1	11	S BANKRUPTCY COURT
2	DISTRICT	OF DELAWARE
3	IN RE:	. Chapter 11 . Case No. 21-10670 (KBO)
4	TECT AEROSPACE GROUP HOLDINGS, INC., et al.,	. case No. 21 10070 (NDO)
5	molbinos, inc., et al.,	. (Jointly Administered)
6		. 824 Market Street
7	Debtors.	. Wilmington, Delaware 19801
8		Wednesday, April 7, 2021 . 2:04 p.m.
9	TDANGCDIDT	OF ZOOM HEARING
10	BEFORE THE HONO	RABLE KAREN B. OWENS B BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
11		DIMMINOTICI OODGE
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(Proceedings commenced at 2:04 p.m.)

THE COURT: Good afternoon, Counsel. This is

Judge Owens. Nice to see you all. I welcome you to the

first day hearing in TECT Aerospace. I apologize for being a

little tardy, but I just signed off of another evidentiary

hearing. So glad I could squeeze you in today and, again,

it's good to see everybody.

Why don't I turn the podium over to counsel for the debtors and you can walk me through the first day hearing agenda.

MR. HEATH: Sure. Good afternoon, Judge Owens.
Can you hear me?

THE COURT: I can. Can you hear me?

MR. HEATH: I can. I just want to make sure. So, for the record, Paul Heath of Richards Layton & Finger on behalf of the debtors. It's nice to see you again and I hope you are well. Thank you for making time for us today for our first day hearing.

I'm pleased to report that we've spent a fair amount of time with Ms. Casey from the Office of the United States Trustee over the last couple of days and we have resolved all of her concerns and comments to the first day orders. So, other than questions that Your Honor may have, we hope that we're here on a fully-consensual basis today.

I'd like to start by making some brief

introductions. Joining us for the hearing today is Shaun 1 Martin of Winter Harbor. Mr. Martin is the debtors' chief 2 restructuring officer and the first day declarant. I can see 3 4 him on the video, Your Honor, I hope that you can. 5 THE COURT: I can see him as well. 6 MR. HEATH: Good. Additionally, David Burns of 7 Imperial Capital, the debtors' investment banker, is also in attendance. We have submitted the declaration of Mr. Burns 9 in support of the DIP. And I can see Mr. Burns too. Thank 10 you. 11 THE COURT: I can see you. Welcome, Mr. Burns. 12 MR. BURNS: Thank you, Your Honor. 13 MR. HEATH: Additionally, joining us from Richards Layton & Finger is Amanda Steele, Zach Shapiro, Chris De 14 15 Lillo, Travis Cuomo, and Garrett Eggen. 16 And then, finally, we have Al Smith of Perkins Coie and Ken Enos of Young Conaway, who are here on behalf of 17 18 the Boeing Corporation, who importantly for today's hearing is the debtors' DIP lender. 19 20 And of course, Your Honor, Ms. Casey needs no introduction. 21 22 I trust that Your Honor has had the opportunity to review the first day declaration and, specifically, the 23 24 detailed background information set forth therein. And I

don't want to belabor the record by reciting that

information, but there are a few details that I'd like to highlight.

First, the debtors make parts for airplanes. I think that's clear from our declaration. And, as you would expect, manufacturing an airplane is a complicated process and, like many of the suppliers to airplane manufacturers, the debtors play a critical role. Delay in receipt of the parts that we supply to a manufacturer can significantly disrupt the entire manufacturing process. And, as you would expect, this is a highly regulated industry and, given the high standards and exacting needs of the manufacturers, suppliers are not easily replaced.

Second, as the first day affidavit sets forth,
Boeing is a significant customer of the debtors, and that
part was probably not a surprise. Boeing is also our DIP
lender and, at first blush, that may seem unusual, but I'm
hopeful that some background can help the Court understand
how that came to be.

The debtors' capital structure is fairly straightforward, highlighted by a secured revolving and term loan credit agreement. Until February of 2021, the credit agreement was with PNC. In February, the loan agreement — the loan under the credit agreement was acquired by Boeing. Importantly, Boeing's acquisition of the loan allowed for critical additional borrowings under the credit agreement

that would not have been available otherwise. In short,
Boeing was willing to support the business and they continue
to demonstrate that willingness by providing the DIP.

And last, Your Honor, the past few years have presented some significant challenges for the debtors. They manufacture goods in a space that has been severely impacted by the pandemic and reduced production for certain of the planes that they make parts for. Notwithstanding those challenges, the debtors are hopeful that these cases will allow them the opportunity to maximize the value of their assets through a going-concern sale or sales.

The debtors had hoped to secure a stalking horse agreement prior to the bankruptcy filing, but we were unable to finalize the agreements before commencing these cases.

The debtors' professionals, however, are continuing their efforts and hope to finalize agreements in the short term.

Your Honor, we filed the declaration of Shaun

Martin in support of the first day motions. I would like to

move the declaration into evidence and offer it in support of

the relief requested. Mr. Martin is in attendance and

available for cross-examination.

THE COURT: Okay. Does anyone object to the admission of Mr. Martin's declaration today?

(No verbal response)

THE COURT: Okay. And, for housekeeping purposes,

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is there anyone that wishes to cross-examine Mr. Martin on
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    the substance of his declaration today?
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 3
          (No verbal response)
               THE COURT: Okay. All right, the declaration is
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    admitted.
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          (Declaration of Shaun Martin received in evidence)
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 7
               MR. HEATH: Thank you, Your Honor.
               Additionally, we have filed the declaration of
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 9
    David Burns of Imperial Capital, the debtors' investment
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    banker, in support of the DIP motion. Mr. Burns is in
    attendance and available for cross-examination.
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               THE COURT: Does anyone object to the admission of
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   Mr. Burns declaration in support of the DIP motion today?
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          (No verbal response)
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               THE COURT: Okay, I'm hearing no objections.
               Does anyone, for housekeeping matters, wish to
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    cross-examine Mr. Burns on the substance of his declaration
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    today?
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          (No verbal response)
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               THE COURT: Okay, all right. Well, the
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    declaration is admitted.
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          (Declaration of David Burns received in evidence)
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               THE COURT: And, both Mr. Martin and Mr. Burns,
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    you served your duties, so we won't expect to call you to the
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    witness stand.
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MR. HEATH: Thank you, Your Honor. That concludes my remarks, Your Honor. I'm happy to address any questions that you have, but if you're ready to proceed to the motions, I'll turn the Zoom podium over to my colleagues Garrett Eggen and Travis Cuomo, who are both very eager to present to the Court, and I thank Your Honor for giving them that opportunity.

all the pleadings in anticipation of today's hearing -- I should say, I have no significant questions. My only question to you is that I noticed in the description of the collateral package for the prepetition credit agreement with PNC, now held with Boeing, it mentioned that there was a lien on certain collateral of the debtors, you know, and listed off the receivables, inventory, certain equipment, fixtures. Is there any significant unencumbered assets of the debtors?

MR. HEATH: Your Honor, I think the only category of what would be unencumbered assets would include causes of action, including Chapter 5 causes of action. I think that the DIP order does provide for a lien on the proceeds of those causes of action upon entry of a final order.

And then there is -- there are other -- I won't call them garden variety, but other causes of action that could exist, including commercial tort claims, and I believe that the lien under the DIP, as collateral under the DIP

1 | loan, includes those causes of action immediately.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I really just wanted to know whether there's any substantial -- it sounds to me that the prepetition credit agreement was secured by a lien on substantially all of the debtors' assets, but it sounds like what you just confirmed.

MR. HEATH: That is true, Your Honor, with this note. The debtor leases its real property and leases much of its manufacturing equipment. We described that as the affiliated creditor agreements. So, yes, Judge, I think it's fair to say, understanding that those interests were not available to be liened up, that substantially all of the debtors' assets were subject to the lien under the prepetition credit agreement.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SMITH: And, Your Honor, excuse me, Al Smith for Boeing. Yes, we certainly would reaffirm that we think it is an all-assets secured loan with the exception of those Mr. Heath just mentioned.

THE COURT: Okay, great. Well, thank you for confirming that. I didn't glean it from the first day declaration, so I appreciate that confirmation.

And, with that, I'll let you turn over the podium to those at Richards Layton & Finger that want to present the first day pleadings. Who's up first?

MR. EGGEN: Good morning -- or good afternoon,
Your Honor, Garrett Eggen with Richards Layton & Finger,
proposed counsel to the debtors. Your Honor, I'll be
handling items number 9, 10, 11, and 12 on the agenda. The
first being item number 9, which is Docket Number 2, the
debtors' joint administration motion, which Your Honor
entered the order earlier today. We thank you for that, Your
Honor.

So, with that, I will move to item number 10, which is also Docket Number 6, the debtors' application to retain Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC as their claims and noticing agent.

The debtors filed a creditor matrix with over 200 creditors and, accordingly, the retention of a claims and noticing agent is required. The debtors solicited and received proposals from three approved firms and selected KCC based on its experience, its reputation, and its competitive pricing.

The debtors believe that the retention of KCC as a claims and noticing agent will help alleviate the administrative burden on both the Court and all parties in interest.

