208. THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ALLARD: Pursuant to the objection, the liquidating trust seeks to reduce and allow certain claims. We have already resolved or adjourned certain of the claims subject to the objection, and no responses were filed. So we are going forward today solely with respect to four claims filed by Wells Fargo Bank, and that is claim number 7359, 7360, 7366 and 7373. And we would just request entry of an order reducing and allowing the -- those Wells Fargo claims subject to the objection.

THE COURT: Now, is it -- my understanding, it's going forward on an uncontested basis?

MR. ALLARD: That's correct. It's uncontested.
THE COURT: So is there anyone present on -- in the courtroom or in the telephone for Wells Fargo?

Just to advise me -- tell me, what -- you've reached an agreement with Wells?

MR. ALLARD: No, we were in contact with counsel to Wells Fargo prior to and the day of filing the objection.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ALLARD: And we informed them of our intentions, and they did not file a response. And we interpret that as they are accepting of the reduced and allow of the claim would be one claim against Residential Funding Company for 50,541 dollars and a claim against GMAC Mortgage in the amount of $\$ 7,903.24$, and the other two claims would be disallowed and expunged.

THE COURT: So -- all right. Since they don't have their counsel, they didn't file anything, let me just make some recitals. Through the objection, the Trust seeks to reduce and allow four claims filed by Wells Fargo because they allegedly overstate the value owed and should, therefore, be reduced. In its capacity as custodian of certain mortgage backed security trusts, warehousing facilities, pools of mortgage loans and other financing arrangements, Wells Fargo filed claim number 7359 against debtor Residential Capital, LLC; claim number 7360 against debtor Residential Funding Company; claim number 7366 against debtor GMAC Mortgage, LLC and claim number 7373 against debtor Executive Trustee Services, Inc.

According to the Trust, the Wells Fargo claims are based on custodial agreements with the debtors and Wells Fargo, and the debtors entered into a stipulation whereby all of Wells Fargo's potential custodial claims, of which there were more than four, were deemed consolidated into the Wells Fargo claims that I have here.

The Trust conducted an investigation of the debtors' books and records and determined that Wells Fargo was entitled to a general unsecured claim of 50,541 dollars against RFC and a general unsecured claim in the amount of $\$ 7,903.24$ against GMAC Mortgage. The Trust, therefore, argues that claim number 7360 should be allowed in the amount that I've described against RFC, and claim number 7366 should be allowed in the amount I've described against GMACM and that claim number 7359 and 7373 should be disallowed and expunged.

Wells Fargo did not file any response. Good cause appears to support the objection. The objection's sustained.

MR. ALLARD: Thank you, Your Honor. We will submit a order to chambers.

THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. WISHNEW: Good morning, Your Honor. Jordan Wishnew, Morrison Foerster for the ResCap Borrower Claims Trust.

The next matter on today's agenda is item 2 on page 8, the ResCap Borrower Claims Trust's seventy-sixth omnibus objection to claims. It is a status conference concerning the claim of Maria and Elda Thompson, and I believe Ms. Elda Thompson is on the phone today.

THE COURT: Ms. Thompson, are you on the telephone?
MS. THOMPSON: Yes.
THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Go ahead, Mr. Wishnew.
MR. WISHNEW: Thank you, Your Honor.
Your Honor, just to update the Court, when we were last before Your Honor, we were arguing to have the claim expunged under the -- for the reasons stated in the omnibus -- seventy-sixth omnibus objection. There were questions raised concerning whether, in fact, Ms. Thompson had made the payments that we asserted were not made and prompted the foreclosure proceeding to be commenced in July of 2007 against Ms. Thompson.

The Court subsequently directed counsel to meet with Ms. Thompson. Ultimately, on March 17th, I appeared -- or I visited with Ms. Thompson at her home in Willingboro, New Jersey, discussed the claim, reviewed payments that the claimant believed reflected timely payment of the nonpayments preceding the 2007 foreclosure. And what I was shown, in fact, were payments made in 2008 pursuant to a repayment plan that Ms. Thompson had entered into with GMAC Mortgage, which brought current the loan on account the missed payments in the spring of 2007.

So it was essentially my position that, notwithstanding that there have been representation that they had documents to show payment, the documents that were ultimately shown to me didn't substantiate a timely payment prior to the commencement of the July 2007 foreclosure. Once I
sat with Ms. Thompson -- I think her mother, Maria Thompson, in -- for approximately seventy-five minutes that day, and ultimately word came out is there -- the disagreement as to whether or not the debtors are or are not responsible to them for any liability, seeing that we had reached, in my opinion, an impasse, I asked to excuse myself from their home and suggested that it was best to try and have the Court instruct us as to what contested issues the Court sees that it would like further evidence on so that we can try and bring this to a head and to a resolution.

And that's what's brought us here today, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. And the Court is in receipt of a letter from Elda and Maria Thompson. It's dated March 24th, 2015, and it refers to your meeting, Mr. Wishnew. I assume you've seen the letter.

MR. WISHNEW: I have, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. So I had directed -- well, Ms.
Thompson, do you want go ahead and respond?
MS. THOMPSON: Yes. I -- actually, on the day that he came to our house, Your Honor, he actually didn't want to discuss the items blacked out on the accounts, itemized, to show the payments, because we were concerned that -- in 2007, we were sent an accounting of everything that $I$ had paid and not paid. And we showed him that. But on the one that he sent us, it's blacked out payments that we cannot see the amount.

We asked him about that, and he said it's only attorney privilege to see items only. But I thought everything that paid on my account, under my name, I should be able to see. And he was not here for seventy-five minutes. So that's a little exaggeration on his time.

THE COURT: Look, Ms. Thomp --
MS. THOMPSON: So we tried to show -- well, we tried to show that the payments that he claims was the -- from the repayment arrangement, he -- we tried to show him that. He got a little upset and said I don't need to be shown out and left. That's not what ended it.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Thompson --
MS. THOMPSON: Now, I -- my concern was that in 2007 we made an arrangement, because they sent -- they sent a sheriff to the house saying that the foreclosure was approved and claiming that the foreclosure was approved in July and in August. Now, when we came to find out that the mortgage actually was dismissed, they knew that it was dismissed. And even though they knew that it wasn't approved, they still went ahead with these arrangements that included court costs and attorney costs, which we ended up paying, over $\$ 28,369.95$. We tried to explain that.

On that day that they sent a sheriff to the house, I suffered a major heart attack and ended up having to be revived six times in front of my children. Now, I think that they
overstepped when they sent the sheriff to the house knowing that the foreclosure was not going to be able to go through. And the following year, they kept accepting the payments even though they weren't listing the payments on the account, which is -- which shows on the reflected -- on the account's itemized section that they sent. It's also not reflected on there.

And so we were trying to explain to him that the
payments that $I$ had made, most of -- all the payments that I had made are not shown on the itemized account. They did not put them on the account.

THE COURT: Ms. Thom --
MS. THOMPSON: And we wanted to know why --
THE COURT: Ms. Thompson, stop. Stop.
When you were here last in court, you told the Court that you had bank records that showed --

MS. THOMPSON: Yes.
THE COURT: Stop. Don't interrupt me, please -- that you had bank records that show the payments made to the Trust. You -- the Trust lawyer said they have no record of having received the payments. You indicated it was made --

MS. THOMPSON: I show --
THE COURT: Stop, don't interrupt.
You indicated you had made the payments in the -- and they had been credited against your account -- drawn against your account. I asked whether you had the documents with you
in court; you told me you did not. I directed Mr. Wishnew that, either, he or one of his colleagues go to your home to meet with you -- that was agreeable with you -- for you to show the Trust's lawyer your bank records showing that you had made the payments.

That's why --
MS. THOMPSON: I --
THE COURT: -- Mr. Wishnew -- don't interrupt. That's why Mr. Wishnew went to meet with you at a date you agreed on.

What you're now complaining about is the Trust's records, those which are redacted to remove certain entries. They've asserted it's based on attorney-client privilege. What Mr. Wishnew has indicated to the Court is that you did not show him any of your bank records showing that you had made the payments.

Did you show him bank records establishing that you had made the payments?

MS. THOMPSON: Yes, I did. I have it in my hand. THE COURT: Well --

MR. WISHNEW: Your --
THE COURT: -- you didn't have it in your hand in court.

Mr. Wishnew, did she show you records -- her bank records that payments were made?

MR. WISHNEW: What she showed me was a check receipt,
like, essentially --
MS. THOMPSON: Yes, I did.
THE COURT: Ms. Thompson, stop. Let Mr. Wishnew answer. I'll give you a chance to speak again. Go ahead, Mr. Wishnew.

MR. WISHNEW: What I saw, Your Honor, was essentially the copy or the receipt from a check, which showed that on a certain date in 2008 a check was drawn to GMAC Mortgage. Now, that would be a payment made pursuant to the repayment plan, months, if not almost a year after the payment should have been made. I did not see any checks or any bank records from the spring of 2007 on account of the months that were missed and led to the commencement of the foreclosure proceedings.

THE COURT: All right.
All right. I'm going to schedule an evidentiary
hearing. There's a disputed issue of fact, whether the Thompsons made the payments. They claim they did. The Trust claims they didn't. I will schedule an evidentiary hearing. This seems to me to be fairly straight forward.

Monday, April 20th, at 2 p.m. Ms. Thompson --
MS. THOMPSON: Yes.
THE COURT: -- you need to bring with you any records -- any bank records you have available to you that shows the payments you made. Mr. Wishnew contends the payments that you made in 2007 were in connection with an earlier
repayment plan, not the missed payments that this dispute relates to. If your position is that you made those payments, bring that evidence, be prepared to testify about it. I will listen -- because this is not an evidentiary hearing today. The Trust will have to bring a witness as well, and -- who can testify about what their records show about the receipt of payments, about a repayment plan, et cetera.

So I'm scheduling it for 2 p.m., Monday, April 20th, 2015, in my courtroom. You've been here before, Ms. Thompson, so you know where that is.

MS. THOMPSON: Yes, I'm bringing a wheelchair this time.

THE COURT: Okay, that's fine.
What records -- Mr. Wishnew, what records do you expect to rely on at that hearing?

MR. WISHNEW: I would expect to rely on the loan payment history --

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. WISHNEW: -- and the loan servicing notes, copies of which have already been provided to Ms. Thompson. And when she refer to the blacked out portions, that was the blacked out portions of the loan servicing notes that we redacted for, what we believed, were --

THE COURT: All right.
MR. WISHNEW: -- privileged.

THE COURT: What I would direct is, is that, Ms. Thompson, you and the Trust lawyers, Mr. Wishnew, need to exchange copies of any exhibits that you intend to rely on at the hearing on April 20th.

Mr. Wishnew, I'm going to ask that you speak with Ms. Thompson well in advance of that.

MR. WISHNEW: Um-hum.
THE COURT: And I would ask that you pre-mark the Thompsons' exhibits, as well as your own so that each -- since they don't have a lawyer --

MR. WISHNEW: Um-hum.
THE COURT: -- so that each exhibit has a unique identifier, all right?

So Ms. Thompson, I -- what -- I want you to speak with Mr. Wishnew and make sure that you exchange those exhibits by 5 p.m., April 15th.

And Mr. Wishnew, you bring copies of both your exhibits and the Thompsons' exhibits to the hearing.

MR. WISHNEW: Absolutely, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And I --
MS. THOMPSON: I will e-mail -- I can e-mail them today, if you'd --

THE COURT: Well, why --
MS. THOMPSON: -- like.
THE COURT: -- why don't you -- let me -- you speak
with Mr. Wishnew and see whether you can -- you work it out between the two of you. I want to do this as -- with the least inconvenience as possible to both sides, and I think it'll be easier for Mr . Wishnew to present to the Court the pre-marked exhibits.

So -- but anything you want to rely on, any documents you wish to rely on at the hearing, you need to get them to Mr. Wishnew. He'll speak with you, and you'll work out the timing so that he can submit them all on the 15th. Okay?

