UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In the Matter of:
GARRETT MOTION INC., et al., Debtors. Main Case No. 20-12212-mew

October 23, 2020
3:00 PM

BEFORE:
HON. MICHAEL E. WILES
U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

Motion for One or More Orders (A) Authorizing and Approving Bid Procedures, (B) Authorizing and Approving the Stalking Horse Bid Protections, (C) Scheduling a Sale Hearing,
(D) Authorizing and Approving Assumption and Assignment Procedures, (E)

Approving Notice Procedures and (F) Granting Other Relief

Objection filed

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## PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Good afternoon, everybody.

Mr. Dietderich, do you have a follow-up report after Wednesday?

MR. DIETDERICH: I do, Your Honor. Thank you.
So Your Honor had a request of the debtor -- for the record it's Andy Dietderich, Sullivan \& Cromwell, Your Honor -that we make a fully informed business judgment that the KPS proposal was the best bid in hand and do so after engagement in discussions with the proponents of what I'll call the COH proposal.

We can proceed if the Court wishes. I don't have additional argument, but $I$ do have a short proffer on the corporate process conducted. Would Your Honor think that's appropriate?

THE COURT: Yes, please. Go ahead.
MR. DIETDERICH: Your Honor, management met promptly after the Wednesday hearing. Management scheduled a restructuring committee meeting for 11 a.m. Thursday and a full board meeting for 11 a.m. this morning. Management asked Morgan Stanley, Perella, and Sullivan and \& Cromwell to work with the proponents of the COH proposal to improve both its level of certainty and its financial merits. Mr. Deason of the company was identified to take the lead for management.

The deal advisors, the debtor advisors, reached out to
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the COH advisors with some initial questions on the COH proposal on Wednesday evening at 9 p.m. The deal advisors spoke, again, with the COH advisors Thursday morning at 9 a.m.

The restructuring subcommittee of the board met at 11 a.m. on Thursday for over ninety minutes. The focus of that meeting was on the COH proposal and specific questions and concerns of it.

At 2 p.m. on Thursday, yesterday, the debtor advisors had a session with the COH advisors to ask questions and communicate the restructuring subcommittee's concerns.

At 3 p.m. Eastern, the restructuring committee met again for over ninety minutes. The focus of this meeting was on the type of financial analysis the restructuring committee believed to be most useful. Matters discussed included distributable value per share to stockholders, total consideration to the estate, the detailed terms of the COH proposal, and potential benchmarking of convertible for stock transactions.

At 7 p.m. last night, the debtor advisors again spoke to the COH advisors.

At 2:30 a.m. Eastern today, a letter was received that modified certain terms, along with correspondence to the board.

At 11:15 this morning, Eastern, the full board met.
There was a quorum, but one director and member of the restructuring committee could not attend. His views had been
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discussed in advance. The start of the meeting was delayed by fifteen minutes to permit the chairman of the board and lead independent to take a call from Centerbridge and Oaktree at the request of those investors. The chairman of the board took that call to hear directly anything relevant that was not included in the various written correspondence.

The board then met. In deliberation, the following information was shared and reviewed: the statements of the Court on the record at Wednesday's hearing; the chronology of the negotiations and four separate conference calls for the COA stakeholders; the discussions of the restructuring committee meetings the day before; the concerns expressed to the COH advisors and the responses received; the letter with modified terms, including the offer of eighty-four million or $\$ 1.10$ per share in cash received overnight; an analysis of the financial merits of both the KPS and COH proposals for stockholders, assuming, Your Honor, that all conditions to closing were satisfied and all financing contingencies were removed; analysis of the total value of both proposals to the estate; analysis of deal conditionality; analysis of cost; analysis of other factors such as the investment opportunities to stockholders in both proposals; letters from Centerbridge, Oaktree, and Honeywell to the board of directors; the feedback from the call with the chairman and Centerbridge and Oaktree; and feedback from other stakeholders, including many
nonparticipating stockholders.

After approximately two hours of deliberations, the board then excluded management and advisors and discussed the matter in executive session. After the executive session, the board invited management and advisors to return and passed a number of resolutions. Those resolutions included authorization to continue to seek approval of KPS as the stalking horse bidder, to seek approval of the bidding procedures, and to seek approval of the stalking horse bid protection.

And they also included the following additional resolutions which I'd like to read. Resolve, that it is the view of the board that if the auction were held today and all conditions satisfied and all financing contingencies removed, the KPS transaction is financially superior to any other alternative at this time and would be the winning bid. Second resolve, that as part of the Court's supervised bidding process, management is authorized to continue active and collaborative discussions with the COH proponents and others in connection with continuing to improve their proposals as competitive alternatives to KPS.

That's my proffer, Your Honor. I'm happy to answer questions. Mr. Deason and Ms. Savage are also on the phone and would testify to these events.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. I
appreciate that.
Does anybody else have anything further they want to add?

MR. LEBLANC: Your Honor, it's Andrew Leblanc of Millbank on behalf of Centerbridge and Oaktree.

THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. LEBLANC: Thank you, Your Honor.
Your Honor, it's a little disappointing, obviously, to hear the outcome of that, but it's also surprising that this is the first that we're hearing of the outcome of the board's resolutions when, in fact, as Mr. Dietderich said, there was a call between principals at 10:45 this morning and apparently the board met at 11 o'clock. So we're surprised that the first we're hearing about it is when it's announced in open court.

But, Your Honor, what we understood to come out of the hearing on Friday was that there would be meaningful engagement with our clients. And I want to talk about two things, the substance of those engagements over the course of the last several days and the changes that we've made to the proposal that we made just so the Court and all the parties are aware of the changes that we made in response to objections that were raised by the debtors to our proposal on Wednesday.

Your Honor, just to update the Court on where we are with our proposal, as of today we continue to have the support of a majority of the shareholders of the company, the support
of Honeywell, the support of seventy-four -- over seventy-four percent of the holders of the senior notes. And as Your Honor knows, at least as of Wednesday, the UCC was also objecting to the eighty-four million dollars in bid protections that were sought by KPS. So our -- the support for our plan remains substantial. And the opposition of relief requested is even stronger, we believe, than it was on Wednesday.

But let me talk for a second in response to the proffer about the conduct of the engagement we've had with the debtors' advisors over the last two days. Mr. Dietderich is correct that there have been a number of calls and emails between the sides. But I think we think it's important to cut through the record-makings efforts and look at the substance of that engagement. So let me try to describe that engagement for you.

It is true that on the evening after the hearing, we were asked to provide items that the witness had testified to, Ms. Savage had testified to on Wednesday, including courses and uses, details on our debt financing efforts, and further explanations of our proposal with respect to the equity. That was the first time that our advisors had engaged at all with the debtors' advisors, the debtors' financial advisors, their lead banker.

With respect to the debt financing, Your Honor, we provided the company's advisors with the two highly confident
financing letters that we received from commercial banks. Subsequent to that, we've received a third that we've also provided to the debtors. We also made available in addition to our financial advisor our investment banker, Houlihan Advisors, working for Honeywell from TRS advisors and Centerview working with the Jones Day Group were also made available to the debtors' advisors.

The response we got, Your Honor, was not what we would have expected. It was not the kind of engagement that we've come to expect from bankruptcy professionals who are trying to get the best possible transaction from a debtor. Rather than engaging with us on how they valued our proposal versus the KPS proposal and where the gaps were, they asked questions of us of what we were proposing. Rather than telling us what changes they would need to make our proposal superior to the KPS proposal and to get them to not seek the reimbursement of the administrative expense of eighty-four million dollars today, they, again, just asked us questions about our proposal.

It became clear to us that it didn't appear as though they were looking to move to get us to be the best possible proposal for the company but instead just trying to create a record of the superficial engagement and create arguments that they could make to the Court today.

Your Honor, notwithstanding that lack of meaningful engagement, we did make change to our proposal really not in
response so much to what we've done over the last twenty-four hours or forty-eight hours, but really in response to the arguments that the debtors made to the Court on Wednesday. And we made these in a letter to the board overnight. Mr.

