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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

. Chapter 11

IN RE:

. Case No. 21-10670(KBO)

TECT AEROSPACE GROUP

HOLDINGS, INC., et al,

824 Market Street

Wilmington, Delaware 19801

Debtors.

. Tuesday, October 19, 2021

TRANSCRIPT OF VIDEO HEARING RE:

EMERGENCY MOTION OF UTICA EQUIPMENT FINANCE, LLC AND UTICA REALTY WELLINGTON, LLC TO REMOVE EQUIPMENT FROM DEBTORS' LOCATION

BEFORE THE HONORABLE KAREN B. OWENS UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

APPEARANCES VIA ZOOM:

For the Debtors: Daniel J. DiFranceschi, Esq.

Paul N. Heath, Esq.

Christopher M. De Lillo, Esq. RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, PA

For the U.S. Trustee: Linda Casey, Esq.

OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRUSTEE

For the Official Committee

of Unsecured Creditors: Matthew Ward, Esq.

WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US), LLP

David Posner, Esq.
KILPATRICK, TOWNSEND
& STOCKTON, LLP

(Appearances Continued)

Audio Operator: Electronically Recorded

by Lisa Brown, ECRO

Transcription Company: Reliable

1007 N. Orange Street Wilmington, Delaware 19801

(302)654 - 8080

Email: qmatthews@reliable-co.com

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APPEARANCES VIA ZOOM: (Continued)

For the Boeing Company: Edmon Morton, Esq.

Kenneth Enos, Esq.

YOUNG, CONAWAY, STARGATT

& TAYLOR, LLP

Amir Gamliel, Esq. Alan Smith, Esq. PERKINS COIE

For Spirit AeroSystems,

Inc.:

Rahmon Brown, Esq. HOGAN LOVELLS US, LLP

For the Utica Entities: Storm John, Esq.

Ropke Nelson, Esq. William Price, Esq. Jennings Horace, Esq. Karen Grivner, Esq. CLARK HILL, PLC

For the United States: I-Heng Hsu, Esq.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CIVIL DIVISION

Also Appearing: Christopher Glass

Joseph Cascio Todd Fleisher

THE BOEING COMPANY

Matthew Czerkowitz

Shaun Martin Nicholas Vara Matthew Dalton Kurt Hedderich RIVERON RTS, LLC

Walther Armin

BAVIUS-TECHNOLOGIE

Devon Patel Jeff Ficks ERNST & YOUNG

Sanjuro Kietlinski

PROVINCE, LLC

Brown Scott, Witness

(Appearances Continued)

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APPEARANCES VIA ZOOM: (Continued)

Also Appearing: Kevin Kidwell, Bar Applicant

Shuyan Sun, Bar Applicant RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, PA

Megan Davies, Bar Applicant

Uday Gorrepati
"ABI PROJECT"

Taylor Harrison

DEBTWIRE

Becky Yerak

WALL STREET JOURNAL

Jessica Steinhagen

REORG RESEARCH

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(Proceedings commence at 1:02 p.m.)

THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone. This is

Judge Owens. We're gathered virtually for an omnibus hearing
in TECT Aerospace Group Holdings. I have a fairly lengthy
agenda, but I think there was only one matter scheduled to go
forward, I think.

Why don't I turn the podium over to counsel for the debtors; or, if there's only one matter going forward, counsel to the movants, and we can talk about where things stand.

MR. HEATH: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Paul Heath of Richards, Layton & Finger. I hope you can hear me.

There is only one matter scheduled for today. And we are in receipt from the email from your chambers yesterday regarding how Your Honor would like to proceed. I think the — it was stated that the Court would not be proceeding today with an evidentiary hearing. So, Your Honor, we're happy to take guidance from you as to how you would like to proceed. And if that is as simple as just simply turning it over to Mr. Price on behalf of the movant, we can do that.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I toyed with -- well, let me tell you. I had the opportunity to read all of the pleadings before I sent the email yesterday, and it seemed to me that there was a threshold legal issue that was presented by the objecting parties as to whether it was appropriate to

move forward with the relief requested by the movants on a motion, as opposed to an adversary proceeding. That's why I advised the parties that we would not be moving forward with an evidentiary hearing today.