MS. THOMPSON: Okay.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you very --
MS. THOMPSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: -- much, Ms. Thompson.
MR. WISHNEW: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Wishnew.
MR. WISHNEW: Your Honor, that brings us to the next matter on today's agenda, item 3 on page 9, the ResCap Borrower Claims Trust's objection to claim number 2397, filed by John Satterwhite. I believe Mr. Satterwhite is on the phone today.

THE COURT: Mr. Satterwhite, are you on the phone?
MR. SATTERWHITE: Yes, sir, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. SATTERWHITE: Good morning.
THE COURT: Just -- I have to make a note on something else, so just hang on for a second, okay?

MR. SATTERWHITE: Yes, sir.
MS. THOMPSON: I'm sorry; excuse me, Your Honor. This is Elda Thompson again. We --

THE COURT: Oh, yeah, you're excused. You can -- you don't have to stay on. You're welcome to, but you don't have to.

MS. THOMPSON: All right. Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Thompson.
MS. THOMPSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
All right. I've finished with my notes.
So Mr. Wishnew, why don't you go ahead with your claim objection, and then we'll let Mr. Satterwhite respond, okay?

MR. WISHNEW: Thank you, Your Honor.
This is the Borrower Trust claim's objection against the claim -- or pertaining to the claim number 2397 , filed by John Satterwhite, which was filed at docket number 7990. Mr. Satterwhite filed a response to the objection on March 3rd at docket number 8280. The Trust filed a reply on March 26th, filed at docket number 8363.

In support of the objection, the Borrower Trust submitted a declaration by Kathy Priore, associate counsel of the ResCap Liquidating Trust, attached as Exhibit 2 to the objection. She also submitted a supplemental declaration in further support of the objection, attached as Exhibit 1 to the
reply. Ms. Priore is appearing by telephone today and is available to answer any questions the Court might have.

Mr. Satterwhite filed a general unsecured claim designated as claim 2397 on November 5th, 2012 in the amount of 455,000 dollars. Essentially, Your Honor, this is a claim -- the 455,000-dollar claim is made up of three components. There is 100,000 dollars for compensatory damages, 350,000 dollars for punitive damages and 5,000 dollars for attorneys' fees.

The crux of the dispute here, Your Honor, is what liability, if any, GMAC Mortgage has on account of a foreclosure sale that took place in April 2010. Mr. Satterwhite has identified three bases for his claim. That is fraud, implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and quiet title. It is the Trust's position that for the reasons stated in our pleadings the claimant has not established, by a preponderance of the evidence, a claim on any one of three bases. At most --

THE COURT: I think the issue that -- so you know what to address -- is whether there are disputed issues of fact that require an evidentiary to be resolved and whether any of the three theories for liability, quiet title, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing or fraud --

MR. WISHNEW: Sure.
THE COURT: -- whether, as a matter of law, those
claims fail. But to the extent that the claims all fail as a matter of law, the issue is -- this is not an evidentiary hearing --

MR. WISHNEW: Right.
THE COURT: -- whether there are disputed issues of fact that are going to require an evidentiary hearing.

MR. WISHNEW: I suggest the answer is, no, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Let me ask you to do this. Address,
first, the quiet title --
MR. WISHNEW: Sure.
THE COURT: -- because that seems to me to be
primarily an issue of law --
MR. WISHNEW: And that actually has been --
THE COURT: -- that's probably going to be resolved --
MR. WISHNEW: -- previously dealt with through a
demurrer motion filed in the Virginia courts, in which --
THE COURT: Pronounced demurrer, but --
MR. WISHNEW: Demurrer. By the time --
THE COURT: I only know because I practiced in
California for many years, and that's what they do out there. That's the motion to dismiss.

MR. WISHNEW: By the time we actually get through and fully reconcile all these claims, I promise I will actually be able to pronounce demurrer.

So there was a demurrer action in --

THE COURT: There was even a demurrer, too.
MR. WISHNEW: Demurrer -- there was a
demurrer -- tomato/tomato, Your Honor.
There was a demurrer action in Virginia. There was a ruling in GMAC Mortgage's favor on the quiet title action. So at this point, we don't believe there is a valid cause of action --

THE COURT: Well, your basic position is that neither GMAC nor any of the other debtors assert any claim -- have any --

MR. WISHNEW: Or have --
THE COURT: -- claim of title to the property.
MR. WISHNEW: Have any interest in the title.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. WISHNEW: Exactly, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You don't have any interest in the property.

MR. WISHNEW: Exactly, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And your argument is that a quiet title action can't lie where the defendant asserts no interest in the property?

MR. WISHNEW: Absolutely correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. WISHNEW: With regards to implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Your Honor, to extent that GMAC

Mortgage, in its capacity as servicer, was simply enforcing the terms of the contact, there isn't a separate cause of action for a breach of the implied duty -- covenant -- the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It can't -- essentially, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can't be the vehicle for rewriting and unambiguous contract in order to create duties that, otherwise, do not exist.

In support of that, Your Honor, we cite the Covra Rubius (ph.) case, 2014 Westland 6968035. And that case cites, in part, Skillstorm, Inv. V. Electric (sic) Data Systems, LLC, 666 F.2d 610 at 620, Eastern District of Virginia 2009. So those -- we believe those two causes of action are easily dealt with.

With regards to the claim for fraud --
THE COURT: Let me -- let's stop on the breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing. So what's the contract that you're focusing on? What are they? Are there one or more contracts?

MR. WISHNEW: Well, I think, Your Honor, it would be the note here and, to the extent that there is a -- I mean, it'd really be the relationship that -- to which Mr. Satterwhite was a party would be the note and his obligation to pay the note, consistent with taking out the loan he did, and the GMAC Mortgage's rights as servicer to enforce the terms of
the note on behalf of the lender.
THE COURT: All right. Would you agree that GMAC was the agent for the holder of the note?

MR. WISHNEW: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. And as an agent, would GMAC have the authority to agree to a forbearance agreement?

MR. WISHNEW: Yes, Your Honor, yes.
THE COURT: All right. And could it agree orally to forbear in timely payments under the note? Look, Mr.

Satterwhite -- there's disputed issues of fact about this, all right?

MR. WISHNEW: Um-hum.
THE COURT: He contends that he spoke with
representatives of GMAC --
MR. WISHNEW: Um-hum.
THE COURT: -- and he didn't use this term, but
essentially agreed -- they would agree that they would forbear that they wouldn't move forward with foreclosure. Foreclosure was scheduled --

MR. WISHNEW: April 15th, Your Honor.
THE COURT: -- for April 15th, and -- bear with me a
second. He alleges that he spoke to someone from GMAC on April 12th, 2010. Foreclosure was scheduled for April 15th, 2010.

Am I right so far?
MR. WISHNEW: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And he alleges that in this phone conversation he was promised that Bank of New York would not foreclose on his home while Satterwhite applied for HAMP modification. And he was advised how to do that. That's his allegation, right?

MR. WISHNEW: Right, and that would be consistent with the April 12th communication from GMAC Mortgage --

THE COURT: Right.
MR. WISHNEW: -- concerning the request for
documentation --
THE COURT: All right. And --
MR. WISHNEW: -- in further support of a workout
package.
THE COURT: -- the letter -- I'll get to the issue of whether the letter was received or not. But there's an April 12th letter, right?

MR. WISHNEW: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And so he had to submit it within ten days.

MR. WISHNEW: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Ten days from April 12th. It's not clear, but it seems to me --

MR. WISHNEW: It's not clear.
THE COURT: -- if you send the letter on April 12th and say submit it within ten days, the logical inference is ten
days --
MR. WISHNEW: Correct.
THE COURT: -- no sooner than ten days from April
12 th .
MR. WISHNEW: No argument there, Your Honor.
THE COURT: But three days later, they were going to have him foreclosed?

MR. WISHNEW: Correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. So if a loan servicer, as an agent for the noteholder, had the authority to agree to forbear, why wouldn't that -- and then didn't -- it didn't because it -- three days later, it went ahead and foreclosed. Why wouldn't that breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing? There -- and the Virginia cases, there's a split in authority exactly about what -- whether Virginia recognizes an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing it the residential mortgage loan context, at least it appears to me there seems to be some sort -- the cases aren't uniform. You would agree with that?

MR. WISHNEW: I would agree, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. So why hasn't Mr. Satterwhite alleged a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing? He's very specific about that he talked to a GMAC representative on April 12th. He says what his position is about what they told him. They did send him a letter dated

April 15th -- or, excuse me -- yeah, they sent him a letter telling him, submit your application in ten days. But they went ahead and foreclosed before then.

MR. WISHNEW: Um-hum. And --
THE COURT: So why doesn't that state a breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing?

MR. WISHNEW: It doesn't state a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fear dealing because what this really has amounted to -- or what this amounts to is a mistake, an oversight.

THE COURT: Well, sometimes mistakes are breaches of contracts, sometimes they're negligence of representation, sometimes they're even fraud.

MR. WISHNEW: Well -- but it's fraud, Your Honor -
THE COURT: You say it was a mistake.
MR. WISHNEW: I say --
THE COURT: You say it was a mistake.
MR. WISHNEW: Yes.
THE COURT: Mr. Satterwhite, he doesn't say it was a mistake. He says, they told me they wouldn't foreclose. They would consider my HAMP loan modification. They told me how much time I had to get it in, but then they just went ahead and foreclosed. That's what he says. You have a different position, I understand. I'm not resolving the dispute.

MR. WISHNEW: Right.

THE COURT: But --
MR. WISHNEW: I guess what we're trying to do, through the objection, is recognizing that could be a disputed issue of fact, is to frame for Mr . Satterwhite and for the Court what we believe a limitation on damages here, which is to make -- to essentially Mr. Satterwhite whole, restore him to -- provide him with the equity that he lost at the time of the foreclosure sale. And so if there is a mistake, then the fact of the matter is what his damages are, are a little bit over 40,000 dollars as opposed to 100,000 dollars for compensatory damages, 350,000 dollars for punitive damages --

THE COURT: Well, let me stop --
MR. WISHNEW: -- and --
THE COURT: Let me stop you right there.
Mr. Satterwhite, in other disputes in the ResCap case, I have held, including in writing, that punitive damages are not available from the Trust because there's a fixed amount available for borrowers' claims, every additional dollar of claims against that amount is that much less available to satisfy the claims of other borrowers. And so I've held, in connection with the Reed claim -- R-E-E-D, I believe it was -- that punitive damages aren't available.

That issue has also come up in connection with the Mack claim, M-A-C-K. And there, I don't have a written opinion. I ruled orally from the bench that punitive damages
are not available. So I'm -- I've ruled consistently in this case with respect to that, so I'm not saying what damages -- what compensatory damages you may be entitled to recover. But you're not going to be able to recover any punitive damages. I just wanted to interrupt you for that purpose --

MR. WISHNEW: No, I appreciate that.
THE COURT: -- Mr. Wishnew. You've obviously lived through this case. Mr. Satterwhite has not.

MR. WISHNEW: Understood.
THE COURT: And I've already ruled previously with respect to the punitive damage issue.

MR. WISHNEW: No, I appreciate Your Honor's clarification on that point.

So Your Honor, that's really the sum and substance -THE COURT: May I ask you this? if -- I want to make clear that $I$ don't anticipate ruling now whether Mr . Satterwhite could recover for breach of covenant of good faith and fear dealing, which is a contract claim, or fraud claim -- two types: actual and constructive. Would there be a difference in the damages remedy --

MR. WISHNEW: Absolutely not, Your Honor.
THE COURT: -- available under any of those three
theories of recovery?
MR. WISHNEW: It's the borrowers trust's position that
it isn't -- there is no difference in recovery; that the recovery, regardless of whether we are found responsible for fraud or found responsible for implied covenant of breach of -- breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the remedy is the same: making Mr. Satterwhite whole, which is restoring him or providing a claim for the equity in the property at the time of the foreclosure.