Dietderich is correct. It was at 2:30ish in the morning. And we made these proposals to the debtor, advising them that we would be prepared to proceed on this basis of the board agreed to work with us on our proposal and to not seek -- and if the Court did not approve the breakup fees.

And let me just quickly describe, Your Honor, the changes that we made. We filed on the docket at Exhibit -- at docket entry 270, we filed a letter -- the letter that we had sent. And these changes are detailed in there. And there really are three changes that we've made, Your Honor. The first is with respect to the series $A$ preferred that would be issued to the parties providing 1.1 billion dollars of new money funding to this company to fund its -- a bankruptcy plan and its emergence.

Mr. Dietderich had described that as a Pac-Man preferred, which we took to mean that if it was converted to a payment-in-kind dividend, that it could eat up all of the equity that would be available to equity holders. So in response to that concern, we've proposed to the board if our -if the breakup fee is not approved and the board engages on our proposal that we would provide that the only way that the
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dividends paid to the series A preferred could convert to a pick instrument would be the disinterested members of the board. So it would never be those that had an interest in that transaction electing to receive payment-in-kind. They would be paid in cash.

Second, Your Honor, we heard Mr. Dietderich complain on Wednesday that our series $A$ was not callable. So in response to that, we agreed that if the board engages on our proposal and the breakup fee is not approved, we would make the series A callable after six years.

In addition, Your Honor, to these changes, in response to arguments about the series $A$ preferred, we also made another significant change. And Mr. Dietderich referred in passing to this, but I think it's important to highlight what we did. And this was in response to the suggestion that our proposal didn't provide the nonparticipating minority shareholders sufficient value.

So we proposed to the board, again, if the breakup fee is not approved, that we would take the eighty-four million dollars that would otherwise go to KPS as an administrative expense and we would make that as a distribution to all shareholders. That represents -- Mr. Dietderich had said \$1.10. Our calculation is $\$ 1.11$ per share in a distribution to equity holders, whether they participate in the funding or not. And that just recognizes the simple reality that you have --
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and I'll talk about this more in just a moment -- you have two completing plans here, one that is entirely dependent on a litigation strategy to generate recoveries for equity and one that is not dependent on a litigation strategy. And so the cost savings that would be reflected from not having the litigation downpour that is expected from the debtors' plan and the KPS plan, that those savings would be provided to shareholders in the form of an eighty-four-million-dollar payment directly, in addition to them being able to keep their equity and share on any upside that comes from the -- comes from the company's operation.

Your Honor, we filed on the docket -- because we're doing this by Court Solutions and I couldn't simply hand this up, we filed on the docket as Exhibit -- at docket entry number 273 two demonstrative exhibits. Is it -- would Your Honor be okay if I just walked through a couple of points on these that were filed? I don't know if Your Honor has those available.

THE COURT: You'll have to hang on a second while I look it up.

MR. LEBLANC: Okay.
THE COURT: While I'm looking that up, Mr. Leblanc, what I heard the other day is the main objections -- to some extent I heard questions about the structuring of the preferred stock and whether that itself was good. But the main objection I heard was that the opportunity to buy it was being reserved
almost exclusively -- not exclusively but almost exclusively to Centerbridge, Oaktree, and a forty-percent group of shareholders, right?

MR. LEBLANC: Your Honor, that certainly is one of the objections that we heard. And what I would say to that is, Your Honor, that is -- that is -- the plan that we have is -it's not the opportunity to buy it as reserved to those shareholders. Those are the -- those are the entities that are agreeing to fund the debtors' bankruptcy plan. And so the new money funding is being provided by those entities.

But what I want to walk you through in our demonstratives is the effect of our plan is that it actually leaves in place the equity so that they're entitled to and permitted to share in the recoveries of the company as the company continues to operate. That is a wide contrast from the KPS plan --

THE COURT: How do you --
MR. LEBLANC: -- where those shares are extinguished.
THE COURT: -- their cooperation agreement though, that opportunity to buy that new preferred stock, has to be exclusively with your group. And your group has agreed to vote no against any competing process, right?

MR. LEBLANC: We have, Your Honor, for so long as that cooperation agreement remains in place. That's correct.

THE COURT: You know, the argument was made the other
day, and somebody referred to the Peabody case which I am familiar with, that while this is -- this exclusive opportunity is not in consideration of shares, but when it's an exclusive opportunity that's being reserved to people who hold a blocking position and when the entire hammer behind the proposal is that you have a blocking position and have agreed not to vote for anything else, how can you with a straight faced say that nothing about it is in consideration of your existing position?

MR. LEBLANC: Well, Your Honor, I actually argued Peabody at every level and lost, arguing against the proposal in Peabody. And I actually think that this is a lot different than what happened in Peabody. There, there was a private placement that was done that was done pursuant -- there were two forms, a private placement then a rights offering.

But, Your Honor, what didn't happen there -- that was a private placement done to acquire the entirety of the company. Equity didn't remain in place. It wasn't just a capital raise as part of the plan. It was instead to replace all existing classes of both creditors -- in that instance, we -- my client had subordinated claims -- and to eliminate the equity shares. That's very different than what's happening here.

We certainly -- and, Your Honor, we've only been doing this now for a handful of days. And we've certainly been taking phone calls from a number of people. And we're
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interested in talking to any holders that are interested in talking to us. And we'll continue to do so. But there's nothing -- I don't think there's anything surprising -- and I know Your Honor has dealt with this issue a number of times, including Pacific Drilling. But I don't think there's anything surprising about new money -- that the plan sponsors providing new money -- and what's unusual about this case is that the plan sponsors are providing new money in a way that preserves the value of the equity and retains the equity in place. And that's what I think is critical here.

And in an addition, with the change that we've made overnight, not only does the equity remain in place. It actually gets a distribution of eighty-four million dollars immediately -- more than a dollar per share immediately upon the effectiveness of the plan.

If you contrast that to the KPS proposal, the KPS proposal provides -- in our estimation, Your Honor, it provides no distribution to equity unless litigation against Honeywell or litigation with respect to the allocation between the U.S. entities in ASASCO is wildly successful in favor of the debtors.

MR. DIETDERICH: Your Honor, may I be --
MR. LEBLANC: And while that --
MR. DIETDERICH: May I be heard, Your Honor? This is Andy Dietderich, Sullivan \& Cromwell. May I be heard?

THE COURT: Let Mr. Leblanc finish, Mr. Dietderich.

MR. DIETDERICH: Okay. Thank You.

MR. LEBLANC: Your Honor, do you have the
demonstratives we filed?

THE COURT: I do.

MR. DIETDERICH: Okay. Your Honor, if you look at demonstrative 1, this is our effort to compare the two proposals. And I think what's important on this chart on demonstrative 1, what you can see is that on the right side, our plan proposal, every class is either resolved or settled, or in the case of -- resolved, settled, unimpaired, or, in the case of equity, reinstated.

If you look at the left side, the KPS proposal, you have the Honeywell claim which is impaired, the senior notes claim which are currently impaired, the equity which is extinguished subject to a litigation trust interest and replaced with a litigation trust interest, dependent upon the Honeywell recovery. And it -- what becomes clear when you compare these two, Your Honor, is the entirety of the recovery to equity under their plan as compared to ours is dependent upon the outcome of the Honeywell litigation.

In addition, Your Honor, we put into this charge, in this demonstrative Exhibit 1, the eighty-four million dollars of cash distributions that we've agreed to make as part of the proposal we made overnight.
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Now, Your Honor, if you look at Exhibit 2, demonstrative 2 , what we tried to do here is just to isolate the effect on equity alone from the two proposals. On the left side of Exhibit 2, what we've done here -- and the details are behind it in the appendix -- is calculate what the return to equity is. If all that happens under our plan is the company returns to its pre-pandemic level of EBITDA, the EBITDA it averaged from 2017 to 2019, in that instance, using just a -the same multiple we think would apply for its closest competitor, the result is something in the range of $\$ 6.28$ per share equity price. That includes the $\$ 1.11$ that's paid as part of the changed that we made overnight.