We'd like to thank Ms. Casey from the Office of the United States Trustee for her comments, which we have incorporated into the proposed form of order. Pursuant to Ms. Casey's comments, we added a sentence stating that the limitation of liability section of the engagement agreement is deemed to be of no effect pursuant to the order.

And, unless Your Honor has any questions, we would respectfully request that you enter the order.

THE COURT: Okay. Does anyone wish to be heard in connection with the application to retain KCC as claims agent?

(No verbal response)

THE COURT: Okay. I'm hearing nothing.

I had the opportunity to review the application, as well as the redline of the proposed order that you sent over to chambers prior to today's hearing that incorporates that comment from Ms. Casey. I have no questions or concerns of the relief requested, it's appropriate and warranted in this jurisdiction given the facts and circumstances, and I'll go ahead and enter that order shortly after the conclusion of today's hearing.

MR. EGGEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

Turning to the next item, which is item number 11, Docket Number 9, the debtors' taxes motion.

By the taxes motion, the debtors are seeking authority to pay \$31,500 in taxing obligations on an interim basis, and up to \$225,500 in taxing obligations on a final basis.

In the ordinary course of business, the debtors typically incur franchise and income taxes, sales and use taxes, property taxes, and certain fees. I wanted to highlight the fees paid to BSI Group America to maintain certification under the AS-9100 standard, given that this is sort of a unique thing.

The AS-9100 quality management standard is used in the aerospace industry to ensure compliance with certain regulations and, indeed, many aerospace manufacturing suppliers refuse to work with entities that are not certified under the standard. Your Honor, the debtors believe that paying the taxing obligations is necessary because failure to do so may result in penalties, liens imposed on the debtors' property, and an increase in the scope of secured and priority claims held by the taxing authorities.

Your Honor, we are unaware of any comments to the proposed order, which we uploaded in advance of today's hearing, and, unless Your Honor has any questions, we would respectfully request that you enter the order.

THE COURT: Okay. Does anyone wish to be heard in connection with the relief requested with respect to the taxes motion?

(No verbal response)

THE COURT: Okay, I'm not hearing anyone.

Similar to the KCC retention application, I had an

opportunity to review the motion, as well the relief requested. I see that there was a redline of the proposed order sent over to chambers that just makes non-substantive changes reflecting the second day hearing, which it seems as if you were able to obtain a date for that from my chambers of May 6th at 10:00 a.m., with an objection deadline of April 29th.

MR. EGGEN: That's correct.

THE COURT: That's acceptable to me and I have no questions or concerns with respect to the relief requested, it's customary and standard in this jurisdiction; and also, based on the facts and circumstances described in the first day declaration, I'm satisfied the debtors have met their burden to carry that which is required of Rule 6003; so I will go ahead and approve it, and enter the order after the conclusion of today's hearing.

MR. EGGEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

Turning to the final item that I'll be handling, that would be item number 12 on the agenda, which is Docket Number 10, the debtors' insurance motion.

Pursuant to the debtors' insurance motion, the debtors are seeking authority to maintain, continue, and renew their insurance policies and programs, including their premium financing agreement, and to pay their insurance obligations. Specifically, the debtors are seeking authority

to pay insurance obligations in an amount not to exceed \$75,000 in the interim period and not to exceed \$150,000 on a final basis.

The debtors have coverage under a standard set of insurance policies, including general liability, property, directors and officers' liability, and so on. These policies fall under two categories, the first being the insurance policies directly obtained by the debtors under which the debtors are the sole named insured, and second being the shared insurance policies and programs wherein the debtors and certain non-debtor affiliates are jointly covered.

With respect to those policies directly obtained by the debtors, the debtors either pay a premium based on a fixed rate directly to the insurer or the policies are financed by the premium financing agreement whereby the debtors directly pay the lenders thereunder.

With respect to the shared policies -- and this is touched upon a little bit more fully in the motion -- the debtors are part of the TECT family business and, as part of the structure, Glass Holdings LLC or certain non-debtor affiliates provide critical support to the debtors. This support includes Glass Holdings and certain non-debtor affiliates maintaining shared insurance policies and programs for the benefit of the debtors.

Sorry, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Take your time.

MR. EGGEN: Sorry. Each shared policy either jointly names the debtors and non-debtor affiliates covered thereunder as the insured or names the non-debtor affiliate as an insured, but the policy still provides necessary coverage for the debtors.

As alluded to earlier, the debtors and certain non-debtor affiliates finance a majority of their insurance policies, including both those directly obtained by the debtors and the shared insurance policies and programs.

With respect to the shared policies and programs, the debtors only pay an allocated portion of the payments due thereunder and such payments do not satisfy the insurance obligations of any non-debtor affiliate. This allocation is mostly based on the sales generated by the applicable insured; however, with respect to the property insurance policy, such allocation is based on the total insurable value of the applicable insured's property.

As of the petition date, approximately \$150,000 remains outstanding with respect to the premium financing agreement.

Your Honor, the debtors believe that the relief requested in the insurance motion is necessary for multiple reasons. As an initial matter, the debtors manufacture highly-specialized products in a highly-regulated industry,

which exposes them to potentially significant liabilities.

Accordingly, failure to maintain such insurance coverage could result in substantial personal liability to the detriment of the debtors and their estates. In addition, maintaining such insurance policies is required under the operating guidelines of the Office of the United States

Trustee, and certain applicable non-bankruptcy law mandates such coverage as well.

Your Honor, we're unaware of any comments to the proposed order that was uploaded prior to today's hearing and, unless Your Honor has any questions, we would respectfully request that you enter the order.

THE COURT: Okay. Does anyone wish to be heard in connection with the insurance motion?

(No verbal response)

THE COURT: Okay, I'm not hearing anyone.

Thank you for that recitation of the facts. I had the opportunity to review the insurance motion, but that was very helpful, and I have no questions or concerns.

I see that there's -- like you said, there's no substantive changes to the proposed form of order that was filed on the docket except for the insertion of the second day hearing and the associated objection deadline.

So, based on that, I will go ahead and enter the order following the conclusion of the hearing and find that

you've met your burden, including that of Rule 6003, today. 1 2 MR. EGGEN: Thank you, Your Honor. That's it for 3 I will now cede the virtual podium over to my colleague 4 Mr. Cuomo. 5 THE COURT: Excellent. All right, thank you, Mr. 6 Eggen. 7 MR. CUOMO: Thank you, Mr. Eggen. 8 Good afternoon, Your Honor. It's good to see you 9 again. 10 THE COURT: Good to see you too. 11 MR. CUOMO: For the record, Travis Cuomo from 12 Richards Layton & Finger on behalf of the debtors. 13 And I'll just keep moving down the agenda, and I'll be handling the utilities motion, as well as the 14 15 employee wages motion. So we'll start with the utilities 16 motion, which is Docket Number 4 and 13 on the agenda. 17 Your Honor, the debtors have approximately utility 18 companies that provide various services, including 19 telecommunications, water, gas, and electric services. What 20 we propose for purposes of the interim order is funding a 21 newly created, segregated account with an adequate assurance 22 deposit of just over \$110,000. We also have standard 23 procedures which would permit the utility companies to submit a request for additional assurance, and also procedures that 24 25 would allow for the debtors to remove, supplement, or

otherwise amend the list of utility companies.

And we did receive a few comments from the Trustee that have been incorporated in the form of order and I believe you have a blackline reflecting these changes, which I can walk through briefly.

In paragraph 5(e), we removed some language with respect to the additional assurance requests in order to track with the bankruptcy code.

And moving down to page 5 and paragraph 8, we added language which clarifies that this order must be served on any utility company that's added to the list for the order to apply to that company.

And a little lower in paragraph 11, there's similar clarifying language, which requires service to a utility company in order for the relief to apply.

And, lastly, you'll see we added a new paragraph 12, and this paragraph clarifies that the lender only has a lien on any reversionary interests in the utility deposit account that we've set up.

And, Your Honor, we believe this relief is necessary to avoid immediate and irreparable harm, and ask that this order be entered, but I'm happy to answer any questions if you have them.

THE COURT: I have no questions or concerns. It's all very standard and customary in this jurisdiction, and the

order conforms to the standard and customary relief that is commonly sought, especially with Ms. Casey's added comments.

So let me ask for the record, is there anyone else that wishes to be heard in connection with the utilities motion?

(No verbal response)

THE COURT: Okay. Well, with that, I will approve the order as proposed -- excuse me, as revised, not proposed, and find that the debtor has carried its burden necessary in connection with the motion, including that of Rule 6003.

MR. CUOMO: All right. Thank you, Your Honor.

So we'll move on to the employee wages motion, which is Docket Number 5 and number 14 on the agenda. And, pursuant to this motion, the debtors are requesting authority to continue paying employee wages and benefit obligations in the ordinary course, including the debtors' self-funded health benefit plans, which are all subject to an interim cap of \$2,049,500. And, Your Honor, the debtors have almost 400 employees who are critical to the debtors' operations, and to the debtors' ability to preserve and maximize the company's value.

The debtors don't believe any employees are above the statutory cap with respect to wages and benefits. I should note that there are some employees that would be above on account of paid time off, but that is not a current cash

obligation and we will not be paying that unless we're required to do so by law.

Additionally, there is one employee who recently left the company last Friday on April 2nd, who is above the cap with respect to paid time off and is required to be paid by Kansas law.