THE COURT: So address the fraud claim -- there are two theories in the fraud claim, right, actual or construction fraud.

MR. WISHNEW: Yes, Your Honor. That was -- since it wasn't clear to us what -- whether we were being -- or the claim was for actual or constructive fraud, we addressed both, Your Honor. to prevail on a cause of action for actual fraud, the plaintiff or, in this case, the claimant, Mr. Satterwhite, must prove by clear and convincing evidence a false representation of material fact --

THE COURT: Virginia applies the clear and convincing evidence standard?

MR. WISHNEW: Yes, Your Honor, cited Richmond Metropolitan Authority v. McDevitt Street Bovis, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 344 at 346 , and $I$ think it's the Supreme Court of Virginia 1998.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. WISHNEW: Made intentionally and knowingly, with
intent to mislead, reliance on the party misled a resulting damage to the party.

Frankly, Your Honor --
THE COURT: Let me ask you this. Am I correct that the Covra Rubius case, which you rely on with respect to actual fraud, also recognizes that reckless disregard for the truth satisfies the intent requirement for actual fraud?

MR. WISHNEW: Just one moment, Your Honor.
THE COURT: That's at Star 5 -- 4.
MR. WISHNEW: Yes, correct. Yes --
THE COURT: Reckless abandon --
MR. WISHNEW: -- yes.
THE COURT: -- and --
MR. WISHNEW: Yes.
THE COURT: -- disregard for the truth.
MR. WISHNEW: That is correct, Your Honor, yes.
THE COURT: So that would -- reckless disregard for the truth, which is not uncommon, but that would satisfy the Virginia requirement for --

MR. WISHNEW: For actual fraud, Your Honor.
THE COURT: -- intent? Okay.
MR. WISHNEW: Yes, Your Honor.
Given that the actions here were simply, what the
Borrower Trust contends is, a mistake --
THE COURT: Well, we'll see. I mean, I don't know
whether it was or not. I can understand from Mr. Satterwhite's standpoint -- his argument that it was an egregious mistake when you talk to GMAC on April 10th, facing an April 15th foreclosure date, they tell you, according to him, that they wouldn't go forward with the foreclosure on April 15th, that he had ten days to submit the HAMP modification package, and then they just go ahead with foreclosure.

I can unders -- I'm not making any determination about it, but I can understand that he would argue that shows reckless disregard for the truth.

MR. WISHNEW: I unders -- yes, I understand his position. And obviously, we don't agree with the position. We feel that this was simply an internal miscommunication with an --

THE COURT: You're going to have people --
MR. WISHNEW: -- unfortunate --
THE COURT: -- who miscommunicated, come here and testify?

MR. WISHNEW: I'm sorry, Your Honor?
THE COURT: You're going to have the internal GMAC people --

MR. WISHNEW: We would have --
THE COURT: -- who are going to come here and testify about this mistake that they made?

MR. WISHNEW: Your Honor, if this goes to an
evidentiary hearing, we would be -- we would produce someone with knowledge of the debtors' servicing practices, who could address and interpret the servicing notes and explain what happened to --

THE COURT: That's what you're relying on is an interpret -- somebody's going to interpret the servicing notes rather than somebody who actually did it?

MR. WISHNEW: Your Honor, with the limited resources that the borrower claims trust and the liquidating trust have right now, there are a fixed number of people who are available -_

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. WISHNEW: -- to testify, and so the best we can do is rely upon --

THE COURT: That may be your problem at an evidentiary hearing.

MR. WISHNEW: It -- I acknowledge that, Your Honor. That's just the inherent problem that the Trust has going forward. as a liquidating equity with limited resources, it can -- it has a fixed number of personnel that it can utilize, and it -- the best it can do is utilize its contemporaneous business records to substantiate its position.

THE COURT: You -- well, your best version of events is that GMAC made a serious mistake that resulted in Mr. Satterwhite's home being foreclosed on April 15th, 2010, right?

MR. WISHNEW: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
All right. Talk about constructive fraud.
MR. WISHNEW: Sure. So Your Honor, a party claiming constructive fraud in the context of a contractual relationship must either show a duty existing outside the scope of the contract or a fraud in the inducement of the contract, again citing to the Covra Rubius case at Star 5. It's the Trust's position that Mr . Satterwhite hasn't alleged either of these elements. So in that regards, there is not necessarily a claim for constructive fraud.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this -- a couple of hypothetical questions. I think -- not with respect to Virginia law but in some of the ResCap claim objections, I think with respect to other claims for negligent misrepresentation, which is the equivalent of a negligent misrepresentation claim -- would you agree with that?

MR. WISHNEW: Um-hum.
THE COURT: The construct fraud claim here is the equivalent of what other states would consider a negligent misrepresentation claim. Is that right?

MR. WISHNEW: I believe so, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. And ordinarily, the loan servicer doesn't owe a duty to the borrower.

MR. WISHNEW: Agreed, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And I haven't seen any cases under Virginia law saying that they do.

MR. WISHNEW: Correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Does that change if the loan servicer communicates directly with the borrower here or, allegedly, orally? It's one thing to say you don't have a duty to speak, okay, or to do something. Once you affirmatively take the step of engaging in a discussion with Mr. Satterwhite, specifically about whether you're going to go forward with foreclosure or not go forward with foreclosure --

MR. WISHNEW: Um-hum.
THE COURT: -- whether you're going to consider a HAMP modification or not consider a HAMP modification, let's assume that he's able to establish that on April 10th he spoke with GMAC -- a representative of GMAC who said we won't foreclosure -- get a HAMP modifi -- get a modification in. You've got to get it in within ten days, we won't go forward with the foreclosure. Does that create a duty on the party of GMACM such that a negligent misrepresentation claim would lie?

I don't remember -- when this issue has come up before me --

MR. WISHNEW: Sure.
THE COURT: -- in the past, not involving Virginia law but other states' law, people tried to assert that the loan servicer owed a duty just because it was the loan servicer.

MR. WISHNEW: Sure.
THE COURT: And I think I've said no.
MR. WISHNEW: Right.
THE COURT: But I don't -- and I've got to go back and
look some more --
MR. WISHNEW: Yeah.
THE COURT: -- but I don't remember that coming up in the context of affirmative communications between the loan servicer and the borrower.

MR. WISHNEW: I don't know that a communication all of a sudden takes -- somehow creates a special relationship for that --

THE COURT: When you tell the --
MR. WISHNEW: -- loan servicer.
THE COURT: -- borrower we won't foreclose if you get us a HAMP loan modifi -- we won't guarantee you get a modification, but we're not going to foreclose five days from now if you get us a HAMP application --

MR. WISHNEW: Well, I mean, that --
THE COURT: -- within ten day -- you -- I think you've acknowledged -- I think that -- putting aside the Satterwhite circumstance, it was GMAC's general practice not to foreclose while a loan modification was being considered.

MR. WISHNEW: That's --
THE COURT: Is that true?

MR. WISHNEW: That is correct, Your Honor, yes.
THE COURT: Okay. So that's your general practice.
Here, there may be disputed elements in the communica -- I know the service note said no guarantee that we won't foreclose.

MR. WISHNEW: Right.
THE COURT: That may be ambiguous because -- well, we'll have to deal with that at an evidentiary hearing. But there are two sides to this story; I would certainly acknowledge that.

MR. WISHNEW: Okay.
THE COURT: Look, I'm troubled. You can call that a mistake. It was -- clearly, it was a mistake. Whether it's an actionable mistake is a different issue.

MR. WISHNEW: Um-hum.
THE COURT: And if so, on what theory is it actionable? And then, if it is actionable, what are the circumstances?

MR. WISHNEW: Right.
THE COURT: What's the measure of damages?
MR. WISHNEW: Correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. can you -- I didn't see any
authority cited for the proposition that the loan servicer has no duty to the borrower even if the loan servicer undertakes to communicate to the borrower we won't do certain things if you do certain things.

MR. WISHNEW: I don't know that we specifically addressed that issue, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I think what I'm likely to do -- I don't want to go through another round of briefing at this stage.

I haven't heard from Mr. Satterwhite yet, and I will. But I -- I mean, it's clear to me this is going forward for an evidentiary hearing.

MR. WISHNEW: Um-hum.
THE COURT: The facts are going to be the facts are going to be the facts. Which of these legal theories, if any, do -- are -- is at -- are the facts actionable --

MR. WISHNEW: Um-hum.
THE COURT: -- I'll have to determine. I think that Mr. Satterwhite has certainly alleged enough to proceed, if -- on nothing else, on the actual fraud. Whether he could make it out or not, $I$ don't know. I -- it does seem to me that -- and I'm not citing the issue today. he may well be able to proceed on the constructive fraud theory, whereas -- it's undisputed here, GMAC communicated with him and told him -- gave him ten days to do a loan modification application.

And again, I'm not deciding today whether that would be actionable or breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but, initially, my reaction is the remedy -- if he makes out any of those three claims, the remedy's going to be
the same --
MR. WISHNEW: Right.
THE COURT: -- essentially, here.
Let me hear from Mr. Satterwhite. Go ahead, Mr. Satterwhite.

MR. SATTERWHITE: Thank you, Your Honor. Good morning, sir. I appreciate you giving me the chance to speak.

I am also blind in one eye and low vision in the other, and I do have a complaint, not with the Court, but with the counsel of Morrison \& Morrison (sic) because they keep sending me paperwork after my deadline date to get into you. And I don't have time nor did I have resources to pay for a lawyer, because I haven't worked in five years since I became blind. And it was my fault for falling in the arrears of only 1,000 dollars when $I$ had 70,000 dollars' worth of equity.

They said -- and my property was bad. So I requested further modification, and GMAC told me that I didn't have to worry about it as long as I got the paperwork in. So I didn't seek any more counsel or help to try to stop the foreclosure because I believed in what they told me. And when the plan came on TV, and I called GMAC and asked them, I believed what they told me. I'm a ex-Green Beret for fourteen years, with an honorable discharge. I didn't ask them to give me anything. I've always taken care of myself.

But I just asked them to treat me fair, under the

Constitution, of we the people, in God we trust, and I believed what they said, Your Honor. So yes, I feel they intentionally did it. And when I went to the foreclosure on the court steps, a man told me the property didn't sell and that I was okay. Then, I find out that Bank of New York Mellon bought -- was the highest bidder and bought the property. So this is why I feel that, in good faith and proof, I was misled, because my house used to be one of the nicest houses on the block. Now, it's rundown. I don't have the -- or didn't have the money to fix it. And why would I go and put money in it now when you've taken my name off the deed?

And I also presented evidence in Richmond, which I still have a fraud case. The judge told my lawyer -- when Morrison \& Morrison contacted me, they said, well, how did you come up with the figures? I said, sir, I didn't come up with the figures. I was able to borrow money from my family and the church to get a lawyer to help fight this. And he came up with the figures. I didn't come up with the figures. And when the case went to court, the judge in Richmond said, he felt that $I$ had proven enough for fraud and then told my lawyer to go back and figure up the damages. And he was the one that figured up the damages, but he took so long in figuring out what the damages was.

The next thing I know GMAC had filed bankruptcy, and I my lawyer said they filed bankruptcy. Then, he came to me and
said I can't represent you because I'm a Virginia lawyer, and this in the State of New York, which is a different bar association, which I understood. But Morrison \& Morrison never, Your Honor, sent -- I don't understand why they sent me -- I got paperwork yesterday or Saturday to be in court for today. I got paperwork on Friday, which was really Saturday morning for -- to be in court for today.

You see what I'm saying? And all my paperwork -- and I do apologize, and I thank your secretary, because I have not been treated fair even in getting my paperwork to give me ample time, knowing that I'm disabled, knowing that I'm handicapped and being able to even get someone to help me try to figure this mess out or what I'm supposed to do.

THE COURT: May I ask you --
MR. SATTERWHITE: Do you understand what I'm saying,
Your Honor?
THE COURT: May I ask you a few ques --
MR. SATTERWHITE: And --
THE COURT: Mr. Satterwhite, may I ask you --
MR. SATTERWHITE: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: -- a few questions? Are you still living in the property?