On the right side, Your Honor, there's -- the distribution -- the right side is the KPS purchase. Now, we have to make assumptions here because their purchase depends on -- any recovery to equity there depends on a determination that you can allocate between the U.S. and ASASCO entities. If you can't do that, then there's no distribution unless -- and you can see this in the fifth bullet -- unless you can knock out at least sixty-three percent of the Honeywell claims.

But given the resolution of the Honeywell claims that's reflected in our proposal, Your Honor, there's no circumstance under the KPS purchase transaction where equity holders could ever get a recovery equal to what they would get if the company returns to its pre-pandemic levels, the EBITDA
that they realized from 2017 to 2019. It simply can't get there. And the reason for that is their -- the KPS purchase doesn't allow the company -- the company shareholders, they're no longer sharing in the upside of the company. They are sharing instead in a litigation outcome that depends on the outcome of that Honeywell litigation.

And, Your Honor, I think it's -- the other development over the course of the last forty-eight hours is, of course, Your Honor heard the status conference yesterday with respect to the Honeywell litigation which, you know, as we understand it from the KPS proposal, is the linchpin of the debtors -- of the recovery expected to any equity holder. It did not appear to us -- now, we -- obviously, we're not participants in that. We were bystanders.

But it did not appear to us that the company was looking forward to moving that case quickly. As we understand it, they were looking to delay it, even the motion to dismiss, by months while they continued -- or began it seems like investigation into other claims. That does not look like an outcome that could ever be perceived as being preferable for equity holders.

So, Your Honor, we -- when we walked through this all -- the reason $I$ wanted to go through this is to identify for Your Honor the changes that -- both the changes that we have made and how we perceive our plan relative to theirs. And
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in our view, there is no meaningful difference. And we -there's no meaningful comparison between the two. And that, we think, Your Honor, is why a majority of the equity holders have already agreed to support our plan. And this is without -with, frankly, antagonism with the company rather than engagement. We think with engagement with the company, we could get to a plan that has overwhelming support in a very short period of time.

THE COURT: Who --

MR. LEBLANC: What will hinder that --

THE COURT: Who among --
MR. LEBLANC: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Who among the equity is siding with you who isn't also participating in this exclusive purchase opportunity?

MR. LEBLANC: Your Honor, I don't -- in fairness, I don't know the answer to -- I don't -- I don't know that there is anybody in our group at the moment who is not participating, who's not funding. But I would say at the same time, the people who are opposing it represent an exceedingly small percentage of the equity. Mr. Bennett I think I could probably speak more directly to that question in a moment, but $I$ think what's important to look at is just where things line up.

We believe -- and I don't know -- I don't know if Mr. Glenn has filed anything yet. I don't know what his position
is. But we know from Mr. Entwistle and from Mr. Rosen that their clients represent a couple of percent of the equity whereas the clients represented by Mr . Bennett and my clients represent a majority of the equity. And so we -- you're correct, but, Your Honor -- yes.

THE COURT: Therein lies -- therein lies the problem. You want this exclusive opportunity on the theory that it's not in consideration of your holdings, but it plainly is. Nobody wants to give it to you. Other shareholders don't want you have it. Nobody has explained to me any reason why it should be exclusive to you as a matter of common sense. The only reason for it is that you've otherwise got a blocking position. And so telling me that this isn't favored treatment in consideration of your large holdings in a particular class is naive it seems to me. That's --

MR. LEBLANC: Well --

THE COURT: -- exactly what it is.
MR. LEBLANC: Your Honor, and look, in fairness, I don't think we -- our plan is not out there for people to vote on at the moment. We'd love for that to be the case. We also have -- in addition to the cash that's being provided to nonparticipating creditors, we also -- there's an equal opportunity. And if you look at demonstrative 1 which is at docket 273, there's an opportunity in ours for shareholders to co-invest up to 100 million dollars side by side with us. So
that opportunity is provided to people. And again --
THE COURT: Why can't they share pro rata in the full amount of the preferred stock? What's the reason for that?

MR. LEBLANC: Your Honor, the reason is that the parties that are sponsoring the plan are not prepared to give up that level of economics. But again, we're more than happy to have an engagement.

I think what's important for today, Your Honor -- and this is the point I was about to make, Your Honor, is what's important for today is this opportunity, the opportunity that is represented by our proposal, exists today in the absence of an -- of saddling the estate with an eighty-four-million-dollar administrative expense. I can't say whether it will or will not be here in the future, but it's certainly -- the eighty-four-million-dollar payment to shareholders, that makes no sense if instead the company decides to proceed with a proposal that pays that eighty-four million dollars to KPS. That's what we're trying to avoid.

What we're trying to do, Your Honor, is to keep an even playing field so that we can try to go out and get -- and generate as much support so that when Your Honor is faced with a plan that has our structure in it and faced -- if there are objections at that time, that Your Honor can hear them and resolve them but that we're not saddling the estate with an eighty-four-million-dollar obligation. Because to be clear --
and I know Mr. Dunn made this point on Wednesday -- we are not afraid of competition. We are not afraid of somebody coming in with a truly higher and better bid that outbids us. We're not afraid of other people lining up to provide the funding. We're not afraid of any of that. What we do not want to have happen is the incurrence of an eighty-four-million-dollar liability that has to be overbid as an administrative expense in the event that Your Honor approves this term, the bid protection. So that's what we're trying to avoid, Your Honor.

I think what is clear, Your Honor, from what's happened over the course of this week really from last Friday when we made -- when we made our $13(d)$ filing, Your Honor does not need to approve bid protections in an eighty-four-milliondollar administrative expense to get people to come in and show an interest in this debtor. The interest is there. And if -and if the minority shareholders have an interest, we want to hear from them. If the debtors have ideas on how to improve it, we actually want to hear from them on how they want us to improve our plan, not just ask us questions about our plan. But that all is hindered, Your Honor, not enhanced, by approval of the bid protection.

And, so, Your Honor, I wanted -- the two things I wanted to do was really respond to the -- to Mr. Dietderich's description of how they engaged with us. I'll leave out -- we had some -- there were questions from them about how our board
was going to be composed, what the cost of our financing was, things that we think Your Honor had made clear on Wednesday were not questions that a seller should be asking that weren't really of their concern. But we've answered those questions as well to the best of our ability.

What we think is important here is that Your Honor allow for this competitive process to play out without putting a finger on the scale in favor of KPS which is exactly what we think we do.

Your Honor, you may be right that when we get to confirmation of our plan, you're going to demand that changes be made to our plan to make it confirmable if there are objections when we get to that point. We don't think it will. But what we're asking for is the opportunity to have that -have that debate, have that argument, have that fight when it comes. And by forcing through this bid procedures and these bid protections, we think you will hinder the ability to do that, Your Honor.

So unless Your Honor has any questions, I know there are others that will likely want to speak, but those are the issues we wanted to address to make sure Your Honor knew what our proposal was, knew what we thought of the engagement that we've had, and urge the Court not to approve the bid protections that are contained in the bid procedures order. We're all for a competitive process. We just want it to be
truly fair.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. LEBLANC: Unless Your Honor has any questions, I'm happy to -- that's all I had, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Dietderich, you wanted to respond?
MR. DIETDERICH: Your Honor, I did. I did very briefly really on two or three points.

In our proffer, we tried not to characterize the content of the discussions we had. We didn't decline to do that because we felt there was anything inappropriate about what we did. We declined to do that because, frankly, I just didn't want to get into a he-said, she-said. But I have to strongly disagree with the characterization of those discussions.

Your Honor admonished both sides, us and the other -the COH proponents, against making this adversarial or antagonistic at the Wednesday hearing. And we have tried really hard to take that into account. But the tactics employed are of -- the public bear hug with no consulting of us. And the continued making of proposals public rather than in discussions and negotiations with us have made things very difficult. And the mischaracterization of our discussions in public and on the record of the Court make full, frank, and honest discussions even more difficult.