The debtors also utilize two independent contractors who provide LEED programming expertise for the debtors' machine shops and, as with the employees, the debtors do not seek authority to pay above the statutory cap.

In relation to the debtors' worker compensation programs, the debtors are requesting authority to lift the automatic stay of Section 362, which will allow workers' compensation claimants to proceed with their claims.

Additionally, the debtors have a severance plan in place, but currently no one -- none of their employees are owed any money, and we are not seeking authority to make any payments pursuant to this plan in the interim order.

The debtors do owe severance obligations to certain former employees pursuant to a retention program, which was related to the closing of their former facility in Kent, Washington. The debtors do not seek authority to pay such former employees in excess of the statutory cap. And, additionally, the debtors were not seeking relief to make any payments on an interim basis.

However, just this morning we were informed that the process for the debtors' next payroll has been initiated and that it inadvertently included payments for severance obligations to the former employees under the Kent facility retention program. These are all hourly employees and it totaled approximately \$34,000. Though the funds have not yet left the debtors' account, we've been told that the process cannot be reversed at this time. And so you'll see when we go through the blackline that we've revised the order to reflect this change that we will be seeking authority to pay these employees.

And if you have the blackline in front of you,

I'll run through the revisions we made, including comments
that we received from the UST.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CUOMO: In paragraph 2, you'll see first we just made a NIT, and then we had to adjust the amount due to the Kent facility payroll issue that we just discussed.

And moving down to page 4 and paragraph 7 and new paragraph 8, we've made the revision and added language to account for the Kent facility issue.

And then, lastly, in paragraph -- or new paragraph 9, we revised the language to clarify that no unpaid leave benefits will be paid unless required by applicable law.

And so, Your Honor, we believe the relief is

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How are you doing?

necessary to avoid immediate and irreparable harm, and ask that the order be entered, but are happy to answer any questions should you have them. THE COURT: Okay. Does anyone wish to be heard in 5 connection with the employee wage motion? 6 (No verbal response) 7 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm glad you were able to resolve the small severance issue with Ms. Casey and I'm glad that the U.S. Trustee's Office was able to accommodate you on that issue. I know that it's our normal course procedure 11 that we don't allow severance payments to be made in the 12 interim order, but the amounts are de minimis and, with Ms. 13 Casey's approval, I am fine with them as well. I think you met your burden with respect to the 14 15 remainder of the relief requested in the motion, including that of Rule 6003, and I'm happy to enter this revised 16 17 proposed form of order and will do so following the 18 conclusion of today's first day hearing. 19 MR. CUOMO: Thank you, Your Honor. So that 20 concludes my portion and I'll now cede the podium, the 21 virtual podium over to Mr. Chris De Lillo. 22 THE COURT: All right. Mr. De Lillo, how are you? MR. DE LILLO: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Good. 23

25 THE COURT: I'm doing well, thank you. MR. DE LILLO: Can you hear me okay?

THE COURT: I can, yes.

MR. DE LILLO: Great. So I'm presenting critical vendors, shippers, shared services, and the cash management motions. If it's okay with Your Honor, I propose to just take those in agenda order.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. DE LILLO: Turning first to critical vendors, which is filed at Docket Number 7. Your Honor, by this motion the debtors are seeking approval to pay three types of claims. First, prepetition claims of a limited set of vendors that are mission-critical to the debtors' operations; second, foreign vendors who may have limited familiarity and understanding of the bankruptcy code and its rights and protections; and, third, in the final order only, claims under Section 503(b)(9) of the bankruptcy code for goods received by the debtors within 20 days of the petition date.

The motion also seeks confirmation of administrative expense status for goods delivered after the petition date related to prepetition orders.

As discussed in Mr. Martin's declaration, the debtors operate in a specialized industry with a limited number of suppliers that are highly customized both to the debtors and to the debtors' paying customers' needs. Given the nature of the industry and the supply chain, to replace

some of these vendors could take up to a year or more in some instances.

The debtors and their advisers, in consultation with their DIP lender, worked very hard to narrow the list of critical vendors only to those that are truly essential, and we think we've done that.

Mr. Martin's declaration notes that the debtors have approximately \$35 million of unsecured trade debt as of the petition date; of that, the debtors are only seeking to pay \$1.8 million in the interim period to critical vendors and \$10,000 in the interim period to foreign vendors. On a final basis, the debtors seek to pay \$4.7 million to critical vendors, \$103,000 to foreign vendors, and \$1.3 million to 503(b)(9) claimants.

Your Honor, I'll note that from the version of the order filed with the motion we did reduce the interim cap from about \$2.35 million to \$1.8 million. That was in part due to comments from the United States Trustee. We did receive some other comments that are reflected in the redline sent to chambers prior to the hearing, and we believe we are resolving Ms. Casey on those.

I'm happy to answer any other questions Your Honor has. Otherwise, we would respectfully request entry of the proposed order granting the motion on an interim basis to avoid irreparable harm to the estates at this time.

THE COURT: Okay. Give me one opportunity to look at the redline.

(Pause)

THE COURT: Okay. I see that you omitted the ability of the debtors to make payments to affiliates or insiders pursuant to the interim order, as well as inserted the sort of standard language that the U.S. Trustee requests with respect to vendors who have executory contracts and that may be deemed critical vendors.

And, with that, I am prepared -- well, let me ask for the record, is there anyone that wishes to be heard in connection with the critical vendor motion?

(No verbal response)

THE COURT: Okay, I'm not hearing anyone.

This motion, as well as the next one, the shippers and lienholders, shares one thing, which is it is necessary to avoid disruption to the supply chain. This company is very similar in circumstance to many of the automotive companies that we often see and the supply chain here is extremely critical to the debtors' operations, but also, more importantly, the operations of the debtors' customers, including that of Boeing. So it's essential that this type of relief is entered and entered promptly.

So, with that, I am prepared to enter the interim order, and I will go ahead and do so following the conclusion

of today's hearing.

MR. DE LILLO: Thank you, Your Honor.

Turning next, as you noted, to shippers and lienholders, which is filed at Docket Number 8. The debtors utilize certain third party shipping companies to move their products in the ordinary course of business from their manufacturing facilities to their customers or from their own suppliers to the debtors' manufacturing facilities. Under state law, if the debtors were to fail to pay amounts owed to these shippers, they may assert statutory liens against their goods, hold them in transit, which would disrupt not only the debtors' operations, but also the operations of their customers.

The debtors also utilize certain technicians, material men, and other service providers that may similarly be able to assert liens under state law if they were not to be paid.

Accordingly, the debtors seek to pay the claims of these parties to prevent them from asserting liens on their products and their goods. In the interim period, we're only seeking to pay approximately \$55,000 to shippers and lienholders and, upon entry of a final order, to pay all claims in the ordinary course of business.

We did receive comments from the United States

Trustee, which mirrored those that were reflected in the

interim order for critical vendors, that is confirming that the debtors will not make payments to an affiliate or insider pursuant to the relief granted in the interim orders for shipping, and likewise changing certain language around seeking repayment or seeking relief to determine something is an improper post-petition transfer.

Unless Your Honor has any questions on this order, we would respectfully request entry of the order granting the motion on an interim basis to prevent irreparable harm to the estates.

THE COURT: Okay. Does anyone wish to be heard in connection with the shippers and lienholders motion?

(No verbal response)

THE COURT: Okay, I'm not hearing anyone.

For the reasons similarly stated with respect to the critical vendor motion, I am prepared to approve the relief requested here. I find it's necessary and important to achieve the outset of these cases, that Rule 6003 is implicated and that the findings -- excuse me, the bases -- the relief satisfies the requirements of Rule 6003. And, accordingly, I will go ahead and approve the order and have it entered as soon as possible.

MR. DE LILLO: Thank you, Your Honor.

Next up is the debtors' shared services motion, which was filed at Docket Number 11.

The debtors utilize certain other non-debtor affiliates to provide necessary administrative and back office support services, for which the debtors do not have their own personnel to provide those services. And the entity that does that is Office Support Services LLC. You may have heard some of my colleagues mention hold Glass Holdings LLC, they both share -- both the debtors and Office Support Services share common and direct ownership with Glass Holdings.

The services that OSS provides the debtors primarily relate to information technology, human resources, and treasury management. I believe Mr. Eggen also referenced that OSS arranges for premium financing for their insurance policies. All those services are captured by two agreements the debtors have with OSS, one is with debtor TECT Aerospace Holdings, LLC, which relates primarily to the debtors' Washington operations, and then the other is with TECT Aerospace Kansas Holdings, LLC, which, aptly named, relates to the debtors Kansas operations.

Debtors pay monthly fees to OSS for these services, which are based on annualized costs for the services that OSS provides. And I think it's important to note a few things with respect to this motion.

The debtors view this primarily as providing disclosure both to the Court and to parties in interest that

they intend to continue operating on a post-petition basis only with respect to these contracts. The debtors are not seeking to pay any prepetition claims of OSS pursuant to this motion, the debtors are not seeking at this time to assume the OSS agreements, and the debtors are not seeking to modify the status quo in any way or to have the Court bless these agreements. The proposed order contains no findings regarding the shared services or their value, and the proposed order does not bind any party in interest with respect to the OSS agreements, which the debtors understand are likely the subject of further discussions with interested parties.