MR. SATTERWHITE: Yes, sir, I never left.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SATTERWHITE: Hello?

THE COURT: Yes, I'm here. I'm here.
MR. SATTERWHITE: Yes, sir. They sent somebody with a gun to tell me to get out, and I told -- I said, sir, I'm not going nowhere, so I went back to the court. And the judge here in Richmond told me I didn't have to get out. And because they filed bankruptcy, which he was getting ready to rule on the fraud, but because they filed bankruptcy, he can't rule because it's in bankruptcy court and it's still sitting here in Richmond waiting on what your decision is in the bankruptcy court. And then, I can go back for the fraud.

But that's how the case -- so then, when I went to court here, they said, no, you got to wait now because they filed bankruptcy.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SATTERWHITE: SO I'm, you know --
THE COURT: Anything else --
MR. SATTERWHITE: -- I just --
THE COURT: -- any --
MR. SATTERWHITE: -- trust and believe in God, and I'm thankful. But sir, this is what I risked my life for as a Green Beret to protect and serve this country on foreign and American soil. But they do not have the right to be above the law and then have expensive lawyers to hide under the law. And I appreciate everything. And that's just the truth, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Wishnew, do you want to add anything?

MR. WISHNEW: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. I'm going to enter a written order to the following effect. First, sustaining the objection of the quiet title claim.

What I mean by that, Mr. Satterwhite, one of the claims you've asserted is to the -- the legal terminology's quiet title to the property. But because the debtors nor the Trust have any interest in the property, that cause of action would fail.

With respect to your other claims, the breach of
covenant --
MR. SATTERWHITE: Can I ask a question, Your Honor?
THE COURT: No, let me finish and then I'll give you a chance.

MR. SATTERWHITE: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, I'm overruling the objection without prejudice. I'm not deciding at this stage whether --

MR. SATTERWHITE: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: -- a claim for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing would lie under Virginia law. And it's Virginia law that controls.

As the Court observed in some of my questioning
earlier of Mr. Wishnew, it does seem to me that the loan servicer's the agent of the noteholder and would have authority to enter into a forbearance agreement. That's -- Mr. Wishnew has basically acknowledged that to be the case. The facts alleged by Mr . Satterwhite would support the argument that he loan servicer, as agent for the noteholder, agreed to forbear and, instead of forbearing, three days later went forward with the foreclosure. And that could well support a claim for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Virginia law is unclear. Virginia law will control. I will defer an ultimate ruling on the breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim until we have an evidentiary hearing.

With respect to the fraud claim, there are two types of fraud that the Court has to consider: actual fraud, and the Court finds that there are disputed issues of fact as to whether GMAC acted with reckless disregard for the truth, assuming, for purposes of -- at this stage of the proceeding that Mr. Satterwhite's assertions of fact are correct that they told him they wouldn't foreclose if he got his HAMP loan modification application in within ten days, but three days later, they went ahead and foreclosed anyway. That would certainly support a claim for actual fraud.

With respect to the issue of whether the facts would also support a claim for constructive fraud, the Court is going
to defer ruling on that issue. I haven't been provided with authority about the one issue that bothers me. While ordinarily a loan servicer does not have a duty to the borrower, whether that would be true under Virginia law in a circumstance where the loan servicer affirmatively represented to the borrower that it would take certain action or not take certain action, whether that would give rise to a duty on the part of the loan servicer that would support a claim for constructive fraud, which essentially appears to be the equivalent of a claim for negligent misrepresentation.

MR. SATTERWHITE: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: At best, the Trust acknowledged that GMAC made a mistake. It clearly made a mistake. Mr. Satterwhite certainly alleges that it was a lot more than a simple mistake; that it was either actual fraud or constructive fraud. So it's going to be necessary for the Court to go forward with an evidentiary hearing.

In the circumstances here, Mr . Wishnew, I'm not going to issue a lengthy opinion. I'm going to simply enter an order and it'll refer to the record. I've sort of explained what's on my mind here.

Mr. Satterwhite, I think that -- what I would hope would happen is that you and Mr . Wishnew or one of his colleagues would try and engage in some further settlement discussions to see whether you can resolve this issue without
having to go forward with an evidentiary hearing. If we have to go forward --

MR. SATTERWHITE: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: -- with an evidentiary hearing, you're going to have to do that here. You're going to have to come to New York for that. I don't have --

MR. SATTERWHITE: Yes, sir, Your Honor.
THE COURT: -- trials with witnesses testifying by telephone.

MR. SATTERWHITE: Okay.
THE COURT: So you're living in Richmond, Virginia,
and --
MR. SATTERWHITE: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: -- I will ask you and Mr. Wishnew or one of his colleagues to discuss, if we have to go forward to an evidentiary hearing, that you confer and try to do this at a time that's convenient for you and the Trust and for the Court.

So you can talk to Mr. Wishnew or his colleagues about that. I really do hope --

MR. SATTERWHITE: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: -- that you'll see whether you can reach a resolution of this. I said earlier, Mr. Satterwhite, one of the big dollar items that you were seeking in your claim is punitive damages. It's just not available. I've determined -MR. SATTERWHITE: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: -- in a number of matters here, so the question is, what compensatory -- what actual damages can you establish? I'm not going to elaborate further on that. I'm -MR. SATTERWHITE: Yes, sir, I understand.

THE COURT: I didn't prepare to do that today. You ought to engage in some discussions with Mr. Wishnew or his colleagues.

Mr. Wishnew --
MR. SATTERWHITE: Yes. Can I ask you one more question --

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. SATTERWHITE: -- sir?
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Satterwhite.
MR. SATTERWHITE: I didn't understand where -- if Mr. Jeffrey Stephans (sic) had robosigned paperwork and the paperwork, which was notarized by Ms. Reinhart, which was in the Washington Post that he was indicted on and that the paperwork was robosigned, that he sent 10,000 loans to her, and she admitted that she stamped them and sent them back through the mail, then how could it be a legal foreclosure if the paperwork was bogus?

THE COURT: Let me address -- I -- and I had intended to address the issue of Mr . Jeffrey Stephan.

MR. SATTERWHITE: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: There're some -- a number of things that
are not clear, Mr. Wishnew, about the paperwork that supported the foreclosure. And that certainly would be an issue for the evidentiary hearing.

MR. SATTERWHITE: Yeah, all I'm saying, if he wasn't a valid --

THE COURT: Yeah, let me -- I'm collecting my thought. I have some more to say about it, Mr. Satterwhite. Okay?

MR. SATTERWHITE: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Just give me a second.
MR. SATTERWHITE: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: The Trust, for the first time, addressed the issue of robosigning in its reply, arguing that the allegations cannot be construed against the debtors because Stephan was acting in his capacity as a limited signatory on behalf of Bank of New York pursuant to a power of attorney. Mr . Satter -- because it was raised in the reply, Mr . Satterwhite didn't have an opportunity to respond to those arguments.

Additionally, the Court observes that the Trust's argument is not completely supported by the documentation provided. The Trust has not provided the copy of the power of attorney, instead, only relies on the signature page of the foreclosure deed as evidence that Stephan was not acting on behalf of any of the debtors. I actually looked yesterday. There are five of my opinions that refer to conduct by Mr.

Stephan -- five published opinions that refer to Mr. Stephan, so the Court's very familiar with Mr . Stephan.

Stephan's signature block reads, "limited signing officer of", and then there's -- it's illegible -- "LLC, attorney in fact, Residential Funding Company. Bank of New York is not an LLC and it's not a debtor. The document that the Trust provided doesn't provide sufficient evidence on whose behalf Stephan was signing. It can't be disputed that Stephan -- he was an employee of GMAC. He may have -- through MERS, have had authority in certain circumstances. Whether there was a power of attorney that gave him certain authority, that has not been provided to the Court.

So Mr. Satterwhite's quite correct that the proceeding with his claims, be they breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, either actual fraud or constructive fraud, one of the issues -- one of the factual issues on which -- let me be clear, the Trust is going to bear the burden of proof with respect to Mr . Stephan, not Mr . Satterwhite. The facts are within the Trust's control. Sufficient issues have been raised in other matters about Mr . Stephan's authority, what he signed. I don't know who the notary was. Was the notary -- did the notary actually see Stephan come and sign in her presence? I don't know. I don't have those facts.

But Mr. Satterwhite, thank you for raising the issue, because I did intend to address it. Go ahead --

MR. SATTERWHITE: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: -- Mr. Satterwhite. Anything else you want to add?

MR. SATTERWHITE: No, sir. Thank you. And God bless. I appreciate all your assistance --

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SATTERWHITE: -- and help.
THE COURT: Mr. Wishnew, this matter ought to be settled.

MR. WISHNEW: I recognize that, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. WISHNEW: I don't -- I recognize that.
If I can add just one point of clarification.
THE COURT: Let me just raise one other thing.
Mr. Satterwhite, you can proceed --
MR. SATTERWHITE: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: -- without a lawyer. That's certainly your prerogative. There are many lawyers who appear in this court who are not members of the New York bar. I've let them appear by telephone, and I've let them appear -- they have to -- if they come here, they have to -- there's an application they have to make. They don't have to be a member of the New York bar. I just -- what -- you're doing pretty well on your own. Let me just tell you, okay?

MR. SATTERWHITE: Thank you sir. God bless.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Wishnew, something you wanted to add before we finish the record on Satterwhite?

MR. WISHNEW: Yes, please, Your Honor.
With regards to the question about the Stephan signatures and the question about who he was signing for, I wanted to just make one point.

MR. SATTERWHITE: Yes.
MR. WISHNEW: So at Exhibit A to the Priore declaration in support of the reply, Your Honor mentioned that there's a -- it's Xed out, and there's a LLC afterwards, so it's not clear who Mr. Stephan's signing for. I would just note that, on the line underneath, it says Residential Funding Company, so it's intended to read, "Jeffrey Stephan, limited signing officer of Residential Funding Company, LLC, attorney in fact". And that same point is also repeated --

THE COURT: Are you saying Residential Funding Company was attorney in fact for Bank of New York?

MR. WISHNEW: As master servicer, which I think we've pointed out in our reply, yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, it's an open issue.
MR. WISHNEW: Okay. I just --
THE COURT: Be prepared --
MR. WISHNEW: I just want to --
THE COURT: Be prepared to put on evidence.
MR. WISHNEW: I recognize that, Your Honor. I just
want to make sure the record reflected --
THE COURT: That's fine. Okay.
MR. WISHNEW: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much, Mr .
Satterwhite. So you're excused, okay?
MR. SATTERWHITE: Thank you. God bless, sir.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
MR. WISHNEW: Your Honor, that brings us to item 4 on today's agenda, the eighty-second omnibus claims objection. I will turn the podium over to my colleague, Mr. Rosenbaum.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. ROSENBAUM: Your Honor, Norm Rosenbaum for the ResCap Borrower Claims Trust.

Your Honor, this is the Borrower Trust's eighty-second omnibus objection to claims, no liability borrower claims. It's filed at docket number 8042. It was filed on January 29th, 2015. Your Honor, through this objection, the Borrower Trust seeks to expunge eighteen proofs of claim that do not represent valid pre-petition claims against any of the debtors because they have not proven by a preponderance of the evidence any specific wrongdoing by any debtor.

The Borrower Trust has thoroughly examined the debtors' books and records in an effort to validate the accuracy of the allegations made in the responses in the claims at issue and determined that the books and records do not show
any liability owing to any of the respondents.
Responses to the objection were due on March 2nd. The Borrower Trust received four responses. We were planning on addressing three of them today. One is claim number 9060, filed by Michael Boyd, that's at docket number -- the responses were at docket numbers 8190 and 8191; claim number 1142, filed Steven [Rih'-gel] or [Re'-gal], that's at docket number -- his response is at docket number 8101; and claim number 4497, filed by Herold Gay, and that's at docket number 8188.