I would like to describe just very briefly the eight
concerns -- actually, the seven concerns that we expressed to -- on the COH proposal. The first, we asked whether it could be competitive, in other words whether the no-shop could be removed from the coordination agreement. They declined. So I do not think they can say now they're in favor of a competitive process. They're in favor of a noncompetitive process based on the idea that because they own the company as stockholders, they should be entitled to investment.

Second, we asked if the M\&A bid, the bid from Centerbridge and Oaktree, to acquire a controlling equity interest for cash, if that was available without the linkage to the Honeywell settlement because that has put the estate in a very difficult position to have the litigation with Honeywell be linked to the bid of a specific M\&A bidder. We asked to delink that so we could look at the Centerbridge and Oaktree bid on its merits as a potential acquisition or potential investment

I don't mean to use the word "acquisition" as a color word. I don't think from the board's perspective when we look at these two transactions we see much of a financial difference or the question of sale or liquidation or plan. What's happening in either one is that someone is acquiring a majority of the voting control of the company, and the minority stockholders need to be treated fairly.

But the Centerbridge and Oaktree proposal, our second
concern was that it was linked to a Honeywell settlement that we believe is wildly move favorable to Honeywell than anything the estate would approve at this time.

The third concern we had is that their bid is also linked to a settlement with the bonds. In order to achieve the bondholders' support, their settlement, they informed us, was linked to the payment of a fifteen-million-dollar make-whole to the bonds that we don't believe as the estate currently we could justify on the record before us. That was the third concern was to delink the make-whole payment to the bonds.

The fourth concern was to cap advisory fees because their proposal includes five, six if you include the bondholder financial advisors -- six different banks and multiple law firms who requested reimbursement of expenses, including for the pre-petition period. We estimate that to be in the neighborhood -- although it's unclear because they would not agree to a cap, we estimate that probably to be between twenty-five and fifty million dollars which is payable in all circumstances without limit. So our fourth concern was to cap the advisory fees so that we could plug it into a financial model.

The next concern was Your Honor's. We asked if they would please proceed with a full rights offering to all stockholders. And we informed them we would be open to a customary backstop provision as long as the backstop parties
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were selected fairly and received reasonable compensation. As guidance, Your Honor, we gave them a standalone plan term sheet that the debtor circulated to Baupost, Cyrus, and Sessa on Friday, October 15th, the day before we received the surprised unsolicited bear hug, which provided for a standalone alternative proposed by the debtors with a broadly distributed rights offering open to all stockholders. We have never been afraid of an alternative plan or a standalone plan. We would love to have an alternative plan that was in the best interest of the company beat KPS by offering a full and fair investment opportunity to our own stockholders.

The next issue we raised was could this be straight common stock, please, and not novel income-bearing securities. And we don't care, Your Honor, about -- we took -- Your Honor is exactly right, that if we're selling the company and everyone is cashing out, it doesn't matter how much leverage the buyer has. But because we have stockholders who think our transaction might be undervalued, no matter what we do -- and that's good, believers in the company -- we want -- we think that the best transaction, the winning transaction here will not just have a night topline price but will have a real opportunity for investors who like the price to invest in the company. And that's why we're concerned about the capital structure of the future company.

And we've informed them based on our analysis that the
series A preferred stock is likely to be a trouble from a ratings perspective. And the series B preferred stock is likely to be viewed simply as debt from a ratings perspective. And that creates problems with exit financing.

And we've reviewed the three highly confident letters that they provided, one of which was not a highly confident letter, it said the bank was highly confident in their ability to do a deal with us, not with financing; the second which was a highly confident letter with a ratings assumption that we think was unrealistic. And only the third was really a highly confident letter. But they were just highly confident letters, subject to diligence and everything else.

And what we -- so our last point was to see if we could work with them to figure out how the financing condition works. And, Your Honor, in our board deliberations, we did not -- we regarded that, of course, as a fact to be considered. But when I recited earlier that we looked at the fairness of the transaction to the corporation, assuming that the financing condition has been satisfied, we actually set all that aside.

And we gave their proposal -- we assumed -- because there's real money behind this proposal. Centerbridge and Oaktree are serious investors. No one has a concern with selling to them. No one has a concern with them as future owners of the business. No one has a concern with their ability to execute. We would love them to join the competitive
auction. So we understand that they can bring financing to the table, and so we gave them the credit for that on the side-by-side analysis.

Those were the issues that we raised with them. And we raised those -- we initially highlighted them, and we raised those at the 2 p.m. meeting. We -- they refused to budge on those issues at the time, but we asked them to please consider. They then came back, and we said that we'll have a call later in the evening for feedback on those issues. They then came back with the following responses: They were not open to competition. Their deal, the M\&A deal, the Honeywell settlement, and the bonds settlement, were an integrated deal. The deal was a package, and we had to take it and assess it as a package. They were not willing to cap advisory fees. They were not willing to open the offer up to stockholders more broadly.

They were considering -- and this is useful. And this is very important actually. They were considering whether or not their deal could be toggled to a common stock deal and still preserve some kind of a settlement that would be acceptable to them and the estate and Honeywell. And that is a very, very welcomed idea. And so we appreciated that.

But they were not able to change the structure in time for our meeting today. Hopefully as we continue to work with them, they can move in that direction.

And then finally, they provided the contingent -- the improvement in financing and showing us highly confident letters. Again, those were all subject to diligence. But as I said, Your Honor, we gave them credit.

We then asked them, Your Honor, if they had a -- if they were going to make a revised proposal. They refused to say whether they were going to or not. We asked them if there was a possibility if they were going to make a revised proposal. They refused to tell us whether they would or wouldn't. We, of course, thought they might try it again before the hearing. It's how they've done it before. Every proposal, whether it's DIP financing or an M\&A proposal, has been done within a few days of one of Your Honor's hearings. So we assumed they'd do it again. And so we were prepared for their proposal. When it came in, we assessed that. We included it in the board decs, et cetera.

So I mention that only to make sure that Your Honor understands that we've tried hard as debtors to engage. And we will continue to try hard as debtors to engage. But it's very difficult when we have parties like KPS and the other parties in the data room who will engage with us as the debtors in conversations to have to structure things, with this group where we just receive things like an eighties tender offer, like an old bear hug in an eighties takeover context. It's not really conducive to being able to figure out how to do things
as the estate.
But from our perspective, everyone in the debtor team believes this, as the board does too, we would love if Centerbridge and Oaktree would begin a discussion with us as a bidder or capital provider -- I don't mean to use the color word "bidder" -- as a capital provider. We believe that whether it's a distribution or it's not a distribution, the price still needs to be fair. And we'd like to have the marketing process so we can establish it. But this is an auction. This is a marketing process in our view. And we will continue to look at standalone plan proposals that broadly distribute rights. We will continue to look at a solution that's driven by Centerbridge and Oaktree. We wish they would disassociate it from the Honeywell settlement. But even if they don't, we will look at that. And we will look at KPS.

But the last thing I want to respond to is actually the most important which is the accusation that we have a litigation strategy. We don't have a litigation strategy. This estate would like to fairly settle claims with Honeywell. We recognize it's an important part of the picture. We'd love to do that. But the box that they put us in with this coordination agreement is Honeywell is actually -- has never tried to have settlement discussions with us. But it is actually contractually committed itself to Centerbridge and Oaktree never to have settlement discussions with us and though

Centerbridge and Oaktree release Honeywell from that promise. So we are forced by that to have nothing but a litigation strategy, because if someone wants a settlement with Honeywell, that takes a golden key that is in the pocket only of Centerbridge and Oaktree.