We received no comments from the Office of the United States Trustee to the proposed form of order we did discuss with Ms. Casey.

Unless Your Honor has any questions, we would respectfully request entry of the proposed interim order at this time.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm just looking at the revised proposed form of order. It looks like it's just non-substantive changes with respect to the hearing date.

Let me ask, is there anyone who wishes to be heard in connection with the shared services motion?

(No verbal response)

THE COURT: Mr. Shapiro, I see you coming online,

but you're with RLF, so I know you don't have any comments.

Okay. Well, I have reviewed the motion and, I agree with you, it's relatively benign. And it's, in my view, an ordinary course transaction, but I appreciate the debtors filing the motion for -- I think you said out of an abundance of caution, but also as a matter of disclosure.

And I will note you're not seeking to assume the agreement or make any payments to OSS on account of prepetition debt.

I have no questions or concerns. The scope of the relief is limited, as I just described, and I'm prepared to enter the order and will do so at the conclusion of today's hearing.

MR. DE LILLO: Thank you, Your Honor.

Last up on my plate is the cash management motion, which is filed at Docket Number 3. By this motion, as is customary in other cash management motions, the debtors seek to continue using their prepetition cash management system; maintain their bank accounts; honor prepetition bank fees that may have accrued between the beginning of the month and the petition date related to the use of that system; and then also authority to continue certain intercompany transactions on a post-petition basis only in the ordinary course.

Regarding the cash management system, the debtors has utilized a pooled cash management system. All of their accounts are with PNC Bank. They were organized under their

prepetition revolving credit facility to maximize efficiency under that. There are collection accounts that draw in customer collections and that are swept daily to pay down the revolver. There is one master operating account that makes all wire and ACH disbursements, and then there are eight subdisbursement accounts that honor checks related to the debtors' various facilities or organizational units.

I'm happy to go into more depth, but at a high level the debtors seek to maintain the same structure with respect to their DIP facility on a post-petition basis -- or rather because the DIP lender is the same lender as was the prepetition lender, maintain the same control and operate on a post-petition basis in the same way.

Consistent with PNC's holding of the bank accounts, the debtors seek authority to honor fees owed to -the de minimis fees owed to PNC in the ordinary course. The debtors estimate as of the petition date there's approximately \$2500 in fees owed to PNC, which because PNC holds the bank accounts, it could assert setoff rights against those if unpaid.

Regarding the intercompany transactions sought by this motion, they are limited in scope. We are not seeking to generally continue all intercompany transactions, but as Your Honor probably noted from the diagram and from the description in the motion, all of the actual operating

accounts and disbursement accounts are held by Aerospace Holdings, LLC. Necessarily, according to that, each of the debtors transacts with each other by doing intercompany loans on a daily basis based on Aerospace Holdings bank accounts making all the disbursements through all the other debtors. Those are recorded as non-cash transfers that are recorded as intercompany loans and they reconcile -- the debtors reconcile those monthly.

The second type of intercompany transaction covered under the motion are parts orders in the ordinary course. From time to time, for example, the debtors' Park City, Kansas facility might need a part that the Washington facility has in stock, and the debtors would record that as an ordinary course purchase order. If it's between both Kansas facilities, the debtors would record that as a normal intercompany loan or intercompany transaction on a non-cash basis.

As between the debtors' non-debtor affiliates, the debtors would issue an ordinary course purchase order and transact on a cash basis with those.

The debtors do not seek to pay prepetition claims related to parts orders and only continue those on a postpetition basis.

The third category of intercompany transactions under the cash management motion is with the non-debtor

subsidiaries. The debtors have two wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries, one in the United Kingdom and one in Mexico. The Mexican subsidiary has been wound down and is simply waiting for final authority from the Mexican government to dissolve under Mexican law, and so there are certain de minimis consulting fees owed to a Mexican consulting firm, and those are the only transfers that occur to or on behalf of the Mexican subsidiary.

With respect to the United Kingdom, the debtors make monthly payroll payments to a United Kingdom consulting firm on behalf of the U.K. entity, and then quarterly and semi-annually the debtors make regulatory filings necessary to exist in the United Kingdom. And in consultation with the DIP lender, the debtors have included a cap in the order of \$30,000 per month for those payments.

We did receive a few comments from Ms. Casey regarding the proposed form of interim order, which we've incorporated and believe resolve her comments. And if Your Honor has that in front of you, I can walk through I think just one substantive change. It's in paragraph 6 at the top of page 4. And this is with respect to checks the debtors may seek to honor, it's only as authorized by an order of the Court. So if Your Honor authorizes the (indiscernible) seeking to honor and pay amounts as authorized.

Unless Your Honor has other questions, we would

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respectfully request entry of the proposed interim order granting the motion to allow the debtors to continue using their cash management system. THE COURT: Looking at that language, it seems to cover any payment that you want to make out of an account, even post-petition. It's pretty broad in scope. limited to just the prepetition, payments made on account of prepetition obligations? MR. DE LILLO: I'm sorry, Your Honor, I'm just reading it again. THE COURT: I just don't want you to run into difficulties (indiscernible) --MR. DE LILLO: If I'm understanding Your Honor correctly -- and perhaps we didn't consider this -- so -- and I think to the addition and with respect to prepetition claims, the concern is that it might apply to every postpetition amount which may not be pursuant to an order of the Court? Okay.

THE COURT: If you're fine with the language, I'm fine with the language. I just -- if you need further modifications in the final order, that's fine, and you can seek amendment if you think it will cause you any difficulties.

MR. DE LILLO: No, and I'll let Ms. Casey chime in if she disagrees, but I think we would propose to edit that

slightly to clarify that it's solely with respect to prepetition, any payments done prepetition obligations, that it's solely to the extent authorized by an order of the Court.

THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Casey, are you with us

today? Oh, there she is.

MS. CASEY: Yes, I am. Your Honor, the concern I had was that the original language was too broad the other direction, allowing any prepetition amounts to be paid even if it wasn't approved by the Court. So I think that appropriate language can be crafted to address both issues.

THE COURT: Okay, okay. Well, is there anyone else that wishes to be heard in connection with the debtors' cash management motion and the interim order?

(No verbal response)

THE COURT: Okay, I'm not hearing anything.

The relief that you request is customary. I appreciate the disclosures with respect to the various intercompany transfers or loans, as well as the limitation that you've placed upon yourself with respect to the U.K. affiliate that's been represented in the cash management motion. I'm prepared to enter the relief as requested, however I do agree that you should tweak that language so you don't run into some technical difficulties post-petition. And if you're able to do that -- or when you're able to do

- that, go ahead and submit it under certification of counsel,
 and I will review it and enter it as soon as possible,
 hopefully.

 MR. DE LILLO: Will do. Thank you very much, Your
 Honor.
 - With that, I will cede the floor to Mr. Shapiro, who will handle the DIP motion.

- THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Shapiro, how are you?

 MR. SHAPIRO: Good. How are you? I apologize for

 the false alarm. Much like everything I do, it was poorly

 timed.
 - So I will just very quickly go through the DIP financing motion. I'm last, so I don't want to keep people here longer than necessary, but of course I'll answer your questions.
 - I'll start with the evidence. Exhibit C to the motion is the declaration of David E. Burns of Imperial Capital. We submitted that declaration in support of the DIP; Mr. Heath moved it into evidence at the start of the hearing.
 - In Mr. Burns' declaration, he evidences the need for financing, the efforts to obtain alternative financing, that the terms of the DIP are market and appropriate under the circumstances, and that this DIP facility is the best and only option available under the circumstances.

So, with that, unless Your Honor has any questions, I will turn to the DIP itself.

THE COURT: That's fine. I have no questions.

MR. SHAPIRO: Thank you. The DIP facility consists of a \$60.2 million senior secured super-priority credit facility; of that top line amount, 22 million will be made available by entry of the interim order. The DIP agent is Boeing, the DIP lender is Boeing. As Your Honor also knows, the prepetition agent and the prepetition lender are also Boeing.

And I did want to make one point of clarification about the scope of the DIP collateral. Your Honor probably missed it in the 70-page chart, but we did mention this. The TopCo entity, that's TECT Aerospace Group Holdings, Inc., was not a party to the prepetition credit agreement. It is a party now as a guarantor to the DIP credit agreement.

As Your Honor might imagine, this entity is just a holding company that holds equity interest in two debtors that are in turn intermediate holding companies. It has no operations or assets other than its equity interest in two debtor subsidiaries, but because it is a guarantor those equity interests will become part of the DIP collateral upon entry of Your Honor's order.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you for that clarification.

MR. SHAPIRO: Certainly. All right, so going back to the terms of the DIP.

The way the DIP works is that all cash receipts that come in from the operations of the debtors' business are in turn applied to pay down the prepetition secured obligations. It's really no different from what we were doing prior to the petition date, and these are essentially and were disclosed as adequate protection payments.

The debtors then go-forward operations, including all the administrative expenses that we would incur related to the case are then funded on an as-needed basis by, you know, daily or periodic draws on the DIP.