The Trust also received a response from a Mr. Dlin. He's a holder of claim number 3732, and that'll be addressed at the April 16th hearing.

I believe, at the outset of the hearing, Mr. Gay made an appearance. I don't think I heard appearances from anyone or individually on behalf of Mr. Boyd or Mr. Rigel.

THE COURT: Mr. Rigel, are you on the phone?
Mr. Boyd, are you on the phone?
Mr . Gay, are you on the phone?
MR. GAY: Yes, I am holding.
THE COURT: All right, thank you.
All right. So first, with respect to the fourteen uncontested claims, the objection's sustained.

MR. ROSENBAUM: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And as to Din -- Dlin, D-L-I-N, that's adjourned to April 16th.

Let's go forward with -- let's do Mr. Gay first since he's on the phone, okay?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Certainly, Your Honor.
Your Honor, we've outlined the --
THE COURT: Before you go ahead, Mr. Rigel, are you on the phone?

MR. RIGEL: I am.
THE COURT: All right. So Rigel is. So -- and it's
Ms. Gay? Am I correct about that?
MR. GAY: Mr. Gay.
THE COURT: Mr. Gay? Okay, thank you.
MR. GAY: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. We'll go forward and ahead with Mr. Gay's first, and then we'll do Mr. Rigel, okay?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Your Honor, we've outlined the facts surrounding this mortgage in the response. I think the sum and substance of it is, is that Mr. Gay's allegation and proof of claim and his response relates to the origination of the loan and allegations as to the interest rate and the note that he signed. None of the debtors were an originator of this loan. It was subsequently purchased and -- by debtor and assigned into a securitization, but we don't have any origination liability for this loan. And nothing in Mr. Gay's responses indicated otherwise.

I think Mr. Gay also has taken a position that -- as
other borrowers have and Your Court has ruled on, that through the effect of the plan and the confirmation order that his claim was allowed. Your Honor has refuted that in a couple of decisions.

If Your Honor has any question, I'm happy to -THE COURT: No, I don't.

MR. ROSENBAUM: -- address it.
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Gay.
MR. GAY: Yes. I'm confused to the origination. The note was purchased by GMAC. It was purchased by Homecoming Financial, which an affiliate with GMAC. So the origination of the loan from the start, in my opinion, it will be made to Homecoming Financial and GMAC.

THE COURT: Well, am I correct, Mr. --
MR. GAY: And --
THE COURT: Mr. Gay? Mr. Gay, am I correct that Trust One Mortgage Corporation originated the loan to you on May 17, 2006? Do you agree with that?

MR. GAY: Yes, sir, I do. That's correct.
THE COURT: And then, Residential Funding Company, LLC purchased the loan from Trust One and transferred its interest to E*Trade on May 20th, 2006. Do you agree with that?

MR. GAY: Yes, sir, I do.
THE COURT: And Homecoming serviced the loan from June 9th, 2006 to July 1, 2009, at which time servicing was
transferred to GMAC. Do you agree?
MR. GAY: Yes.
THE COURT: And then, GMAC transferred servicing to Ocwen on February 16th, 2013 as part of the transaction during the bankruptcy case. Agreed?

MR. GAY: Yeah, I agree.
THE COURT: So what -- in reading your claim, you're complaining about -- you assert that you were "forced into obtaining this high interest rate" home loan -- "home equity loan in 2006".

MR. GAY: Yes.
THE COURT: But none of the debtors -- they didn't originate the loan. So how -- why do you --

MR. GAY: This was, I think --
THE COURT: -- think you have a claim agai -- they acquired the loan and transferred it. But they didn't originate it. Your claim seems to relate to the origination. You're complaining that "The lender was fully aware of my inability to afford and repay this loan at such outrageous, extortionate interest rate of eleven percent, which was only designed to hinder my ability of ever repaying such loan."

So, what, the loan had an eleven-percent interest
rate?
MR. GAY: Yes. Your Honor, my question to you is, when the note is purchased, isn't all its servicing -- all the
servicing rights are purchased with it, all the rights of the loan, all the servicing when it's purchased, when it's sold, good or bad?

THE COURT: If you have a claim against --
MR. GAY: If there's a --
THE COURT: If you -- at this point, I don't think you have a claim anymore, if you ever had one. If you had a claim in connection with the origination, it would have been against Trust One Mortgage Corporation.

MR. GAY: Yes, my mortgage was -- they sold it immediately; they sold it immediately to the Residential mortgage, Homecoming Financial, and then to Ocwen -- no, to GMAC then to Ocwen.

THE COURT: All right. I understand your argument.
Anything else you want to add?
MR. GAY: When the note is purchased, Your Honor, isn't all the servicing rights -- isn't all the servicing rights are purchased by whoever owned the note?

THE COURT: Servicing is separate from ownership of the note, but -- any other argument you want to make?

MR. GAY: I'm just confused, you know, with the origination and the servicing --

THE COURT: All right.
MR. GAY: -- that's -- my point is I'm confused. It was purchased by GMAC.

THE COURT: It wasn't --
MR. GAY: And therefore, they come for your loan.
THE COURT: -- purchased by --
MR. GAY: I was making payments to Homecoming
Financial and GMAC.
THE COURT: Yeah, that's because they were servicing the loan at various times. They didn't own it.

All right. I'm going to take the matter under submission.

All right. I'm going to issue a written order or ruling, Mr. Gay.

MR. GAY: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.
All right.
MR. GAY: Thank you.
THE COURT: Let's do Rigel next.
MR. ROSENBAUM: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Rigel, you're there?
MR. RIGEL: I am, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. We'll let Mr. Rosenbaum argue first, and then I'll give you a chance to argue. This relates to claims number 1142.

MR. ROSENBAUM: Your Honor, the asserted basis for this claim is mortgage notes. The claim attaches miscellaneous documents that we referenced in our pleadings. Frankly, Your

Honor, we don't see any basis for this loan -- I think the -for the claim, excuse me. I mean, the applicable facts here is the loan was referred to foreclosure in May of 2012 . It was at that time owing for the March 1, 2012 payment. A foreclosure complaint was filed on January 3rd.

On January 7th, the debtors approved -- January 7th, 2013, the debtors approved Mr. Rigel for a trial HAMP modification plan, and the foreclosure was placed on hold at that time. Servicing was transferred to Ocwen, but we understand that Mr. Rigel completed the trial plan and was approved for a permanent HAMP modification on April 25th, 2013. And it's our understanding that the foreclosure file was closed at that time.

Mr. Rigel has not provided any documentation in support of his claim.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Rigel?
MR. RIGEL: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Tell me -- I'd like to know what your argument in support of your claim is.

MR. RIGEL: Well, getting back -- let me first start off by saying in regards to what the last gentleman, I believe I understand where he's coming from as far as that is concerned. These gentlemen here allege that they had no responsibility as far as the originating loan. However, my originating fee has Financial/GMAC directly on that paperwork.

THE COURT: Yes. I think --
MR. RIGEL: I would think --
THE COURT: -- I don't think they dispute this. The Homecomings Financial LLC originated a loan on October 9th, 2007 in the amount of 165,000 dollars. Do you agree with that, Mr. Rosenbaum?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. So that much -- and then GMAC Bank, which is not one of the debtors here, it purchased the loan from Homecomings and then it transferred the interest --

MR. RIGEL: Okay. If you'll let me finish.
THE COURT: -- to GMAC Mortgage and GMAC Mortgage --
MR. RIGEL: That was just -- that was --
THE COURT: -- transferred its interest to Freddie Mac on November 20th, 2007 but none of that gives rise to a claim. So that's what I mean --

MR. RIGEL: And I beg your pardon, sir, if you'd let me finish without interrupting, I'd appreciate it.

THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. RIGEL: Thank you. It does say there on the origina -- that was just the point I just wanted to point out. However, Your Honor, with my case here it's just been so -- it's just like these folks are playing the shell game or something. Hell, I don't even understand it anymore.

The bottom line is simply on -- in October of 2007 I
purchased this property with an appraisal of -- that this property was worth 165,000 dollars at the time of -- that I bought it. As we all know, then, around 2012 that's when the bubble broke and things started falling apart and this is where, you know, they came and they've proven that there was a lot of wrongdoings. And as a result of that, it turns out my property was only worth 112,000 dollars when I bought this -when I bought it but I was charged 165,000. They knew that. Now --

THE COURT: Who did you buy the prop --
MR. RIGEL: -- with all that being said --
THE COURT: Mr. Rigel, who'd you buy the property
from?
MR. RIGEL: With all that being said --
THE COURT: Mr. Rigel, who did you buy the property
from?
MR. RIGEL: I'm sorry.
THE COURT: Who did you buy the property from?
MR. RIGEL: Who did I buy the property from?
THE COURT: Yes, sir. Who did you buy the property
from?
MR. RIGEL: Home Financial/GMAC.
THE COURT: Mr. Rosenbaum?
MR. RIGEL: Okay. Now, with that said, now --
THE COURT: Did one of the debtors sell him the
property?
MR. RIGEL: -- so what happened, I didn't know that -- would you --

THE COURT: Mr. Rigel, stop.
MR. RIGEL: What?
THE COURT: You'll do it the way I want to do it so just be quiet until $I$ tell you to speak.

MR. RIGEL: Oh, I'm sorry; is this the judge?
THE COURT: Yes, it is.
MR. RIGEL: Oh, I'm sorry; I thought you were the lawyer and was, like, good Lord. Go ahead, sir.

THE COURT: Mr. Rosenbaum, did the debtors sell -- did one of the debtors sell him the property?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Your Honor, we have no knowledge of that. That's not our understanding. As we state in our pleadings and supported by Ms. Priore's declaration, it was a loan originated by Homecomings.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, Mr. Rigel.
MR. RIGEL: Okay. I'm sorry, sir.
And -- so when the housing bubble broke, it came out on the news that, you know, we could get relief because we were now under water. In my case it's around 50,000 dollars because of, you know, I was under water. I did not go into foreclosure until these folks put me into foreclosure. In other words, I was making all my payments and when I found that -- through the

TV and through the news media and everything else that we could get relief through what they called at the time a HAMP program, I called and originated for a HAMP program at which time they told me that four things, basically, would happen under this program and that would be -- I'd be relieved of the approximate 50,000 dollars that $I$ was under water, they would lower my monthly amount, they would forgive for five months of nonpayment and they would lower my points. So I went ahead and I opted to do the HAMP -- HAMP program.

Now, after I did all this, and they also told me, and that's the reason I went into foreclosure was just at that time they told me when you started this don't bother making your payments because when you're under this program here you don't have to worry about making these programs (sic) which is how I started -- which is how I got into the foreclosure mess because I missed payments because they told me, look, while this process is going on, you don't have to worry about making payments. So I didn't make the payments. And then they were in the foreclosure thing.

Now, once all this was resolved, about six months later, they give me this trial HAMP; I abided by it and everything like that, and the end result of the HAMP was absolutely nothing. My payments remained the same, 1,400 dollars a month; I was not given a relief for any of the monies that I was under water for; they did not lower my monthly
amount, it did remain the same; they did not forgive the five months of nonpayment; they didn't lower my points -- I'm sorry; that's the one thing they did do. The only thing that they did under this HAMP program was lower it from 6.25 to a 5.25 of which I'm still owing and they renewed it to where I now, after seven years of paying, I still now, under this program, they just -- I still have a 30-year mortgage. So anything and everything that I'm -- that I paid prior to this program was, basically, null and void.

THE COURT: Anything else?
MR. RIGEL: So and from there, I just -- you know, I just dealt with it and been making monthly payments ever since. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Rosenbaum, anything you want to add?

MR. ROSENBAUM: I don't have anything to add other than what's in our papers and supported by our declaration that he was -- Mr. Rigel was approved for the -- went into the trial HAMP modification in January and the subsequent trial mod and approval was through the subsequent servicer, Ocwen, so we can't really --

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. ROSENBAUM: -- address his issues with his
modification.
THE COURT: All right. I'm going to take it under submission.