So I think it's unfair to accuse us, the debtors, as a litigation strategy when Honeywell, Centerbridge, and Oaktree have arranged this public bid, this unsolicited public bid in a way, that forces us to use litigation to do anything other than sell the company to Centerbridge and Oaktree. We would like to have settlement discussions with Honeywell. We would like to have M\&A discussions with Centerbridge and Oaktree. And we would like as the estate to do the best possible job on each of those fronts for all of our constituencies. And we will continue to do so, taking the high road and trying to avoid being adversarial whenever we can. So thank you, Your Honor.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Your Honor --

MR. PFEIFFER: Your Honor, Brian Pfeiffer for the committee. May I be heard?

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Pfeiffer.
MR. PFEIFFER: Thank you, Your Honor.
Your Honor, I think I went into this on Wednesday.
But I think we are -- the creditors' committee is probably the only ones who are not fighting with anyone. We've got no -- we don't want to buy the company. We just -- we are -- we want to
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see competition. We want to see the best possible results. And there is just a lot of anger here.

And I think all of these accusations, this and that -and I'm not pointing a finger at either side, by the way. Just it's everywhere. And there's a flurry of letters coming in. It's all noise and not really relevant to the question that we've got right here.

The question we have is that very simple question which is should KPS get the breakup fee, get the eighty million dollars. And in order to do that, I think the one -- the key question here is you've got to have a determination on -- and I think, Your Honor, as I reflected back on the hearing, this was your very first question I think out of the box, which was which one is better, which one has more value. And we're not looking to make -- you don't have to make a decision on which one is better, but there is that notion that it wouldn't make any sense to create a floor if the floor has already been exceeded by another bid.

So the concept of paying eighty million dollars here should be -- and again, we, as the committee, don't have any problem with the notions of the auction, the timeline that has been put forth. But we -- what we come back to is this -- with all this chaos, we need to know before we sign up to this eighty million dollars that the bid that is getting the stalking horse protection is actually the highest bid as of
now. And again, there is that concern that if you pay out eighty million dollars today, does that in fact harm competition and that if -- there is concern that if -- I know that the -- on the Centerbridge-Honeywell side, there is no breakup fee. But if that eighty million dollars goes out, does it -- I think the -- I think that this was raised earlier, does that make this deal harder or does it make it fail? So again, to me, the question is just one real simple question, is KPS the highest and best bid sitting here right now, considering everything, considering all that you've heard.

And on terms of value, I think on Wednesday, I think debtors' counsel, what they suggested was that the value of the Centerbridge-Honeywell deal was 1.6 billion. We've gone back and talked to our financial advisors. And, frankly, we don't have a position to -- because, again, there's no evidence here as to value. But our view is that we have no idea how that number could possibly be the number. And this is significantly, significantly higher. And I think if you asked us right now, we would say it looks to us like the Centerbridge and Honeywell bid is a higher bid. Now, whether that's higher and better, I mean, look, that's what people would have to consider.

But I think what we're missing here is a firm understanding of -- on an evidentiary basis of what the value is. I mean, we're getting these letters being sent in all over
the place by one party or another. This one wants to own it; that one wants to own it. And that's all fine. But it seems to me that this is too big of a decision in this case and this is too much money at stake to be making it based on on-the-fly judgments.

And I appreciate Mr. Dietderich's comments that the board has determined that KPS is the higher and better bid.

And they -- he's very well -- the board may be right. But we, as the committee, at least just speaking for us -- and again, this was our -- been our position all along, is we just don't know there's no -- we don't have the evidence. We don't have the information to make -- to at least weight in with a thoughtful saying, yes, this makes sense. I mean, again, we want to get the maximum value. We want to have this be a healthy company coming out.

And so as we thought about it -- and again, I know that Your Honor is -- ultimately has a number of options in front of him. But just to put one on the table is there -- we could -- there could be a formulation wherein there's a very short adjournment maybe to next week where there is an evidentiary hearing where people can put on evidence instead of just letters and innuendo about what the comparative values are between the two bids so that we can make an informed decision --

THE COURT: We already did that --
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MR. PFEIFFER: -- as an estate.
THE COURT: We already did that on Wednesday, and nobody elected to put on any evidence. We had our --

MR. PFEIFFER: Well, in terms of -- well, I think that the question $I$ guess that was to the varying parties -- I didn't -- I don't know that that was -- thought that that the evidence that was put on -- and, Your Honor, look, ultimately it would seem to me that that wasn't ever put out as an option for folks. But you're right. This is your courtroom and -but I guess what I'm suggesting is even for the debtors, I don't know what evidence there is supporting their business judgment here other than that they say it's so.

Like the -- as I said, this -- the notion that the Centerbridge bid is worth 1.6 billion, again, I'm struggling -just the math doesn't really add up. And it would seem to me that in order to carry the burden, putting this out for a motion like this when you've got another alternative, it would -- from our perspective, just for the committee, I think what we would like to see -- and again, this is simply our suggested path forward, but the reason why we like it is that from a -- we're not asking -- we were originally asking for two weeks. And this is exactly what we were asking for. We weren't necessarily pickings sides here. We just wanted to have this be done thoughtfully.

And if we say we're going to kick this for a week and
the parties are going to actually put on evidence as to why their bid is better, to the extent that -- from a KPS standpoint -- and by the way, let me just step back because, again, there's a lot of the allegations and the noise. And from a committee's perspective, we've got two parties in terms of Centerbridge and Honeywell on the one side and KPs on the other side that are -- that we are thrilled with how they are behaving here. We are in a better position, much better position, than we were a couple of weeks ago. So none of this is in any way anything negative towards the bids or the actions of KPS or Centerbridge or Honeywell. I mean, they're -necessarily they're competing right now, and the estate is the beneficiary. This is a very good thing for creditors.

But what $I$ would say is if, in fact, KPS is the best bid here, kicking this hearing off for a few days so that there can be an evidentiary hearing that substantiates that should not be a reason for them to walk away. And again, we can't guarantee anything. And that's simply put I guess, and let me wrap it up here, Your Honor, is to say -- again from a committee perspective, we're actually very happy with how this is going. And we think that there's probably too much noise and too much animosity here. And what we'd like to see is the case to settle down.

And the last point is that, again, we view this is a very big decision. It's a lot of money at stake. And we would
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like to make sure before it gets made that we have all the facts in front of us. But with that, I'll stop my presentation. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't want to cut people off, but I also don't really need to hear reargument of things that we've already gone over at length. I understand everybody's position. So is there anybody else who wishes to speak?

MR. GLENN: Your Honor, it's Andrew Glenn, Kasowitz

Benson Torres LLP.
THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Glenn.
MR. GLENN: Good afternoon. I'll be very brief.
ON behalf of our clients who are much smaller
shareholders than the other groups that are before you but who believe their interest need to be protected, our position is this. This seems to be an ongoing process. And we heard that there were board deliberations that occurred literally right before this hearing.

So we're here today, I think as Mr. Pfeiffer indicated, essentially for an auction for the party who's going to be the stalking horse in this case. And the eighty-some-odd million dollars of breakup fee that would be paid to KPS represents, $I$ believe, a little less than, you know, forty percent of the current share price. And so ultimately shareholders are going to be the ones who are paying this fee.

It would seem to me that there's still an ongoing
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auction here, for better or worse. And until the parties have exhausted -- because I believe Centerbridge and Oaktree are willing to continue further discussions. And as Mr. Pfeiffer said, we don't really know because there are kind of apple and oranges bids, that an adjournment would be appropriate just so that we're all sure that we've exhausted this process. And whoever gets that breakup fee is the party that's entitled to it, if anyone. Thank you very much.

THE COURT: And what if KPS walks away if they don't get an approval?

MR. GLENN: Well, they're still on the hook for at least some period of time, but I understand the point. And we do want a competitive process.

THE COURT: Well, they're only on the hook for two more days.