The budget and, really more concisely, the motion show that the amounts needed to fund the case exceed receipts by about \$13 million in the interim period and by another incremental 16.6 million after entry of the final order through the date when the DIP will be fully drawn. And so, by my math, that's about \$30 million of incremental liquidity. And I think what that says to Your Honor is that if we were seeking to run these cases just on cash collateral, we'd be about \$30 million short, at least during the budget period.

All right, so now I'll just turn to the economics. There are two fees, there's a 1.5 percent commitment fee and a one percent funding fee. The commitment fee is earned and

payable upon entry of the interim order and it's calculated based on the total commitment. The funding fee is paid following the funding of each advance or, if the lender desires, netted out of the proceeds of the advance. As I mentioned, that's a one percent. So, in the aggregate, that's roughly 2.5 percent of the total commitment will be equal to the aggregate commitment fee and funding fee.

As to the interest rate, the non-default rate is LIBOR plus ten and the default rate is five percent above that.

On the other terms, the non-economic terms, based on the local rule changes, we -- as I mentioned, we include a very lengthy chart in the motion highlighting key terms. I certainly won't go through all of them, I don't think we have time for that, but at a very high level, as part of the lending package, we did agree to several provisions and protections to both Boeing as DIP lender and prepetition lender.

For instance, our use of cash is subject to a budget with permitted variances. Boeing is getting a consensual priming lien on all DIP collateral. Boeing, as prepetition agent and lender, is getting adequate protection; that includes adequate protection liens, super-priority claims, the payments that I mentioned earlier, and certain other fees such as professional fees.

There are, as you would expect, customary 1 2 stipulations and releases, which are all subject to the challenge period and in certain instances subject to entry of 3 4 the final order. There are liens on the proceeds of 5 avoidance actions, marshaling, equity of the case, and 506(c) waivers, all of which are subject to entry of a final order. 6 And there are also several sale and plan-related milestones. 7 Now, on the sale, the outside date -- I'll just 8 hit the very highlights on those -- on the sale, the outside 9 10 date for consummation of the sale of the debtors' Everett, Washington assets is a little less than 50 calendar days from 11 today -- I think I did that right, but that's basically what 12 we're looking at -- and the outside date for the consummation 13 of the sale of the debtors' Kansas assets is about 110 14 calendar days from today. Again, I think I did my math 15 16 right, but I could be a day or two off there. 17 There's also, as I mentioned, some plan-related 18 milestones. Those dates are a long way out, as I'm sure Your 19 Honor saw. The deadline to obtain entry of a confirmation order is about 200 days from today. 20 With that, unless Your Honor has any questions for 21 22 me, I can turn to the order. 23 THE COURT: Okay, let's walk through (indiscernible) --24

MR. SHAPIRO: All right. As noted at the outset,

we were able to resolve all issues with Ms. Casey for purposes of today, and I thank Ms. Casey for that.

For purposes of the record, I can walk you through all the changes. We did send you a blackline; I can focus on the substantive changes. I'll let Your Honor choose what makes the most sense for you and for the record.

THE COURT: Why don't we just scroll through and focus on the substantive changes. I haven't had the opportunity to look at that.

MR. SHAPIRO: Certainly. All right, so this is on the border of being substantive, but I'll mention it. On page 4, we removed the last sentence of finding C regarding the sufficiency of notice. I know Your Honor is well aware of that comment that the Office of the United States Trustee often makes.

On page 6 -- I'm sorry, I apologize, I'm referencing the page numbers of the redline.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SHAPIRO: On page 6, that's just an update to the claim amount.

On pages 7 and 8, these are -- these were in the stipulation section, but they really aren't stipulations, at least we didn't really think they were. But they're in the form that we inherited, so we didn't have much leverage there, but Ms. Casey pointed it out, so we did strike them.

We moved little x and little xi to the events of default, and 1 2 you'll see that in paragraph 5. On little xii, that is 3 really a finding, it's not so much a stip, and it's 4 duplicative of finding F. So we just struck it entirely. 5 THE COURT: I can remove two of my (indiscernible) 6 and take those out. So, thank you. 7 MR. SHAPIRO: All right, great. You can thank Ms. Casey for that. 8 9 THE COURT: I will. 10 MR. SHAPIRO: Okay, moving ahead to page 9. This is just a conforming change because we struck one of the 11 earlier findings that define diminution, so we had to define 12 it somewhere. That probably wasn't substantive, so sorry. 13 All right, moving on to page 16 of the redline. 14 15 These are the additional events of default that I mentioned 16 earlier, these were just moved from stipulations to paragraph 17 5(e). We had paragraph 5 reserved for some reason, I'm not 18 sure, so that seemed like the natural place to put it. 19 Page 17 of the redline, this was a comment 20 from Ms. Casey again. So the intent of this paragraph was 21 really just to say that the DIP obligations were valid and 22 binding. That's what we would expect, right? That the 23 lender is lending, so the amounts that are lent shouldn't be 24 subject to challenge. We were not trying to say that the

prepetition obligations, including adequate protection claims

and liens, are also valid and binding, those are obviously subject to challenge. And so what we did was we just struck any reference to any obligations under this order and we kept just the reference to the DIP documents. So that was the reason for those changes there.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SHAPIRO: All right. Pages 20 through 22, these are changes to the fee provisions. It starts on page 20 and it goes all the way into page 22. In short, we removed any reference to the lender seeking payment of its internal counsel fees, they won't be doing that. We removed any reference to the lender submitting invoices in summary format. And then, finally, we removed any reference that objections need to only be limited to reasonableness.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question

(indiscernible) the way I had read this paragraph is that the lender (indiscernible) documentation of the fees, costs or expenses until prior to a conversion of the Chapter 11 case and, at that point in time, the parties will receive the invoices and have the opportunity to respond, is that -- is that a correct understanding or did I misread this provision in the wee hours of the morning?

MR. SHAPIRO: I don't want to say you misread it,
I had the same thought, but Mr. Smith can correct me if I'm
wrong, but the intent is certainly -- at least the way I read

it, is that all invoices will be submitted and go through the ten-day objection period.

THE COURT: Okay, I don't think that's very clear.

Mr. Smith, is that what is happening here?

MR. SMITH: Yeah, Your Honor, I now see it. I apologize to the extent that I'm the source of some of this language. The intent was certainly no later than conversion we will have to submit any of these expenses and they should be paid, the intent was not to require us to wait until that date. But, yes, it is intended that it be subject to the notice period whenever we submit it and, frankly, having been through this in other cases, this may or may not be something we do on a regular basis. We may just hold it and see where things are going and all of that. The idea was to leave some flexibility in terms of when we actually make the request, but when we do it will be subject to the notice period.

We can clean that up in a subsequent -- in a posthearing clarification of that.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I mean, I'm fine with that language on an interim basis and if you feel like further tweaks need to be made to make it more clear for you, you can do so in connection with the submission of a final order, but based on --

MR. SMITH: Okay. I appreciate that, Your Honor, and certainly in the interest of time we would prefer not to

mess with the order now, I think it's clear enough and, again, it's very unlikely that this topic will be relevant before a final hearing.

THE COURT: I agree, I agree. Okay. Well, thank you for that. Let's move on then.

Actually, let's move on to paragraph 12, because I see there's no changes in that paragraph. I did have one question, which is there's a discussion there about that — for amendments, they can just be entered into in the ordinary course if they're non-material or not adverse to the debtors' estates or their creditors, but I guess my question to you is, who's going to be making the determination that it's not adverse? Because basically where I'm going with this is, if it's a material modification, I think we should contemplate putting that on notice. Perhaps you may not think it's adverse, but other parties in interest may think it's adverse. So that's why we give the parties an opportunity to review a modification that's material and have an opportunity to bring it up with the Court.

So perhaps we could just strike "or not" -- so I'm in paragraph 12 -- five lines down, starting with the clause "or not adverse to the debtors' estates or their creditors," parentheses, "(other than the required DIP lenders)."

Would anyone be opposed to that modification? Mr. Smith?

MR. SMITH: No, Your Honor, we can certainly live with that.

THE COURT: Okay, okay. So let's plan on making that change. Normally I would say I would interlineate it, but I'm not able to do that anymore. So if you could all make that change, that would be great.

(Pause)

MR. SHAPIRO: Okay. I was going to skip ahead to page 24, unless Your Honor had any questions before then.

THE COURT: I do not.

MR. SHAPIRO: Okay. This was a change at the request of the United States Trustee. The language that was stricken is now rather than a prohibition is in the event of default. That's in paragraph 5.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SHAPIRO: All right. So page 26, there's two changes here. The first change was to make clear that the priority of a DIP super-priority claim has the priority that it has under Section 364(c)(1) rather than listing all those various sections. That was at Ms. Casey's request. And then the second change was there, there was a provision that said that the priority of the super -- sorry, the DIP super-priority claim shall be senior to and shall be not made subordinate to, you know, X, Y, Z, you know, that's now an event of default rather than a prohibition.