Thank you, Mr. Rigel. I'll issue an order in due course.

MR. RIGEL: Thank you.
MR. ROSENBAUM: Your Honor, the only -- the remaining claim that we're addressing today on the eighty-second omnibus is the Boyd claim, Your Honor, and --

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. ROSENBAUM: -- I don't know if Your Honor has any questions.

THE COURT: Give me a second.
So what's the status of the petition for certiorari? Ninth Circuit ruled against Mr. Boyd. There's a petition for writ of certiorari.

MR. ROSENBAUM: He filed his petition of writ of certiorari.

THE COURT: I'm sorry?
MR. ROSENBAUM: He did file it. Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. ROSENBAUM: My understanding was timely.
THE COURT: And it's still pending.
MR. ROSENBAUM: It's pending.
THE COURT: Okay. And it's Cal -- and we're dealing with California State law claims.

MR. ROSENBAUM: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And my understanding is that the

California rule -- so you agree that for res judicata purposes, the state law claim, the law of the state where the claim arose applies?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So that's California law.
MR. ROSENBAUM: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And my understanding of California law is that it's not a final judgment as long as there's a cert petition pending. You disagree?

MR. ROSENBAUM: Well, Your Honor, we didn't cite cases specifically to res judicata, but we've cited cases in California law and generally that petition for cert does not affect the --

THE COURT: Federal. You have any cases that deal with a petition for certiorari?

MR. ROSENBAUM: I'm sorry, Your Honor, give me a minute.

THE COURT: The federal rule is that the petition for certiorari -- it's final without regard to what happens on a petition for certiorari but my understanding of the state law in California is it's not final.

MR. ROSENBAUM: Your Honor, we cited one case in our papers; Sacramento -- excuse me -- Sacramento County Department of Social Welfare v. Javier, In re Christy (sic) 187 Cal. App. 3d 753. It's a 1986 decision. And I quote, "It is" -- from
the decision, "It is immaterial that appellants have filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court" --

THE COURT: I'll go back and look at it. I'm going to take it under submission.

MR. ROSENBAUM: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I'll go back and look at it again.
MR. ROSENBAUM: Your Honor, I think there's one remaining matter.

THE COURT: Well, I see Mr. Bustos got here late.
MR. BUSTOS: Well, I apologize for being --
THE COURT: Well, just sit down. Go ahead, let's deal with the other -- we've got the Liquidating Trust motion to dismiss.

MR. WISHNEW: There's the -- right, that's the Heyward adversary proceeding, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. WISHNEW: But before we get there, there's one other matter for Mr . Philpot.

THE COURT: Okay. Yes.
MR. BUSTOS: Oh, I'm sorry.
THE COURT: All right. Is Mr. Philpot on the phone?
MR. WISHNEW: He's actually in the courtroom, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Oh. Come on up, Mr. Philpot. You've been
sitting there nice and patiently. $I$, obviously, didn't recognize you. So why don't you have a seat and then Mr. Wishnew will go first and then you'll have a chance to respond. Okay?

MR. WISHNEW: Thank you, Your Honor. Jordan Wishnew, Morrison \& Forester for the ResCap Borrower Claims Trust. We are moving forward with $V$, item 1 , the objection of the ResCap Borrower Claims Trust to claim number 5067 filed by Gwendell $L$. Philpot, filed at docket number 7760.

Mr. Philpot filed his response at docket number 8302 and the Borrower Trust filed its reply in further support of the objection at 5067.

In regards to this, there was declaration of Kathy Priore submitted in support. Ms. Priore's on the phone today.

Your Honor, what -- Mr. Philpot has filed a claim for a general unsecured claim of 630,000 dollars against, $I$ believe, GMAC Mortgage. And that damage -- those damages are made up of two elements: 280,000 dollars for hypothetical lost profits over a three-and-a-half-year period as well as 350,000 dollars of compensatory damages.

It is the Borrowers Trust's position that the claim is not valid and does not state a valid basis for liability, in the first instance because this claim arose prior to Mr. Philpot's Chapter 7 bankruptcy in Alabama was not included in his schedules and, therefore, he is judicially estopped from
bringing the claim now against the debtors when it should have been identified as part of his bankruptcy estate -- as part of the 2009 bankruptcy filing.

The second basis is regards to whether the claim even has any merit. And it's our position that, essentially, this claim amounts to $a, ~ I ~ g u e s s, ~ a ~ s e r i e s ~ o f ~ c o n s e q u e n t i a l ~ e v e n t s ~$ that followed a purported system error in terms of processing a payment on or about September 30th, 2008.

In his submissions to the Court, Mr. Philpot, essentially, acknowledges that he didn't try and make up the payment even though the debtors gave him that option.

THE COURT: His position, as I understand it, is that a lawyer advised him he didn't have to make any payments until the issue got resolved of that one payment in 2008.

MR. WISHNEW: I absolutely agree, Your Honor, and just to clarify, that lawyer was his lawyer. It was not --

THE COURT: Yes, I understand.
MR. WISHNEW: Okay.
THE COURT: His lawyer.
MR. WISHNEW: It was his lawyer. So it was not that there was any representation from GMAC Mortgage --

THE COURT: Right.
MR. WISHNEW: -- that oh, don't make the payments until we figure this out. This is advice he got from his own counsel --

THE COURT: He says.
MR. WISHNEW: -- in terms of resolving this. The fact of the matter is is that there were multiple ways Mr. Philpot could have made up the payments. He could have sent in a MoneyGram, he could have sent in a Western Union payment, he could have sent in a certified check, a cashier's check, a personal check. The fact of the --

THE COURT: Am I correct that the debtor agreed -when the dispute arose about whether the September payment was made in order to be processed properly, at some point the debtor agreed that it would accept the late payment and forego any late fees.

MR. WISHNEW: That's correct, Your Honor. And we reflect that it was paid within sixty days. According to Mr. Philpot and the advice he got from his counsel, that wasn't good enough.

THE COURT: I'm not -- we'll put aside what -- but the debtor -- it seems to be undisputed the debtor advised him that to resolve the dispute about whether the payment was correctly processed or not, the debtor would accept a late payment and waive any late fee.

MR. WISHNEW: That's correct, Your Honor.
So in essence, Your Honor, the Borrowers Trust's position is that this claim and the purported damages identified therein are really a result from Mr. Philpot's own
actions and not by anything that GMAC Mortgage did back in September 2008. And so from that regards, we believe their claim lacks merit and should be expunged.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Philpot, let me hear from you. MR. PHILPOT: My name is Gwendell Lloyd Philpot and this morning I filed a response against document 8360 and I ask that the response be added to this proceeding.

THE COURT: Mr. Philpot, it's an untimely response.
The time for all submissions has come and gone but just -- I'll listen to your argument but I'm not going to go back and read your additional submission.

MR. PHILPOT: Your Honor, may we adjourn this -THE COURT: No, we can't.

MR. PHILPOT: -- until some --
THE COURT: No.
MR. PHILPOT: -- other time?
THE COURT: When you come up here -- you live in
Alabama?
MR. PHILPOT: I came up, yes. I tried to get here yesterday but right after I got here, my health, I could not make it to here to --

THE COURT: Okay. All right. But go ahead; I want to hear your argument.

MR. PHILPOT: Okay. First of all, I ask the Court's indulgence to -- because of my health and I have eyesight and
hearing and speech, I did not use the telephone system because I knew that $I$ would not be able to understand the proceedings that were going on. I -- so that is why I came today.

The attorneys, Morrison \& Foerster, have been diligent in their administration in matters with me and $I$ have no issue against their process and -- but I do disagree with their findings in the writings that they have provided and in the response that $I$ filed this morning that is illuminated except for one error that I made but I'm assuming that I would correct that error after this proceeding.

THE COURT: You can do it right now on the record.
MR. PHILPOT: Okay. There's an assertion by the author of -- with attorney Morrison \& Foerster that the sixtyday allowance that the debtors gave was acceptable for me to make my record correct, and the problem with that is that within sixty days is not the same as prior to sixty days.

The issue was I had to make my payment prior to October the 1st, 2008 in order not to be sixty days late. And in fact, I did execute my payment by the servicer's pay-byphone processing system on the night of September the 30th, 2008 within that specific time.

The debtors have asserted that they would have made the provisions that -- and e-mails confirmed such to me that $I$ could make the payments within and they would have administered it as though it were within sixty days, but that was totally
against what actually happened.
I made the payment -- I executed the payment to be made in their system prior to the sixty days which would go on the record of being not sixty days late. That's a significant issue.

THE COURT: When's the last time you made a payment, Mr. Philpot?

MR. PHILPOT: That -- I executed that payment on September the 30th, 2008 --

THE COURT: And --
MR. PHILPOT: -- and the last payment that they recorded that I made was last day of August 2008.

THE COURT: Have you made any payments --
MR. PHILPOT: I have not.
THE COURT: Stop. Have you made any payments since September 30th, 2008?

MR. PHILPOT: No, I did not. And my position here is not based on the resulting situation that happened in regard to my home being foreclosed or losing that home because of subsequent failure to make payment. My position is strictly what transpired against me because I could not have the payment that I executed on September the 30th, 2008 actually recognized and received as such because I had ongoing negotiations with Jack Wright of Redstone Federal Credit Union and the Small Business Administration agent for a loan having gone back over
my credit history and the process by which I was trying to start -- continue -- not start, continue the development of an Alzheimer's caregiving system. I needed capital working funds in order to continue the development of that system to be introduced at the June Apple Developers Conference in 2009.

My document that I filed this morning have an error in page 3, paragraph 3, in the second line where I use the term "within" and it was my error but that specific word I meant to be "before" and should have been "before" and I did correct that now. But the -- I have a true credit report of -- in January the 28th, 2008 which I have and could be submitted to the Court that shows my pattern of payment not only to the note for this mortgage to Homecomings as being consistently thirty days late and not sixty days late.

THE COURT: May I ask you this? The debtor asserts in the papers they filed that you spoke to GMAC on October 9th, 2008 -- are you able to hear me okay?

MR. PHILPOT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Because I actually have a hearing
assist --
MR. PHILPOT: I don't need the hearing assist.
THE COURT: We have a hearing assist if you need it.
MR. PHILPOT: I don't need that; I just -- I can hear from this.

THE COURT: Okay. That's fine.

That you spoke -- did you speak with someone on October 9th, 2008?

MR. PHILPOT: Your Honor, I would have to look at my records --

THE COURT: Can you --
MR. PHILPOT: -- to determine but I can say that immediately on October the 1st, 2008, I e-mailed the servicing organization. As a matter of fact, $I$ am an industrial designer and an ergonomics engineer, quite some record having designed computer systems and I recognized on the night -- at midnight when their computer system failed that there was an issue that I needed to address immediately because I understood that -that there was a possibility that their computer system did not accurately provide and complete the transaction. And that happened at midnight.

THE COURT: Well, here's what $I$ want to focus on, Mr . Philpot. They've indicated that they spoke to you on October 9th, 2008, that you again requested that your payment be backdated -- just don't interrupt me -- September 30th, 2008, but that they told you that while the payment couldn't be backdated that if you made the payment within a few days, the debtors would amend your credit report to reflect that the payment was received within sixty days due to a voice recognition unit error. Were you told that? This is the point --

MR. PHILPOT: To claim -- that -- to claim -THE COURT: -- that's hanging me up. Let me explain. MR. PHILPOT: I understand.

THE COURT: Because their position is okay, here was this issue about whether you made the payment on September 30th, or you didn't, but they told you on October 9th, if you make the payment within a few days, the credit report will be amended to reflect that you made the payment but you didn't make the payment and you still haven't made a payment.