I guess I need to understand from the movants -and I'll allow the movants to argue this point, which is:
Why is it appropriate to move forward seeking the relief that
you seek by motion? I think that is really the threshold
issue and the one that we have to discuss today. To the
extent that I think we can move forward in the fashion that's
been proposed, then we can talk about scheduling a hearing.

So, Mr. Price, I believe you're the moving party, so I'm happy to hear from you on this threshold legal issue. Good afternoon.

MR. PRICE: Thank you, Your Honor. William Price, Clark Hill, on behalf of the movant. Your Honor, can you hear me okay?

THE COURT: I can, yes. And just so you know, because I don't think you've appeared me, I have a series of screens, series of cameras. And when I'm looking like this, I am actually looking at you. So I don't want you to think - you, or any other witnesses or parties presenting, thinking that I'm ignoring you. But I -- it's a little awkward and I like to tell that to people that are new to my court.

MR. PRICE: I appreciate --

THE COURT: So welcome.

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MR. PRICE: -- that, Your Honor. Thank you very much, Your Honor, and thank you for your time today.

This is, you know, at least in my experience, not a typical or usual situation that I see in cases, so I understand the specific issue that the Court has raised.

Before I get into the substance of the motion, I'd like to address the procedural posture, if that is -- if that's what you would prefer for me to proceed with.

THE COURT: Yes, I think that's what we have to talk about today.

MR. PRICE: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

The respondent, Central Kansas/Boeing, has filed in its papers a variety of filings and positions, vis-a-vis the motion. And I'll openly admit, Your Honor, that this was something that was discussed internally amongst our team as to the appropriate vehicle, including which court to go to, as to how to address the issue. And Your Honor, there is no easy citation that I can point to, so it will take me a few moments to walk through the decision tree that we had on it, and we obviously hope that you side with our analysis. But we understand if you have a different view and we'd like to understand it, so we proceed in a fashion that we get the relief that we're seeking and that that the estate can be administrated in an orderly fashion.

Your Honor, we filed it in the form of a motion because we believe that there is a controlling order already in place. We believe, based on the few filings related to this piece of equipment in this case, that there's a few things that have not been disputed by any party at this point. Those points are this:

The debtor filed a standard statement of financial affairs and identified in that statement that there is specific property in its possession that it is holding for a third party. This piece of equipment is one of those items that were identified that was filed under penalty of perjury and that has — to our knowledge, nobody has objected to that assertion by the debtor. So there does not appear to be any actual dispute as to the debtor — from the debtors' perspective, that this is not an item that is within their control that is their item; rather, it is a third party's item.

The next thing to go through with the filings is that there was, as you know, two sales administered in this case, and the debtor can sell what the debtor owns. And the debtor administered a sale of the Washington process and then had a sale of the Kansas assets. This specific machine is located at one of the debtors' Kansas facilities and would have been under the umbrella, if you will, of the Kansas assets.

There is no suggestion that we believe that has been made that this specific asset was transferred in connection with that sale order. Rather, there is a question that flows directly from the entry of that sale order, vis-a-vis the lease interest that CKAM/Boeing has with respect to the Kansas facilities.

That interest, as dealt with in the asset purchase agreement -- which you approved its form and you ordered its entry and the time has passed for appeal of that order, that order is before this Court, which is why we filed with this Court -- that any rights that relate to that machine, in our view, the debtor has admitted it's not their machine. We have consulted the landlord, which openly admit is another affiliate that we are connected to. There's no response from them as to how we would administer an extraction of the machine.