MR. GLENN: Understood.
THE COURT: Sunday.
MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, may I be heard? This is Brian Rosen, Proskauer Rose.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. ROSEN: Thank you, sir. I realize that Mr. Glenn is new to the party and representing also equity shareholders. But as I indicated the other day, Your Honor, the payment of the breakup fee essentially comes out of the equity shareholders. And my clients, to avoid the risk of having KPS
walk away, are very much inclined to allow the breakup fee to be paid or at least to be approved at this time, Your Honor, in the event that there is a termination. We think that that is the only way to ensure the competitive process. And we urge the Court to go forward with the hearing today and not, excuse me, agree to any sort of delay in the overall process. Thank you, sir.

MR. ENTWISTLE: Your Honor, Andrew Entwistle on behalf of the Gabelli Funds, S. Luoio and several other funds who've reached to us. May $I$ be heard for a few moments?

THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. ENTWISTLE: Thank you, Your Honor.

I won't belabor the points, but $I$ think we've in a way come full circle to our arguments the other day. Your Honor pointed out that the core issue here was, 1 , whether a competitive process was necessary to protect all stakeholders, and then secondly, whether the breakup fee is appropriate and the reasonable exercise of the debtors' business judgment.

We've heard from the debtors that -- and the answer to both questions, the exercise of their business judgment is yes. And I think common sense suggests that it's yes.

But more importantly here, we've got a couple of things that suggests that the answer must absolutely be yes. First, with regard to the two proposals before the Court, one has a no-shop auction provision. And we heard from Mr.
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Dietderich that they asked that it be waived, and the consortium bid told them no. And the other, the KPS bid, is subject to overbid and a fully competitive process. So that argues loudly, I think, for -- in support of the KPS bid, leaving aside the issues of economics. And we've heard from the debtors that their bankers and advisors believe that the KPS bid is superior on that basis, although, granted, Mr . Leblanc made arguments to the contrary. But nevertheless, at the moment at least, it's the exercise of the debtors' business judgment that is really at issue.

I think secondly, there should be no question at this point to the extent that there was any question at the hearing the other day that the competitive process is working. And it's working because we have what amounts to a stalking horse bidder, although it hasn't yet been approved as such.

We saw a competitive bid from a consortium, an increase of 500 million by $K P S$, and then just earlier today an increase, albeit a contingent one, of eighty-four million dollars from the consortium, again, arguing loudly that we need a competitive process on a fair and level playing fields that, as Your Honor pointed out, is actually fair and level. And there really can't be any question here that a consortium bid is structured at -- in a blocking position and that it is highly unlikely that there will be a competitive process if we lose KPS in the process here in a stalking horse position.
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And two quick final points in that regard. One, you did hear Mr. Dietderich mention that there were open questions at best regarding whether or not the two bids stand in the same position in terms of full commitment. Clearly, the KPS bid is fully committed. The consortium bid is working toward that. And they may get there, but they're not there today. And as the Court is well aware, there really is an ocean between a bid that is fully committed and one that isn't. And that, again, causes great concern when we look at these bids and probably disqualifies the consortium bid from consideration.

And the last point I would make -- again, I think this is a point Your Honor made. We represent unaligned shareholders, that is shareholders that are not aligned with any proposal. We simply want to see the highest and best result at the end of the day through the sales and auction process. And the same is true for Mr. Rosen. And I assume the same may be true for Mr . Glenn and his clients. And there are legions of other shareholders out there. There are many on the phone. We've been contacted by a number of shareholders since the hearing.

And Your Honor hit the nail right on the head when you said that you've got one bid that is sort of -- provides a benefit to all and one that doesn't. We want to see a process where there's an opportunity for voices to be raised in favor at the end of the day of whatever bids come forward. And that
can't happen unless we have KPS as a stalking horse which, again, argues loudly for the reasonableness of the break fee which, of course, is not being paid today. We're simply agreeing that it will be approved today. And it only gets paid if someone comes in with a higher bid at the end of the day. And given where we are with these bids and the relatively small percentage, it clearly won't have a chilling effect on that. And I think Your Honor for your time, again, today as I did the other day at the hearing. Thank you.

MS. GREENBLATT: Your Honor, may I be heard --
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Your Honor --

MS. GREENBLATT: -- briefly? This is Nicole
Greenblatt for Honeywell.
THE COURT: Yes. Go ahead.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Go ahead.

MS. GREENBLATT: Thank you, Your Honor. And I'll be very brief.

I just want to -- obviously, Your Honor is being confronted with a lot of facts and circumstances and testimony being proffered from the stand. So I just want to focus us back on the legal standard of the break fee for today.

And I think there's a big point being missed. And I think Integrated Resources, which is the indisputable standard that the debtors have put forth for approving the breakup fee, is highly instructive because both in framing and applying the
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three-prong analysis for approval of bid protections, the court placed great weight on both the goal of driving towards a consensual plan of reorganization and the safeguards that need to be provided by the inclusion of creditor constituencies in negotiating what is meant to be a floor bid. And in that case, it was many estate fiduciaries who supported the development of a proposed plan of reorganization in that case in terms of consideration a breakup fee. The court, in fact, distinguished the bankruptcy standards, right, from a typical Revlon duty in connection with an auction and a sale.

And there's a lot of -- I raise this, Your Honor, just because we have the (audio interference) here in terms of those safeguards and protections. You have the overwhelming majority of stakeholders, including those that are most directly impacted by the incurrence of this expense, asking you not to approve this as necessary. And you have debtors who really have failed to demonstrate reasonable engagement with stakeholders on the development of a plan or even a desire to develop a plan. You've heard Mr. Dietderich characterize this many times.

The problem is, Judge, these objections by stakeholders are being mischaracterized as trying to thwart a competitive process. The no-shop and the cooperation agreement is not a people won't engage with the debtors or won't move forward with developing a consensual plan. It's that it's a
partnership with the desire to get to an endgame in these cases that maximizes distributable value and reduces administrative expense and accelerates the timeline to get recoveries into the hands of stakeholders. And again, Integrated Resources is instructive because it actually said in the case that the court may decline to approve a break fee if that fee seems to be part of a plan to thwart the efforts of an unwanted suitor for reasons unrelated to maximizing shareholder profit.

And here, Your Honor, we're in this bespoke situation where the unwanted suitor is being thwarted or -- in fact, the very stakeholders that the debtors are charged with maximizing value for. So $I$ recognize it's a strange dynamic, but $I$ just want to be clear, there's no objection to a competitive process. And I recognize that Honeywell has been painted as this litigious actor. We're not -- we didn't come into this courtroom to create litigation and create problems for everyone. We're responding to something that the debtor set up and put us to. And our interests are completely are aligned with equity, again, and focusing on those goals and maximizing distributable value and getting to an endgame. And we're happy to engage in a competitive process.

This is not about cycling competition or punishing the stalking horse bidder. In fact, Your Honor, we'd be comfortable providing some level of expense reimbursement to the stalking horse for its efforts to date. But an
eighty-four-million-dollar administrative imposition on junior stakeholders is just excessive on this record and in this fact pattern. In evaluating reasonableness, you can't look and think (audio interference) fee as a percentage of the deal as the debtors are suggesting. You have to look at the facts and circumstances, the bid history, the current dynamics, and whether the debtor will ultimately elect to sell its assets or pursue a plan of reorganization.

And a sixty-three-million break fee, especially one that's triggered not as Mr. Entwistle suggests but in a nonsale scenario because the debtors ultimately do elect to pursue a standalone plan supported by the majority of their stakeholders, just isn't necessary or reasonable. And the debtors certainly haven't met their burden to justify this. Thank you.

MR. RESNICK: Your Honor, this is Brian Resnick from Davis Polk on behalf of KPS. May I be heard?

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. RESNICK: Thank you, Your Honor.
Just to respond to a few of the points that have been made and also to reiterate our position from Wednesday which we stand by -- and I don't need to repeat everything we said, but I just wanted to reconfirm that we stand by it. First, to Mr. Leblanc's initial remarks, Your Honor, this is -- at 3 o'clock today was the first that we were hearing of this as well.
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We've had very, very little contact with the debtors since Wednesday and, in fact, did not even hear about the results from their deliberations until it was announced on the record today before Your Honor. So we were pleased to hear that they went through so much deliberation and did come out with we believe is the right answer here.