MR. PHILPOT: Your Honor, I never used the term "backdated." That's a term that the attorneys have used and was not my term and I never had any conversation about that process. What I asked was that the payment be actually credited to September the 30th when the error occurred and that my credit report not show within sixty days but prior to sixty days because --

THE COURT: You think you can go from 2008 until today without making a single payment and come in here --

MR. PHILPOT: I --
THE COURT: -- and argue when they told you get your payment in in a few days and we'll correct the credit report? MR. PHILPOT: I do not have --

THE COURT: I'm not that naive.
MR. PHILPOT: I do not have that house.
THE COURT: When did you lose the house?

MR. PHILPOT: In 2013. We didn't --
THE COURT: So you went from 2008 to 2013 and you didn't make a single payment and they told you if you get your payment in in a few days they'll correct the credit report; give me a break, Mr. Philpot.

MR. PHILPOT: Your Honor, if I could go through the correct history of this, your -- I understand your perception about the issues, but the surface is not -- doesn't provide the truth. The truth is that in 2007, and if I could enter my credit report it would show that $I$ was diligent in making not only the payments for this but other payments. And prior to 2012, we had a storm --

THE COURT: So do you think that the failure to have this payment recorded on September 30th, 2008 excused you from making any further payments and you're surprised that you lost the home in 2013?

MR. PHILPOT: I'm never surprised that I lost the home. And the issue about losing the home is not what I am here for. The issue about what I'm here for is that in my discussions with Jack Wright and my previous situation with my -- all of the records of my payment starting in 2007, agreeing with the servicing -- debtors that I would be thirty days late and that they would not foreclose to give me time to get things corrected.

We had storms in Alabama, tornados and storms that
seriously damaged this house. I filed with the Nationwide Insurance Company and that -- their processing of claims did not allow it to go forth in a timely manner and I used my funds to repair a great deal of the house to make sure it was properly cared for.

This was the home place of Federal Judge -- late Federal Judge Seybourn H. Lynne. It's an important historic facility and my wife and I had been diligent in trying to care for this home, make sure that it was handled properly. And if one may say, I've seen homes and experienced where people have trashed places and torn them up; counter to that, we've preserved this home.

During this time before 2013, I personally sanded and refinished -- after the 2008 , prior to 2013 -- I've sanded and refinished the hardwood floors in the home myself. I worked many, many hours of my own labor. I also diligently worked with Nationwide Insurance and the contractor to make sure there was a new roof placed on the house, that the house was put in good marketable -- excellent marketable condition prior to the time of 2013.

I believe my integrity, if one would look at the total history and the integrity of my wife and myself to be good responsible citizens and to be responsible with this particular property and those who had extended us a note and a mortgage to make sure that it was handled properly. But in 2007 after the
storm, I had an agreement with the servicing company to be thirty days late because of some situations that happened with my health as well as the storms and the funds that $I$ used for that.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this --
MR. PHILPOT: And the record would show that I -- I made those payments and that when I had the conversation with the Small Business Administration agents and several meetings and with Jack Wright, the officer with Redstone Federal Credit Union who also had a lien on the property that my Alzheimer's project was significant, but one important issue was the thirty days late was okay but I could not have another single event in my credit report of being sixty days late. And had they recorded that payment within sixty days, it would still show on my credit report of being sixty days late. And Jack Wright, after this event, after September the 30 th when $I$ met with him, he told me if you cannot get this corrected to show that it was made on September the 30th, you can't get the SBA loan and that's -- that is the whole -- whole issue that I'm --

THE COURT: You filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy on
February 3rd, 2009.
MR. PHILPOT: I did.
THE COURT: And you didn't schedule any claim against --

MR. PHILPOT: I had --

THE COURT: -- any of the debtors.
MR. PHILPOT: -- I did not understand that process. I have to say, I saw an attorney. By that time, our finances were practically wiped out. Everything that I had I had worked on the house.

And by the way, all the funds since that date, since 2009, since our bankruptcy was discharged in 2009 that have come from Nationwide have gone directly to the contractors for payment of materials and labor on that house. And so our -- my knowledge have been by the attorney that $I$ have who is now, for health reasons, I'm not quite sure, he's not practicing, but the clerk that worked for him, Tami Hinkle, is the one that $I$ had ninety percent of my conversations with in documenting everything. I've tried to do the best that I knew how. And she is incarcerated now for fraud in terms of legal matters for that firm.

I have tried and been to them to try to find what I could and talk with them. I can't; they're closed. I don't know anything else I can do with that particular situation but I can -- I do come before this Court and I do have information about my background as a designer and ability to not enter into a speculative arrangement but to actually provide a very consecrated detailed process with business advisors reviewing this during the fall of 2008 that showed that I had, as had been typical with my past of tremendously successful business
adventures and design for my clients and employers --
THE COURT: All right. Let me stop you there.
MR. PHILPOT: -- a good process and --
THE COURT: I'll tell you what I'm going to do. You have -- you indicate that you've submitted something else and my courtroom deputy told me that something else was received this morning and you have some additional documents that you want to provide. Have you given Mr. Wishnew a copy of what you have?

MR. WISHNEW: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Of the documents that he has with him now?
MR. WISHNEW: He provided me with his sur-reply this
morning if there's --
THE COURT: I mean, he has some additional documents.
Do you have something else?
MR. PHILPOT: I have things such as -- that I have not entered in yet.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. PHILPOT: I have two credit reports, I have --
THE COURT: All right. Here's what I'm going to do.
Leave that with Mr. Wishnew. Get it filed on ECF, Mr. Wishnew.
MR. WISHNEW: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. I will read what was filed this morning. It wasn't filed yet; that was why I hadn't seen it. I know we received it. I will review it. I will review what
additional material you have. I'm taking the matter under submission. I'll consider it all before I rule. Okay?

MR. PHILPOT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: So leave it with Mr. Wishnew. He'll make sure that it gets scanned and filed on the electronic case filing system.

MR. WISHNEW: And then we'll overnight the package back to Mr. Philpot.

THE COURT: And then you can send it back to him.
MR. WISHNEW: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay? All right, Mr. Philpot?
MR. PHILPOT: Certainly. And Your Honor, I appreciate this Court's indulgence --

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. PHILPOT: -- with me and the attorneys and their process in working to hopefully find the truth of this. And I understand their position that there should be no wrongful claims allowed under the Borrowers Trust.

THE COURT: You should -- I'm not ruling on it now but this issue of claims that you may have had that arose before your bankruptcy filing, this has come up many times already in this case and it has to be -- they have to be scheduled in your bankruptcy case. I'm not ruling now.

I will look at everything --
MR. PHILPOT: Right.

THE COURT: -- that we either received this morning. It'll get filed and Mr. Wishnew will make sure that the additional documents you want the Court to review, I will review it before I rule. Okay.

MR. PHILPOT: Your Honor, I did address those specific reports in that response --

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. PHILPOT: -- this morning.
THE COURT: I will read it all.
MR. PHILPOT: I will have to say that I have sought attorneys. After the bankruptcy 2009, I did go with an attorney firm Eyster \& Key (sic) which was Glynn Tubb and Nick Roth and we pursued the issue of MERS' failure in federal court and all of those cases were completely thrown out in the class action that was granted. Much of the problem that I did face after the bankruptcy that -- and the only reason I have cited those particular situations is to give some indication as to how the servicing company treated me during that process with callous indifference and a tremendous lack of communication between their internal departments such that my attorneys with Eyster \& Key (sic) had much difficulty as well.

Finally, we were able to get all communications to be channeled through the Alabama attorney Ceron \& Gramoot (ph.) between us with regards to this. So -- and after my bankruptcy and after our financial collapse that I contin -- started on

September the 30th, 2008. We were never in a position afterwards to do anything to recover such that we could have taken the house.

But I do ask this Court to recognize that we were diligent to make sure that this property was well cared for. It is a contributing structure to the national record of historic preservation for the Old Decatur-Bank Street Historic District (sic). And it's the -- the house was the home place of Honorable Seybourn H. Lynne, federal judge, which was a wonderful individual and had such a tremendous record in the State of Alabama especially in dealing with civil rights issues in the '60s. And we just feel that our honor-bound duty is to make sure that we were responsible to this and I believe that we were and all of what we have done we have lost practically everything --

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Philpot --
MR. PHILPOT: -- but God has blessed me --
THE COURT: -- I'm going to read everything but I
still have two other matters --
MR. PHILPOT: I'm sorry?
THE COURT: -- on this calendar that I've got to deal with so we're going to move on.

Thank you very much for your appearance.
MR. PHILPOT: Thank you, sir. Good day.
THE COURT: And, Mr. Wishnew, you just arrange to get
those additional documents and you'll send them back to him and get them filed. Okay?

MR. WISHNEW: Absolutely, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So is anyone here on Heyward v. GMAC
Mortgage? All right.
I have the Liquidating Trust motion to dismiss.
Pending before the Court is the ResCap Liquidating Trust motion to dismiss plaintiff's adversary complaint. It's filed at ECF number 15. It's case number 14-01778.

The Trust filed the declaration of Mr. Wishnew in support of the motion. It's Exhibit 2 to the motion. No opposition or objections were filed in the motion. The Court grants the motion.

There's a history -- I won't go through it all. Mr. Heyward twice sought to get a TRO against foreclosure of a Connecticut property from this Court. The Court denied the motion on both occasions when it arose.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41 (b) permits dismissal for failure to prosecute. In addition, the Court entered an additional procedures order in this case, an adversary proceed -- supplemental adversary procedures that were not followed by Mr. Heyward.

The record clearly establishes that Mr. Heyward has failed to follow on the orders entered by this Court in connection with the adversary proceeding, has not prosecuted
this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41 (b), and the Court dismisses the adversary proceeding for failure to prosecute.

For avoidance of doubt, the dismissal by the Court operates as an adjudication on the merits as is permitted by Rule 41 (b).

MR. WISHNEW: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Bustos came in very late. The Court already ruled, Mr. Bustos, but come up.

MR. BUSTOS: Your Honor, I'd like to make a statement.
THE COURT: Let me -- before you begin, Mr. Bustos -well, go ahead, Mr. Bustos, explain why you were so late today?

MR. BUSTOS: I was supposed to come in on a plane today at 6:30. For reasons in Arizona that really don't matter, I got onto another plane and got in today at 9:21 a.m.

As far as the actual case is concerned -- well, 1 moved everything to Arizona. I don't practice bankruptcy law. I just -- I can do certain --

THE COURT: Well, you didn't practice bankruptcy law the last time you were here, either.

MR. BUSTOS: No, no, but I can do simple petitions. But in terms of a complex case like this I think I went a little over my head, to be quite honest. I talked to my client about this. I asked him, I said maybe you'll be better served with another attorney. He keeps on insisting that I stay on.

I will not stay on as --
THE COURT: Well, you're not going to get out unless I let you out.

MR. BUSTOS: I understand but as an -- for an evidentiary hearing I really don't believe I'm the person.

I did get a phone call from Mr. Wishnew. He said he wanted to settle. If we could come to some sort of settle --

THE COURT: Well, I've already ruled. I'm going to tell you what my ruling is.

MR. BUSTOS: Okay.
THE COURT: I'm going to give you a chance to address it.

You're here on an order to show cause why the Court should not impose sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011.

MR. BUSTOS: Yes.
THE COURT: The order to show cause, which was entered on February 26th, 2014 incorporates by reference the memorandum opinion and order sustaining in part and overruling in part the ResCap Borrower Claims Trust objection to claims number 345 and 3743 filed by Conrad P. Burnett, Jr. That memorandum opinion and order is dated February 26th, 2014. It's incorporated into the order to show cause.

The order to show cause, among other things -- I'm not going to review the entire matter -- but on page 3 notes that
my opinion had addressed each of the eleven affirmative defenses that you asserted an opposition. In the memorandum -and I'll read from this paragraph of the order to show cause; I quoted it in the transcript earlier today in your absence, but it says, "Whereas in its opinion, the Court addressed each of the eleven affirmative defenses Bustos asserts in the opposition and found that the affirmative defenses are frivolous, untimely, unsubstantiated by the evidence in the record before the Court, and/or unsupported by current or applicable law, existing law, or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new laws," referring to the opinion at pages 16 through 20.