THE COURT: Okay. 1 2 MR. SHAPIRO: Okay, paragraph -- I'm sorry, I'm on 3 page 28, it starts on page 27, this is the adequate 4 protection package. Just a clarification that the adequate protection liens are likewise subordinate to senior third 6 party liens. 7 And the same page, just a clarification that the adequate protection super-priority claim has the priority 8 9 afforded to it under 507(b) rather than listing out what it 10 has priority over. 11 THE COURT: Okay. MR. SHAPIRO: The same page, 28, scrolling into 12 Those are just conforming changes to the fee 13 page 30. provision, the same ones that I had mentioned earlier. 14 15 THE COURT: Okay. This has the same or similar 16 language, so to the extent that you make tweaks to the first paragraph regarding (indiscernible) you can make some tweaks 17 18 to this one as well. 19 MR. SHAPIRO: Okay. Thank you. 20 THE COURT: It's up to you. MR. SHAPIRO: Up to Mr. Smith, but we're -- yes, 21 22 understood. 23 Page 35, so this isn't a change, but I was asked

to flag something for you -- you may have flagged it already

-- at the request of Ms. Casey. As you'll see here, we

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negotiated for a wind-down budget to be paid for the proceeds
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    of the sales of both properties and that's -- it's one
   million in the aggregate, 500,000 per sale. We came up with
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    that amount in consultation with Boeing. We certainly think
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    it's appropriate, but that said, I do want to be clear, in
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    case it was not already clear, that amount is not and should
   not be construed as a finding that it is sufficient and all
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   parties' rights are preserved on that point. At Ms. Casey's
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    request, I did agree to make that statement.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Well, I had a note that
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    (indiscernible) appropriate for an interim (indiscernible)
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   but I'm happy to entertain it --
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               MR. SHAPIRO: I'm sorry, you broke up. Your
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    question is why is it appropriate?
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               THE COURT: No, I don't think it's appropriate for
    an interim order --
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               MR. SHAPIRO: Oh.
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               THE COURT: -- but I'm happy to entertain it for
    the final.
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               MR. SHAPIRO:
                             Okay. Just would Your Honor -- can
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    I make one point on that or is Your Honor's mind made up?
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               THE COURT: No, I'm happy to hear you, it's just
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    an unusual decision.
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               MR. SHAPIRO: No, we agree. I'll tell you just a
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    little bit of background. So this form of order was -- there
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are two prior cases with Judge Silverstein and so there was like a blank for the wind-down amount. And so that's where the concept came from, but I guess we thought it made sense to see if we could get an agreement now on a floor, right? That's the way we really look at this, it's something that we were able to negotiate for. There is at least some certainty that when these assets are sold we will have some amount of money left behind to wind down. It's certainly not a ceiling. And so, in our view, it's something good that we were able to get now, but if somebody doesn't like it, if the committee doesn't like it, if Ms. Casey doesn't like it, of course they can say we want more, this amount isn't enough, but that's really the way we're looking at it.

Of course, if Your Honor doesn't feel comfortable approving it now, we totally understand that and that's fine, but we did view this as a good thing that we were able to get and wanted to make sure Your Honor understood that before ruling on the point.

MR. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor, if I may. On that subject, I will say we, Boeing, do not have any objection to putting in a clause about subject to the final order here. This is not something that will be relevant until after the final order. So, I mean, on that front, I think it's fine taking care of that, the timing point, from our perspective.

Second, just in response to what Mr. Shapiro said,

we appreciate what he said and we appreciate the fact that everything is open for anybody coming back and asking for more later, subject to some limitations here that stop that. But it's also subject to Boeing looking at it and saying, no, no, that's the right number, it shouldn't be any higher.

So just to make sure that it's clear, we do think this is a reasonable number reached after discussions with the debtor, based on everything that we know about the operations today. And so we do think it's the right number here, but we certainly don't have a problem with pushing it back to the final order now.

THE COURT: Well, really my comments went to the appropriateness of any provision like this being included in a DIP order, period, whether it's at a final or an interim. I certainly didn't mean my comments to open up negotiations because of the appointment of a committee or another third party getting notice and, you know, trying to increase the numbers, but I understand that all rights are reserved for all parties to discuss that.

So, again, my comments really went to why is this in an order, in a final DIP order, but I think it's fine to include it then based on Mr. Shapiro's representation of the benefits to the estate. So I will allow it to stay in the order and I appreciate the comments of the parties regarding their positions with respect to the wind-down, as well as the

clear reservation of rights that Mr. Shapiro put on the record. So, with that, let's just keep it in there.

But can we go back with regard to page -- well, it was 30 on my copy, let me see if it's -- it's 31 now. It's little i, it's paragraph 16 that talks about the credit bidding rights. I just want to make sure I understand what I'm approving in the context of this interim order.

MR. SHAPIRO: Certainly. So --

THE COURT: With respect to the prepetition (indiscernible) so am I approving today that the prepetition lenders are permitted to credit bid subject to 363(k)?

MR. SHAPIRO: No, you're not. So, I mean, they of course could credit bid subject to 363(k), I mean, there's nothing that you -- sorry, that you could -- there's nothing I could do to stop them, but you're not making any finding as to whether or not that's appropriate or not, and that's the last sentence that's subject to entry of a final order.

just agreements between us and them, the last section is the one I think that matters to you and that's subject to entry of a final order. So at least that's the way we read it. We did -- I will admit that perhaps my thoughts are cogent than you would expect, but that's because I did discuss this with Ms. Casey beforehand and I explained the same thing to her.

THE COURT: Okay. I agree. Thank you very much.

MR. SHAPIRO: Thank you, Your Honor. 1 All right. So moving on, unless Your Honor has 2 3 any other questions, to page 36. That's the release 4 paragraph, which is paragraph number 18. 5 THE COURT: Actually, I do, but let me look at 6 paragraph --7 MR. SHAPIRO: Okay. 8 THE COURT: -- 21. 9 MR. SHAPIRO: Oh, 21, paragraph 21? 10 THE COURT: Okay. We're not there yet, so go 11 ahead. 12 MR. SHAPIRO: Okay. All right. Paragraph 18, here, at Ms. Casey's request, we have made certainly of the 13 releases subject to entry of a final order. There's three 14 categories of releases here: There's releases of the DIP 15 16 lender, releases of the pre-petition lender, and releases of 17 Boeing as trade creditor. So, with respect to the release of 18 Boeing as DIP lender, that's effective immediately, and 19 that's just binding on us, of course, it's just the debtor. 20 We did clarify, though, that the releases of Boeing as 21 lender, agent, and its affiliated and related parties, et 22 cetera, only in their capacity as such; you'll see that in 23 18(a). And then, in 18(b) and (c), you'll see we added "subject to entry of the final order." 24 25 All right. Moving on. We're not yet to 21, but I know, when we get there, you'll stop me.

THE COURT: And it's a minor change.

MR. SHAPIRO: Okay. Moving on to the next page, this is just the challenge paragraph. The first set of changes, at the very beginning -- we're on Page 37 -- but are just conforming changes as a result of the (indiscernible) releases in the earlier paragraph.

And then, on the next page, into -- Page 38 into Page 39, we made several changes at Ms. Casey's request:

First, I mean, the typical provision that, if a trustee is appointed prior to the expiration of a challenge period, then they get the greater of the balance or ten calendar days to commence a challenge.

And then there are a bunch of additional sentences that we added. The first one is -- I think you may have called it the "Judge Dorsey rule." But if someone files a motion seeking standing to commence a challenge prior to the expiration of the challenge period, then the period is tolled until the Court hears that motion. It avoids an emergency hearing on one day notice that could be of great inconvenience to Your Honor, and certainly to us, as well.

The next change is -- I don't think you can take credit for this one. It's the idea that the -- an LLC -- only the -- a member of an LLC can seek and obtain derivative standing. And it's the position of the UST that

that makes the challenge rights in certain -- at least with 1 respect to the LLC debtors, illusory. So we added an 2 agreement that the lenders won't raise that as a defense in 3 4 connection with any creditors -- any creditor seeking to 5 commence a challenge on behalf of LLCs. 6 And then the last sentence was really just a 7 clarification. I -- Your Honor could do this anyway, but making it very clear that, if there is a successful 8 9 challenge, you may fashion any appropriate remedy. 10 THE COURT: Okay. MR. SHAPIRO: So, unless Your Honor had any 11 12 questions on that -- I know there are a lot of questions 13 there. 14 THE COURT: No, I have no questions. Thank you. 15 MR. SHAPIRO: Okay. All right. We are now on 21. 16 THE COURT: Okay. I only have a minor question. 17 The reference to Paragraph 21(d) in Subsection (b). Is that actually -- should that be (f)? Should that reference be to 18 Paragraph 21(f), or am I -- I may be completely off, but ... 19 20 I think you're right in -- because MR. SHAPIRO: 21 of the reference to the remedies notice period. Is that why you think it should be (f)? 22 23 THE COURT: You know, I can't even really remember at this point in time, I'll be honest with you. I've had a 24