Mr. Leblanc criticized the debtor that they didn't appear that they were looking for them to be the best because they didn't go back to them and say what they needed for the COH bid to be the best. Your Honor, I think Mr. Dietderich accurately pointed out from what we can tell that that wasn't the case.

But also, I actually don't think -- didn't take Your Honor's directive from Wednesday as meaning that the debtor should be going back and forth and effectively conducting a forty-eight-hour mini-auction in order to try to get to the best and highest bid today. I think the debtors did exactly what they were being asked to do on Wednesday from what we could tell which is what we heard on the record today.

Your Honor, I would also note that $I$ think it's a little bit ironic that they -- the proposal -- that they had criticized our proposal as being unconfirmable when clearly I think theirs raises plenty of issues with confirmability. We don't have to go into that today, but it certainly is part of it.
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Additionally, Your Honor, with respect to the demonstratives, I don't think Your Honor needs to hear it from me today. But if it were relevant and you were taking that into account, there are certainly mischaracterizations of our proposal in there, most notable the 120 million dollars of cash that they think that KPS is getting, but it would actually go to shareholders under our proposal. And we would certainly take issue with several things, including the
3.9-billion-dollar enterprise valuation that they get from applying a 6.54 multiple to adjust in EBITDA from the last few years. We think that that's not the right way to look at it. What's really at issue here, Your Honor, is the debtor's business judgment. I have no doubt that what was presented to the board by Morgan Stanley and Perella and Sullivan involved a more accurate comparison of the two positions.

Just to hit a few other points, Your Honor, there's -I would reiterate that we do not share the view that their proposal is not a sale, that it's a -- it should be looked at as a reorganization and ours not. As a reminder, Your Honor, we did amend our deal to provide for 350 million dollars of equity to be available as co-investment to shareholders. And so our deal does actually provide for participation by stockholders, including at least 100 million that will be available in our rights offering. So that is part of our deal.

Initially, Your Honor, they note that they have the support of other members of the capital structure as well, including the bond. But what we heard from Mr. Dietderich here for the first time on the record today is that that appears to be because they've agreed to pay the bonds fifteen million dollars of a make-whole that the debtors have said is not supportable. So it's another example, Your Honor, of them -the COH bid referring to themselves as basically representing the constituents, but it seems to represent constituents who have been taken care of in the other transaction.

Your Honor, I think that brings me to Ms. Greenblatt's comments about the -- about the no -- we do see our bid as providing for a much better process in order to get the debtors to the best bid for the stakeholders. The bid procedures are very standard. And we think that the auction process set forth therein --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Now. You know --

MR. RESNICK: -- would maximize value.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: -- what I mean?

MR. RESNICK: I think somebody is off of mute.

And lastly, Your Honor, I just want to point out -and this is -- I don't believe it's going to be relevant because I imagine that on today's record, which we think is amply satisfied by the debtors, that the bid productions will be approved. But $I$ can't let it go unsaid because it's one of
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the things that has been used as a basis of comparison, is that the eighty-four million dollars would be administrative expense claims if approved today. That is true. But, Your Honor, our -- we would also reserve rights to assert an unsecured claim in the event that it wasn't approved today and the debtors were to terminate our bid and take an alternative one. That unsecured claim, at least under the COH bid as currently drafted, would be paid in full. So it -- so apples to apples, I think would need to be taken into accounts, but other parties may take different views of that. But $I$ just wanted to point that out so that our rights are reserved on that perspective.

And I think that just takes us back to, Your Honor, we reiterate that we stand by our bid. We believe that the auction process will yield the most value for the estate. And we look forward to participating in it if Your Honor approves the bid procedure and the bid protections set forth therein.

THE COURT: All right. Would any of the proponents of the Centerbridge-Oaktree proposal like to address the comment by Mr. Resnick that the breakup fee would be payable as an unsecured claim even if $I$ were not to approve it as an administrative claim?

MR. LEBLANC: Your Honor, it's Andrew Leblanc of Millbank on behalf of Centerbridge and Oaktree.

In fairness, Your Honor, I've not looked at that issue specifically, but $I$ suspect that we would certainly have
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defenses. I'm assuming if the debtors did the job they should have done, that they would have written it as something that had to be approved by the Court to be paid. But in fairness, I don't know. They hadn't raised that issue -- that argument before, so $I$ can't answer that question, Your Honor. I just -I haven't looked at the APA on that issue.

MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, this is Bruce Bennett for the shareholders represented by Jones Day.

We agree with Mr. Leblanc. Ordinarily it's -- the bidding procedures are contingent on Bankruptcy Court approval.

THE COURT: Mr. Dietderich?
MR. DIETDERICH: Your Honor, on that issue, $I$ think we have -- we have to reserve rights. We do not agree with the characterization of KPS. We think that that would be an issue where the debtor would certainly contest that at that point. But we do think it's not part of the Integrated Resources standard for today. And we would -- we believe that it would be supported, regardless of the outcome of the question.

THE COURT: Anybody else?
MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, this is Bruce Bennett.

I just have one point really. And that is that we've been hearing endlessly the idea that this is just an auction. And the effort is really to try to analogize this to a circumstance where everybody knows what they're bidding on, certain piece of property, and it's going to be easy to figure
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out who's winning and who's losing and the floor bid is really going to ensure success. And the problem here is that's just not true. And it's not true because the outcome under the KPS bid is entirely contingent on litigation results with Honeywell, entirely.

One of the reasons why our clients were motivated to make a deal is because we think that's a terrible direction for the case. It's really -- what you're being asked to do is to invest eighty-four million dollars to encourage litigation. That's what it is. And it'll be a terrible result for shareholders. And if it goes that way, I hope everyone has a scorecard and remembers how much money was spent really to just create a platform for more litigation as opposed to really looking at this as two competing plans where there may be confirmation problems with both. And Your Honor knows that confirmation problems have a tendency to go away as the process unfolds.

We don't get it as to why people think this is a clean auction and why it would be worthy eighty-four million dollars to protect a bid that can't go anywhere unless there's a lot of litigation and it all goes on way. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Anybody else?
MR. RESNICK: Your Honor, this is Brian Resnick again of Davis Polk.

Just to respond to one of the things that Mr. Bennett
said about this being competing plans here, I'd remind Your Honor that we are within the debtors' exclusivity period. And this seems to be what $1121(\mathrm{~b})$ is designed to prevent from happening thirty-one days into the case. And I know Mr. Dunn mentioned on Wednesday that the securities laws made them file the plan, but I don't believe that the securities laws made them sign the coordination agreement that triggered that obligation, nor do I believe that the securities laws provide an exemption from 1121 (b) of the Bankruptcy Code. And, of course, 1125 is also implicated. So I don't think Your Honor has to get into those things today.

But $I$ would note that, regardless of -- nobody's necessarily raising with Your Honor technical violations here of those provisions today, but I would say that I think that looking at this situation as competing plans is exactly what 1121 (b) and 1125 are designed to say is -- are not supposed to happen thirty-one days into the case during the debtors' exclusivity period.

MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, this is Bruce Bennett. May I be heard again on that?

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. BENNETT: I didn't say that the plans would necessarily have to be considered at the same time. And it may well be that they have to be considered seriatim. And if that happens, of course, the whole process will be more expensive.
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And maybe that's what some people want to see. But that's a separate -- entirely separate question.

What is remarkable about this case and what stimulated action at least by this group of shareholders I represent is a debtor that filed it and said we're liquidating which is what they said. And it was in -- it was printed. Now, they've backed away from that and said we misunderstood and it was really flexibility, but that's what the -- that's what was going on here.

And if it was really true that the only choice was liquidation, it would probably signal more sympathy for the idea of a breakup fee. All we showed, and now the debtor accepts it, is that liquidation was an improper conclusion or at least premature. Again, there's no escaping that this really isn't an auction that we're -- that the -- what's being asked here is to spend eighty-four million dollars to facilitate litigation and the debtor has to win all of it. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Is that it? Okay.