The order to show cause further goes on, "The Court further found that Bustos' arguments in the opposition appear to be entirely unsupported by the record and unsubstantiated by any meaningful legal research."

Did you do any -- did you, sir, do any legal research in connection with any of the eleven affirmative defenses that you asserted in your opposition?

MR. BUSTOS: Very little. I did it the best I could with the --

THE COURT: Well, did you do any -- tell me what research you did? You had a -- let me ask you this. You filed an affirmation of Pablo E. Bustos in support of dismissal of
sanctions motion.
MR. BUSTOS: Yes.
THE COURT: What you didn't do is, I required -- my order to show cause said on page 4, "Bustos' response shall address, as this Court has done in this order and in its opinion, each of the eleven affirmative defenses asserted in the opposition explaining why each asserted affirmative defense does not constitute a violation of Bankruptcy Rule 9011." And you didn't do that in your opposition. Do you agree?

MR. BUSTOS: No. I --
THE COURT: You don't agree or you agree?
MR. BUSTOS: No, I wouldn't say I addressed it. No, I -- no, I --

THE COURT: Are you acknowledging that you did not address in your opposition the merits of any of the eleven affirmative defenses that you asserted?

MR. BUSTOS: I agree with that. Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. In addition to your affirmation, there's a letter from your client --

MR. BUSTOS: Of -- oh, yes.
THE COURT: -- Mr. Burnett, and there's also a declaration of Dennis J. Huelbig, Jr. in support of dismissal of an order to show cause as to Attorney Pablo E. Bustos. Did Mr. Huelbig work for you?

MR. BUSTOS: No. I -- well, not now but I asked him
to call the Court to tell them that I couldn't come.
THE COURT: Was he your paralegal in New York?
MR. BUSTOS: He did paralegal work for me, yes. Like,
I --
THE COURT: You're not answering my question because Mr. Burnett's letter says, "I retained New Research Services out of Las Vegas, Nevada to create and process the claims and necessary paperwork."

MR. BUSTOS: Um-hum.
THE COURT: "This firm is a paralegal firm that claims to be familiar with federal bankruptcy procedure. New Research Services is owned and operated by one person; Dennis Huelbig, Jr."

MR. BUSTOS: That's true.
THE COURT: Is that correct?
MR. BUSTOS: That was way before me, though, before I was retained. I was retained after that. He worked with Huelbig for a long time and when he came to me and said Huelbig -- we'd have to sign a whole new retainer and he has to work directly with me. And if -- and if anything Huelbig did it would be as -- it's in the printed contract -- I asked him to call the Court --

THE COURT: Okay. So you're responsible for any legal arguments that were made in the opposition to the claim objection. Correct?

MR. BUSTOS: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. So why shouldn't -- let me tell you, what in your absence, I ruled earlier --

MR. BUSTOS: Okay.
THE COURT: -- and I'm going to give you a chance to address it.

I awarded sanctions in the amount of 1,000 dollars for the each of the eleven affirmative defenses that have -- are absolutely without merit. So that's 11,000 dollars. And in addition to that, because you didn't appear today and I had ordered you to -- and this part $I$ will take back, you came in late -- an additional 2,500 dollars for not appearing today.

MR. BUSTOS: Um-hum.
THE COURT: And then when it -- so that's 13,500. And then when we came to the case management conference on the adversary proceeding you filed for Mr. Heyward, you weren't here for that, that was an additional, 2,500. So with respect to the sanctions for not appearing, I'm retracting that earlier ruling. So that's a total of 5,000 dollars; 2,500 for failing to appear on the order to show cause and 2,500 for failing to appear on the adversary proceeding case management conference. Tell me -- explain to me why $I$ shouldn't sanction you 1,000 dollars for each of the frivolous eleven affirmative defenses you asserted? It required the Trust to address specifically and it required the Court to address each in its opinion. I'm
giving you a chance to respond.
MR. BUSTOS: Your Honor, that would require me to write, but -- in length; $I$ can't just on a whim address all of them. I could address the case in general.

THE COURT: No, no, no, no. The only claim -- look, the opinion that I filed sustained in part and overruled in part the Trust's objection to your client's claim. But the interesting thing to me is the only part that survived was the part that your client asserted without a lawyer; you didn't address it all. Your client was doing just fine on that one. Anything you added to it was frivolous, unsupported by law, and that's what I'm asking you to address. Okay. Why shouldn't I sanction you for the frivolous arguments not supported by any research or arguments or good-faith arguments based on case law? Why shouldn't I sanction you for that?

MR. BUSTOS: I can tell you what I believe, whether you agree or not, is that in the last appearance when $I$ appeared in front of you, everything went to shambles. I thought we were -- because I spoke to the attorney before that the attorney for -- I thought we were going to settle and then you kept on asking me these questions.

I believed that there was fraud, clearly, from GMAC; that was clear that my client had a good claim, and I didn't expect --

THE COURT: You think you can just throw stuff up
against the wall and hope something sticks with no legal support whatsoever? Your client, his claim goes forward as to one claim; that's explained in my opinion. The problem here is that you asserted eleven affirmative defenses --

MR. BUSTOS: Um-hum.
THE COURT: -- without absolutely no support in fact or in law or any argument for the good-faith extension of law and that's the portion that's covered by my order to show cause why you shouldn't be sanctioned.

MR. BUSTOS: Um-hum.
THE COURT: I'm going to give you one last chance to address the -- why you think I shouldn't impose monetary sanctions against you for making frivolous arguments.

MR. BUSTOS: Because the claim -- the case itself is not frivolous. It's not. He has a good claim, Mr. Burnett.

THE COURT: Do you think -- you think he has a good claim?

MR. BUSTOS: Yes. Yes, I do.
THE COURT: Okay. Do you think that entitles you to make any argument whatsoever?

MR. BUSTOS: No. No. And -- look, I do agree with you that I made mistakes. I believe it's excessive. I don't really even have 11,000 dollars so $I$ wouldn't -- I wouldn't even be able to pay it even if I wanted to.

THE COURT: You should have thought of that before you
filed frivolous --
MR. BUSTOS: I -- look, Your Honor, I agree. I
could -- if you want to impose some sanctions on me, I would think it's fair, but 11,000 dollars, that's just -- especially for a case I don't even want to be on. I told -- and I talked to Mr. Burnett about this and I've discussed it with him thoroughly. He keeps on insisting me being on it. I want to get off the case. I didn't want to fly in today for this. I --

THE COURT: So here's what --
MR. BUSTOS: -- and I never said I was -- I never said I was a bankruptcy attorney --

THE COURT: -- here's --
MR. BUSTOS: -- like, a specialist. I never said that.

THE COURT: Well, you don't have to be a bankruptcy specialist to know this: Rule $9011(b)$ provides a quote, "By presenting to the Court, whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating a petition, pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or an unrepresented party is certified that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances" --

MR. BUSTOS: That I agree with that.
THE COURT: I'm not finished reading it.

Subsection (2) of it is, "the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law."

MR. BUSTOS: Um-hum.
THE COURT: That's the portion I've addressed in the order to show cause and in my original opinion --

MR. BUSTOS: Um-hum.
THE COURT: -- and what you have not addressed. The one piece of your client's, Mr. Burnett's, claim that he asserted pro se has survived, but that's not what you addressed. That's not the problem I had with what you filed.

Whether you believe your client had a good claim or not, it doesn't entitle you to file eleven totally frivolous affirmative defenses. When I give you a chance to file an explanation for why you shouldn't be sanctioned for it, you don't even address it.

MR. BUSTOS: Your Honor, I didn't believe they were frivolous. Whether I made a complete and total mistake, that's another matter, but in fact, I should at least be allowed to address those on the merits given some time.

THE COURT: Right now. That -- look, I gave you a deadline for filing.

MR. BUSTOS: And --
THE COURT: You filed something. You didn't address
it there. I'm asking you right now, this is the time and place; it's not being continued to another date or another time. You have any case authority to support any of the eleven affirmative defenses that you asserted?

MR. BUSTOS: Off the top of my head no, I cannot. I cannot guarantee authority. I could say --

THE COURT: All right.
MR. BUSTOS: -- that I didn't believe they were
frivolous. I did the best I could --
THE COURT: All right.
MR. BUSTOS: -- on the time.
THE COURT: I'm taking the matter under submission.
So the one piece of it, so the record's clear, I am withdrawing my earlier award of sanctions for nonappearance either on the OSC or on the case management.

Mr . Bustos, you're counsel of record in an adversary proceeding you filed in this court. I'm not going to deal with the merits of it today. You better think long and hard before you decide what you're going to do. I think debtors' counsel's going to speak with you about it. If you decide to proceed with the adversary proceeding and they decide to make a motion for sanctions under Rule 9011, I'll consider it and rule on it if they comply with the rule. I'm not going to address it further today, but what remains on my docket is an adversary proceeding that you signed and filed.

MR. BUSTOS: Can I withdraw it, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Talk to Mr. Wishnew after. I'm not going to get into it beyond. Okay.

MR. BUSTOS: Okay. And as far as the sanctions, the 11,000, are those stayed? You said you were going to -- it's pending.

THE COURT: No. I'm going to -- I'm going to enter a written order. I'm going to think some more about what I'm going to do. You should have thought long and hard before you did what you did --

MR. BUSTOS: I mean --
THE COURT: -- and then not respond to the order to show cause.

MR. BUSTOS: I did respond to it; $I$ just didn't respond in the exact way that the Court instructed.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. We're adjourned.
MR. WISHNEW: Thank you for your time, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I'm sorry?
MR. WISHNEW: Thank you for your time.
THE COURT: Thank you.
(Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 12:32 PM)

I N D EX

RULINGS
PAGE LINE
Pablo E. Bustos, Esq. ordered to pay 13,500 11 dollars in sanctions (retracted)

Mr. Bustos ordered to pay 2,500 dollar 13
14
sanction for failure to appear in adversary proceeding pre-trial conference
(retracted)
ResCap Liquidating Trust's eighty-fourth 17
11
omnibus objection to claims sustained
Debtors' objection to the claim of quiet 51
title of Mr. Satterwhite sustained
Debtors' objection to claim of breach of 51
19
covenant of good faith and fair dealing by
Mr. Satterwhite overruled
Borrower Trust's seventy-second omnibus
61
Objection to fourteen uncontested claims
sustained
ResCap Liquidating Trust's motion to dismiss 93 Pg 107 of 126

I, Aliza Chodoff, certify that the foregoing transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

ALIZA CHODOFF
AAERT Certified Electronic Transcriber CET**D-634
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|  | 41:17;45:9 <br> acknowledged (3) <br> 44:21:52:4:53:1 | $\begin{gathered} \text { 61:4;73:5 } \\ \text { adequately (1) } \\ 9: 11 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 27:15;36:19;56:13; } \\ & \text { 60:19;65:4,8;73:12; } \\ & \text { 76:16;77:1;79:6; } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { alleges (3) } \\ & 32: 22 ; 33: 1 ; 53: 14 \\ & \text { allow (4) } \end{aligned}$ |
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| \#607 (1) | acknowledges (1) 77:10 <br> acknowledging (1) | $\begin{gathered} \text { adjourn (1) } \\ 79: 12 \end{gathered}$ | 80:6;81:1,21;87:24; | 15:8;16:3,1 |
| $4: 22$ |  |  |  | 80:14 |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Adjourned (4) } \\ & 3: 14 ; 15: 9 ; 61: 25 ; \\ & 105: 16 \end{aligned}$ | agenda (7) | 80:14 <br> allowed |
| \$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { acknowledging (1) } \\ & 97: 14 \end{aligned}$ |  | 7.8.11.22 |  |
| \$28,369.95 (1) | acquired $64: 16$ |  | agent (6) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 17:6,7;63:3;90:18; } \\ & 103: 20 \end{aligned}$ |
|  | 64:16 | adjudication (1) |  | 103:20 |
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March 31, 2015