lot between the time I looked at this order and today, so --

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MR. SHAPIRO: I think so. I think you're right
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   because --
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               THE COURT: For some reason, I put "(f)," question
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   mark, so I'm hoping you can direct me.
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               MR. SHAPIRO: Yes, I -- looking at it -- we'll
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   certainly discuss it with Mr. Smith. I think you're right,
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    that's a bust in the cross-reference, and it should be a
   reference to (f), which contains the remedies notice, the
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 9
    five-day remedy notice, so that's right. We'll fix that.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Well, if I'm wrong and it needs
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   to remain (d), then that's fine, too.
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               MR. SHAPIRO: Okay. Okay. So the next change is
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   on Page -- unless Your Honor has anything earlier --
               THE COURT: I do --
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               MR. SHAPIRO: -- page forty -- okay. You do?
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16
   Okay.
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               THE COURT: I do, in (q). I was a little
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   confused, actually, because I thought perhaps there's -- it
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    says, upon the occurrence and during the continuance of an
   event of default under the DIP docs, a violation of the terms
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    of the interim order or any termination event, the DIP
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    secured parties may -- and then, basically, sweep the cash,
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   continue to sweep the cash.
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               My thought here is are you sweeping the cash in
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    the ordinary course, anyway. I guess that's my first
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question. Is that -- I just want to make sure I understand 1 2 the arrangement. So the cash is just going to be swept continually, but I though the cash was being swept 3 4 continually to pay the pre-petition lenders, not the DIP 5 lenders. 6 MR. SHAPIRO: That's right, it is being swept continually -- continuously --7 THE COURT: Okay. 8 9 MR. SHAPIRO: -- to pay the pre-petition lenders. 10 THE COURT: Pre-petition lenders. Okay. So this 11 paragraph goes to what the DIP lenders can do if there's a 12 DIP default. And my position is, is that, until the expiration of the remedies period, there really shouldn't be 13 an automatic sweeping of the debtors' cash to repay down the 14 15 DIP. Once the remedies period expires and there's a 16 determination that -- or there's a -- either an order from me, because there was an objection, that there was an event 17 18 of default, and that it's actually true they're in default; 19 or the debtors concede and they don't object during the five-20 day remedies period, you know, at that point, fine, they can 21 -- you can sweep to pay down the DIP. 22 But during this five-day period, I feel as if it's 23 not necessarily appropriate for the DIP parties to be sweeping the debtors' cash because, essentially, what happens 24

if the debtors contest it. And in the unlikely event that

the debtors contest and then I find that there was an event of -- it was not an event of default, what then happens?

Does the DIP lender return all the cash that it swept?

And this is more just, Mr. Smith, if you can tell me why this would be appropriate, or maybe you're thinking along the same lines as I would, but the document doesn't reflect that; or perhaps you say you'll give back the money that you sweep to pay down the DIP if there's an ultimate conclusion at the end of the five-day remedies period that you shouldn't -- or there wasn't an event of default. So I'm happy to discuss this with you. I just don't like to see something about sweeping all of the debtors' cash until I've made a determination that there, in fact, was a default.

MR. SMITH: Well, I think the critical language in (g), Your Honor, is that the -- is the last clause. It doesn't directly address what you just said about sweeping cash, except that the understanding here is that the remedies notice period, we are agreeing that we will fund budgeted amounts during the remedies notice period.

So that I think the issue is simply one of -- my guess -- and I actually don't know what people think about, and I haven't thought about this precisely. But I think what is likely to happen during the remedies notice period is the banking arrangements are going to continue as they are today, which is, nightly, the -- well, as they will upon entry of

the order here. Nightly, the collection accounts, lockbox accounts -- whatever we want to call them -- will be swept. The money will be paid into the -- into Boeing and will be applied to the pre-petition loans. And then the DIP lender will continue to abide by the budget for the remedies budget period. That's what this says.

And I didn't -- I do believe that's appropriate,

Your Honor, that we are -- while I understand the Court's

concern, if we did not have that last phrase in there, we'd

be taking money, not loaning anything new, and leaving the

debtor somewhat at sea, if there were a successful challenge

to the remedies notice -- during the remedies notice period.

I get that. But I don't think we're doing that, I think we

are agreeing to allow for operations during that period. And

there are provisions later on about specific provisions about

payments of employee costs for that period.

And so I think this is written correctly, Your

Honor. I -- obviously, if we've made a mistake, we'll look

at that, but I thought this was correctly phrased.

THE COURT: I think it might just be -- or my hangup might be that I think it's okay to continue to sweep in the ordinary course to pay down the pre-petition credit agreement obligations because that is the agreement the debtor has made. To the extent that -- although, looking at the budget, it doesn't seem as if the credit agreement

obligations will be paid down in full during the operations of this case. But if it -- if there were, then you're sweeping cash to pay the DIP down without a determination that there's been an event of default under the DIP. So that's where I was getting hung up. It seems as if -- MR. SMITH: Okay.

THE COURT: -- to be a bunch of contingencies, and I acknowledge that. But I get hung up on things like that because these orders are so lengthy and they try to address every possible contingency, which leads me down the road of trying to think of every possible contingency. So, as I said, I'm okay for you to continue to pay the pre-petition credit agreement obligations because that's appropriate. But if there hasn't been an actual event of default under the DIP, then I don't think you're able to sweep cash to repay the DIP until the remedies period has expired.

MR. SMITH: Okay. I -- Your Honor, I get that, and I -- it's a good point. And I think -- number one, as a drafting point, I think it's safe to add the words "in the ordinary course" after "free cash" there, and I think we can do that. I -- that is the -- that's my understanding of the intent of all the parties, and that will be used to pay down the pre-petition lenders, as we've discussed before.

The other thing, Your Honor, is, frankly, one of the reasons I think we haven't focused on this as much as we

might have is precisely the economic reason that you identified, which is: According to our understanding of the likely budget and operations and so forth, we will not be in a position of paying down the DIP during this case, absent some sales that turn out to be quite favorable. So I don't - again, I don't have a problem with throwing in the "ordinary course" language because that was the intent of this language.

THE COURT: And/or perhaps you could also add -- after the "DIP secured parties," you might be able to add, parenthesis, "on behalf of the pre-petition lenders."

MR. SMITH: That is certainly fine.

I would note one other thing, Your Honor, just in terms of sweeping cash. That -- it's not as if there are other accounts out there that, all of a sudden, we will try to glom onto. I mean, this is it. The collection accounts is pretty much everything the debtors will have, in terms of cash, other than amounts that are funded into the special, you know -- we're behind somebody else, whether it's utilities or professionals and things like that.

THE COURT: Well, and let me just say I appreciate all of your positions. I also appreciate the accommodation Boeing is making in working with the debtors in this case. So I'm not raising this issue because of the facts and circumstances of this particular case.

But I see this paragraph in many orders and I'm 1 2 sensitive to it because, in other cases, there's no -- the 3 sweep would not be to pay a pre-petition, it would be to sweep all the cash and pay themselves down before there's an 4 actual determination of a default, and it would leave the debtors with no case. So, unfortunately, you are the bearer 6 of something that has been brought to my attention in other 7 8 cases. 9 So I think, with those tweaks, I'm fine with it. 10 And again, it's a contingency on a contingency on a 11 contingency, but that's what we're doing for. Half the 12 paragraphs of this order and every other DIP order are to address those unlikely contingencies. So, if you could just 13 add that, that would make me feel a lot better. 14 15 MR. SMITH: Understood. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. 16 17 MR. SHAPIRO: The next change, Your Honor, at 18 least that I have, was on Page 47 into 48. This is the "responsible person/control person" language that Your Honor 19 20 has seen many times. 21 THE COURT: Okay. Hold on --22 MR. SHAPIRO: The --23 THE COURT: -- (indiscernible) had. 24 (Pause in proceedings) 25 THE COURT: So this goes to the same issue that I

raised, Mr. Smith, in connection with the last paragraph, which is: This is, essentially, the paragraph, I believe, that allows you to sweep the cash to pay down the DIP if there is an event of default and you give the debtors notice. To me, wouldn't this all be more appropriate at the conclusion of the remedies period? And it's a long paragraph, so I could have missed a lot. But this is, essentially, the same issue that I had with the previous paragraph. And I'm not saying I have an issue with you sweeping the cash. It's just the timing of the sweeping of the cash that I have a problem with.

And I apologize, Mr. Smith. You may be on mute.

MR. SMITH: I'm sorry, yes, I was.

Yeah, again, I think, Your Honor, that we are --

Yeah, again, I think, Your Honor, that we are -we're talking about simply application to the DIP loan, as
opposed to the pre-petition loan, because the sweep will be
in the ordinary course. And as it's currently contemplated,
that would go down to pay the pre-petition secured loan.

I do think, Your Honor, we have, in the -- and I'm scrolling down to 46, the bottom of Page 46, (b), the -- this is effectively a deposit account control agreement type provision that is contingent on expiration of the remedies notice period.

So, again, I guess, we can -- following up with what we've run through on the previous section, I have no

problem with 25 saying something about the sweep, ordinary course, and on behalf of the pre-petition lenders. I certainly have no issue with that here, as well, as in the previous section.

THE COURT: Okay. I think that would be -- I mean, I'm looking at that first sentence, and I think it's a marked -- changing it to the pre-petition credit agreement is a marked difference because I think, if I'm reading it correctly, it says, when there's an event of default and we give you notice that we're not going to fund, the debtors are authorized but also directed to essentially pay all of their collections and proceeds of the DIP collateral over to the DIP agent and to pay down the DIP obligations in full.

And I have -- I guess what I would suggest to you is this paragraph seems to go directly to pay-down of the DIP, and I am fine with this language remaining as is, so long as it says after the expiration of the remedies period. So I don't want you to truncate some of the rights that you were given in this order. I just want to effect -- essentially change the timing by which you're going to get all of the debtors' cash.