MR. DIETDERICH: Nothing.
THE COURT: Yes?

MR. DIETDERICH: Oh, nothing more for the debtor, Your

Honor. I was just confirming.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Here is my ruling: We had a hearing on Wednesday to consider the debtor's
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motion for approval of bidding procedures, approval of a stalking horse sale agreement, and approval of the bid protections in that stalking horse agreement. The bid protections consist of a breakup fee of eighty-three million dollars and reasonable expense reimbursements that are capped at twenty-one million dollars.

A competing, or at least different, proposal has been made by a group that is made up of Oaktree, Centerbridge, Honeywell, and certain existing shareholders. That proposal would involve a sale of new preferred stock, a settlement of litigation disputes with Honeywell, and unimpaired treatment of other creditors. Other existing stockholders would be left in place, though their rights to some extent would stand behind the new preferred stock obligations. That's a little bit of an oversimplification, but it's enough for now.

I explained on Wednesday that, although a number of other issues had been raised in the objections that had been (audio interference), most of those issues it seemed to me could be dealt with rather easily or had already been addressed and that the real agreement -- disagreements to be resolved were whether there should be a competitive process at all, and if there is going to be a competitive process, whether it should include the approval of the stalking horse agreement and bid protections.

Many interested parties have participated in the
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hearing on Wednesday and in the additional discussions today. And a lot of very strongly held views have been stated.

The debtors have argued that the stalking horse agreement should be approved and that bid protection should be approved. They have contended that the bid protections are necessary to bind KPS to its agreement and are an important part of fostering a competitive sale process or plan process. Some shareholders spoke up in favor of that view.

Other shareholders, joined by Honeywell and by Oaktree and Centerbridge, have argued that the only proper thing to do would be to abandon the sale process and to pursue the alternative proposal that they have made.

An ad hoc committee of senior noteholders has stated that the ad hoc committee opposes the approval of the bid protections and thinks that the Oaktree-Centerbridge proposal should be pursued.

The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors has opposed the approval of the bid protections but does not otherwise oppose the continuation of a competitive process and, in fact, seems to favor it.

KPS, the proposed stalking horse bidder, has said that it would walk away from the process if its negotiated bid protections are not approved. Others have questioned whether KPS would really do so, but at least that is KPS's stated position.

In the end, I did not really hear much serious dispute as to whether having the competitive process is good. At times the Centerbridge-Oaktree group argued against it but at other times said they were open to it and thought it was a healthy process.

And to me, the real question is do we lock up the stalking horse agreement and pay bid protections. While there was a lot of argument on these points, the only evidence that was submitted on these particular issues was the testimony by two witnesses, one of whom is the managing director at Morgan Stanley who was advising the debtors, and the other of whom is the debtors' chief financial officer.

Ms. Savage of Morgan Stanley is experienced in mergers and acquisitions. She testified that she believes the stalking horse agreement and bid protections should be approved. She said that she believes that they would be beneficial to the competitive process and that the benefits they would provide would exceed the potential eighty-four-million-dollar price tag. She noted that the sale proposal had already prompted a proposal from Centerbridge and Oaktree and that the Centerbridge-Oaktree proposal had in turn prompted an increase of the KPS bid of 500 million dollars, thereby showing the benefit of having two intensely interested competing groups in the process. She testified that she could not know whether KPS actually would walk away from the process if the bid
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protections were not approved but that it would have the right to do so and that she personally did not think that it was worth the risk.

Mr. Deason, the chief financial officer, similarly testified that he believed and that the debtors had determined that the approval of the stalking horse agreement and bid protections were the best way to ensure the best results from a competitive process and that the commitment was worthwhile.

Many parties raised questions on Wednesday as to
whether the debtors had really completely explored and considered the alternative proposal that had been made. I had some questions of my own in that regard. The deadline under the stalking horse agreement for the entry of an order approving bid procedures and bid protections is Sunday, October 26th (sic). And so I declined to enter an order on Wednesday.

I noted that $I$ do not usually approve a stalking horse agreement unless $I$ am confident that the debtors have determined that the agreement is the best option at the moment. And I therefore directed the debtors to negotiate with the parties behind the Centerbridge-Oaktree proposal to express their concerns and to see if those concerns could be addressed. I adjourned the hearing until 3 o'clock today and further directed that in advance of this hearing, the debtors were to consult with the committee or committees of directors who are handling this process and to report to the Court as to what the
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debtors' updated position is.
Debtors have reported today that they did have some further discussions, that the Centerbridge-Oaktree proposal was modified, and that the directors have met to discuss it. And after the conclusions of their discussions, the directors have resolved that they still believe that the stalking horse agreement should be approved and that the bid protections should be approved while at the same time agreeing that discussions should continue with the Centerbridge and Oaktree group.

I noted on Wednesday, and it's happened again today, that an awful lot of the discussion has devolved into a request that $I$ make a ruling today as to which proposal ultimately will be better even though, to some extent, the whole purpose of today is more to foster a competitive process rather than to nail down a single proposal that will be the single proposal that we go forward with.

There are aspects of the Centerbridge and Oaktree proposal that are very attractive, but there are problems too. While there has been a lot of talk about how it is supported by many constituents, to a large extent, the people who support it are the people who under that proposal would receive a favored benefit in the form of the sole opportunity to participate in the purchase of the new preferred stock, maybe not the sole opportunity but certainly the lion's share of that opportunity.

The debtors have expressed some concerns about that, and other shareholders have done so. And I expressed today my own concerns with that.

I'm left with a situation where I'm not really at all happy with my options. I've been urged to adjourn the decision and essentially play chicken with KPS as to whether it will walk or not. I've been urged to reject it, reject the KPS bidding protections, take the risk that KPS will go away in which case, as $I$ understand it, the debtors won't have any locked-in proposal. They could lock in the

Centerbridge-Oaktree proposal, but the terms of that lock-in would require that they abandon the competitive process as I understand it.

So if $I$ left KPS walk or take the risk that they walk, even if there's a competitive process, there's no baseline. There's a Centerbridge-Oaktree proposal that, from the debtors' point of view, isn't locked in unless the debtors join it. And we would be proceeding without kind of a floor that we often have in a sale process.

I'm convinced after hearing the evidence that, while there is substantial room for disagreement and reasonable people could differ, that the debtors have exercised reasonable business judgment in concluding that having a committed proposal that sets a baseline for the ongoing competition is beneficial to the process. And while the dollar amount is
quite large, once again, nobody has offered any evidence that the dollar amount is too large or unusual in a transaction of this kind. I've had argument that it's not worth it but no evidence that it's not worth it. The only evidence I have is that it is worth it.

I've heard argument that the bid protections would impede the process, and I don't find any support for that. It's a lot of money, but $I$ don't think it would impede the competitive process.

So while I wish that time permitted more, it doesn't. While I wish that certain aspects of the Centerbridge-Oaktree proposal were as exclusive or -- had other features that the debtors have raised at the moment, they do, it's quite obvious from what's happened so far that it's beneficial to everybody that the competition continue. I see no reason why the competition would end if I approve the KPS proposal. I see plenty of reason to be concerned whether it would continue with the same vigor if I were to disapprove the KPS stalking horse agreement and bid protections.

So for all those reasons, I will approve the motion. And the debtor should submit a proposed order.

MR. DIETDERICH: Thank you very much, Your Honor. We will do so.

THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything else for today? MR. DIETDERICH: No, Your Honor. That was the agenda.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. We are adjourned. IN UNISON: Thank you.
(Whereupon these proceedings were concluded)

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RULINGS:
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Motion authorizing and approving the 71

20
stalking horse bid protections is
granted.

I, Michael Drake, certify that the foregoing transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Michael Drake (CER-513, CET-513)
AAERT Certified Electronic Transcriber
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352 Seventh Ave., Suite \#604
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Date: October 26, 2020

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