MR. SMITH: I appreciate that, Your Honor, and I think you're right about that. And again, I think the issue is, after the remedies period, we do certainly want the right to apply, frankly, wherever we want. But prior to that time,

it will be swept in the ordinary course in paying down the pre-petition loan. But I think we can come up with some language here that clarifies that first sentence being subject to after the remedies period, and I appreciate that, 5 Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Great. Yeah, the previous paragraph was fine because, if we tweak it, it talks about sweeping the cash to pay the pre-petition credit agreement off, fine.

MR. SMITH: Uh-huh.

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THE COURT: This one clearly wants the ability to do so for the DIP, and I'm fine with that, too, at the expiration of the remedies period.

So I know, in the interest of time, I'll leave you guys to work on that because I know we need to get the ordered entered as soon as possible. So we can move on and I'll allow you to work on that.

MR. SHAPIRO: Thank you, Your Honor.

Paragraph Number 26, which starts on 47. This is the lenders are not responsible persons, the control person paragraph. Just a couple of minor changes there. We added that letter (c) is subject to entry of the final order, at Ms. Casey's request. And we also struck (cy), which has to do with operating the business, just given Boeing's unique relationship with the debtors and their operational

continuity provisions in the credit agreement. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. MR. SHAPIRO: I think we're almost done. 3 Paragraph 32 on Page 50, we just struck that 4 5 because it's now an event of default. 6 THE COURT: Okay. Great. 7 MR. SHAPIRO: On Pages 54 and 55, which is Paragraph 38. Ms. Casey had a concern that she wasn't sure 8 9 how, in particular, a superpriority claim could survive 10 dismissal, and so we -- rather than getting into that 11 debate, we just added language to make it clear that, if the law provides it survives, it survives, and we added that 12 (indiscernible) dismissal. 13 And then, later on in that same page, in Paragraph 14 15 39, we just deleted a sentence, the second sentence that speaks to the sufficiency of notice given at the 16 17 (indiscernible) hearing. 18 THE COURT: Okay. Great. Just one other --19 apologize I (indiscernible) comments and get this 20 (indiscernible) eight, binding nature of the agreement. second paragraph talks about my ability, essentially, to 21 22 enter a subsequent order that modifies my own order, and it 23 limits my ability to do so. 24 Generally, I ask that this be removed and be made 25 as an event of default. But I'm not going to tie my hands to

entering a subsequent form of order. So it may already be an event of default; and, if that's the case, great, and you can just remove this language. But I think you can also just tweak it by saying, you know, that this is an event of default.

MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I apologize, but I -- you broke up for just a second and I missed which pages you were talking about.

THE COURT: I --

MR. SMITH: I'm sorry about that.

THE COURT: That's okay. I apologize. I've been having technical difficulties all day.

I am on Page 48, going into Page 49 of the redline, and I'm talking about the second sentence in Paragraph 28. And it starts with, "Unless otherwise consented to" --

MR. SMITH: Okay.

THE COURT: -- (indiscernible) "by the required DIP lenders." Again, this just goes to my ability to enter what orders I think are appropriate. I don't bind myself to that. That's what this provision does. And so I am happy with the debtors agreeing to it, and you can make it an event of default.

MR. SMITH: Okay. All right. That, Your Honor, I think we just simply have to flip through and make sure that

we've covered all of those as events of default elsewhere. I suspect we have, but we will confirm that.

THE COURT: Okay. And if not, in the interest of

time, you could enter something -- you could put language in before that just says the debtors agree that it's an event of default if -- something to that extent. But I don't think we need to rework the whole document.

MR. SMITH: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SHAPIRO: Unless -- I don't -- unless Your Honor has any questions, I think that's it. I'd ask that -- based on the record before you, that you approve the DIP financing package on an interim basis and enter the order, once we submit it to you this afternoon.

THE COURT: Okay. Great.

Let me ask for the record. Does anyone else wish to be heard in connection with the interim DIP order?

(No verbal response)

THE COURT: Okay. I'm not hearing anyone.

I appreciate very much the colloquy that we all had on the record today, including your answering my questions, as well as agreeing to make the changes that you agreed on.

I am, based on the facts and circumstances and the first-day declaration, as well as the declaration of Mr.

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Burns, prepared to approve the interim relief that has been
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    requested, or that is requested as modified and discussed on
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    the record today. I'm satisfied the debtors have met their
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   burden necessary to carry the motion, including that of Rule
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    6003. And I will consider the entry of the order under
    certification of counsel.
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               It's probably imperative that you get the order
   entered tonight. Is that correct?
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               MR. SMITH: I believe that's certainly the
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    debtors' desire, and that's our desire, as well, on behalf of
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    Boeing, yes, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
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               MR. SMITH: If I might, Your Honor, I actually --
    since we've been talking, just in the last few minutes, I
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    actually got an email --
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               THE COURT: Hold on, I'm going to lose you. I
   have to plug in my iPad.
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               MR. SMITH: Oh, okay.
               THE COURT: So this is awkward and uncomfortable,
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    and you're getting a good view of my office.
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               MR. SMITH:
                          Okay.
               THE COURT: Okay. Why don't (indiscernible) okay.
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    I apologize. Go ahead.
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               MR. SMITH: I got an email that indicates -- as
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   Mr. Shapiro -- actually, I think it was Mr. DeLillo described
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earlier, the cash management process. The funds are swept from a PNC -- a series of PNC collections accounts into a JPMorgan Chase account that -- of Boeing's. That's what happens overnight.

I got an email indicating that Chase was -- that they had not done the sweep yesterday, or PNC had not done the sweep, I guess this morning, technically, and as a result -- as a result of the bankruptcy filing, which, of course, we understand. I just want to flag, and we will take care of this offline with the debtors' counsel and their operating folks.

I believe that, with entry of the cash management motion, as you have already approved it, we shouldn't have an issue, and that should be just completely resolved, and we don't have an issue. But apparently, there was some confusion on the Chase end about whether your orders would sufficiently cover this. And we may come back with a tweak or two on the cash management motion -- well, I don't think it affects the DIP motion -- but the cash management, that more precisely gives them whatever comfort they think they need.

So I just flag that for everyone, and I apologize to everybody, including certainly all the Richards Layton folks to whom this is a surprise, I'm sure. So, anyway, I don't think it's a substantive issue, by any means. I just

want to make sure everyone is aware of it. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. So we'll hold -- should I hold 3 off then having my office enter the cash management order, 4 and when you submit -- you can submit a revised order under 5 certification of counsel or just let me know by email that we can go ahead and enter the order that's proposed? Is that 6 7 (indiscernible) I thought the cash management was one 8 MR. SMITH: 9 that we were going to make a couple of tweaks in anyway and submit. 10 11 MR. HEATH: It is. MR. SMITH: So I'm just -- we're flagging it, 12 13 maybe two tweaks, instead of one. So that's all I wanted to 14 notify everyone of. 15 THE COURT: Okay. So just -- so, for housekeeping purposes, I received a bunch of redlines of all the orders. 16 17 So have all of the orders been uploaded in the revised 18 proposed form, other than the cash management and the DIP orders? 19 20 MR. HEATH: I believe yes, Your Honor. I believe 21 so. 22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 MR. HEATH: I think it's just -- sorry. 24 THE COURT: No, that's okay. So I will go ahead

and direct that all the orders, save for the cash management

order and the DIP order, be entered as soon as possible. And 1 2 then I'll go ahead and wait for direction from you all on the DIP and the cash management order, and you can file whatever 3 4 you need to file with redlines and send them over to Ms. 5 Lopez as soon as possible, so we can go ahead and get those 6 entered for you. 7 MR. HEATH: We'll --THE COURT: I know there are a few changes to the 8 9 DIP order, but I'm hopeful that you'll be able to quickly 10 make those and perhaps file it by no later than 5:30 tonight, 11 perhaps even earlier. So I don't want a situation where 12 we're waiting until ten o'clock at night tonight. MR. HEATH: We will do that. 13 14 THE COURT: Okay. You say that, Mr. Heath, but I 15 can't tell you how many times we're waiting until ten o'clock 16 on something that's really just simple tweaks. But there's a 17 lot of cooks in the kitchen, so I understand why it takes a 18 long time. 19 MR. HEATH: Mr. Shapiro won't let that happen. 20 (Laughter) THE COURT: All right. Well, I look forward to 21 22 testing that timing.

So, with that, let me ask. Is there anything else that we should discuss before we part ways? I think my iPad is on its very last leg.

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MR. HEATH: No, that's all we have, Your Honor. Thank you for your time today. We appreciate and we'll do our best to get you those orders as quickly as possible. THE COURT: Okay. Good. Well, it's wonderful seeing you all and meeting those who I have not met before. I look forward to seeing you all at the second-day hearing, and good luck with everything between now and then. So, with that, consider the hearing adjourned. MR. HEATH: Thank you. THE COURT: Take care, everyone. MR. SMITH: Thank you, Your Honor. COUNSEL: Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you. (Proceedings concluded at 3:39 p.m.)

CERTIFICATION I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter to the best of my knowledge and ability. /s/ Tracey Williams April 9, 2021 Tracey Williams, CET-914 Certified Court Transcriptionist For Reliable