And then the last piece of the -- the only piece that remains, in our view, is that Boeing/Central Kansas could assert some sort of an assertion by virtue of the, quote/unquote, "designation rights" that it has with respect to the lease of the facility; and then, from what designation, what rights actually flow to CKAM/Boeing.

And those rights are controlled under a single provision. That provision says that it is, not surprisingly, as the purchaser has been designated the right to select

leases for assumption and assignment or rejection, and that there's a period of time mandated by the Code -- which can be extended, and there's a motion pending for that extension -- as to when they can designate that lease for assumption and assignment. It also provides a contractual, and now order-based obligation for that CKAM organization to pay the lease obligations for the debtor while it goes through that designation period.

And so the core issue that we see here is that -because there has been a response by Boeing, both outside of
this Court and now in this Court, that says you can't enter
the facility and remove the machine. So we view it as
whatever rights that they may have that assert the ability to
close the gates -- and we can get into the substance as to
whether or not we think that it can be done in a matter that
impairs Boeing's ability to operate within the facility, and
we think that that can be sorted out and we think it was
sorted out, but we can go back to that drawing board to
ensure that this Court is comfortable that we're not
impairing the buyer's operational use of the space.

But what we really are asking and what we think is appropriate by motions practice is seeking direction from Your Honor on an interpretation of the order and the exhibit to that order as to what these designation rights really provide Boeing and the ability to lock the gates and to step

into the shoes of the debtor and say you cannot enter the facility to remove your asset, which they don't say is not our asset.

Now they raise other issues about it being the subject of a fraudulent transfer, and we can orally argue those issues and brief them, if necessary. But we really did believe that this flows from a preexisting motion ordered by this Court, with certain provisions that we think are open to interpretation by one person, and that person is you.

Now could we have filed an action in replevin in the form of an adversary proceeding and named CKAM/Boeing as a third-party defendant? Because they are not the tenant under the lease right now, Your Honor; they have these, quote/unquote, "designation rights." And there's a variety of jurisdictional questions and the ability for us to, you know, utilize the marshal to transfer it to Kansas to get the thing out of there. And I'm sure the parties like to point to the truncated process of motions practice versus an adversary proceeding. And we have to file an adversary proceeding, Your Honor, because you interpret that the situation is requiring one, we'll do so.

We just believe and assert that there is a motion that has already been ruled upon. It created a somewhat complicated -- but it's now memorialized and be reviewed -- order, the sale order, that approved an asset purchase

agreement that we were a notice party and we didn't object to. And we just believe that there's a need for interpretation.

And if interpreted in the way that we would like, we think that it opens the gates in a very seamless fashion, where we will sit down in a commercially reasonable fashion with Boeing, CKAM, the debtor and administer an extraction that does not happen overnight. It will take weeks to administer the removal of the machine. We are coordinating with the underlying titleholder to do it in a fashion that doesn't harm the machine. The machine has not been paid off in full yet, but it is coming due very soon. And so we'd like to get to it.

We'd like to understand what the rights are of the parties from your prior order. And if it gives us the ability to move forward with alacrity to get the machine out, that's fantastic. If we have to go back to the drawing board and draft up an adversary proceeding before Your Honor, or you say you don't have jurisdiction and we should all go to Kansas, we'll do as Your Honor suggests and we will move forward and draft in a manner that we think will hyper-focus the issues and get to the task at hand, which is we do have Bavius, the third party, telling us we want that machine put into the stream of commerce because there's money owed on it and we think that it's more likely that you'll be able to pay

if you're monetizing the value of the asset. But if it can't happen today, we understand, and we'll go back to the drawing board.

THE COURT: Okay. That was a very helpful explanation of the issue tree. Okay. I don't think I appreciated that the issue that you think is the threshold issue is Boeing's right to block your ability to access the premise. I don't know if I appreciated that.

Why don't I hear from --

MR. PRICE: And if my --

THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry.

MR. PRICE: I'm sorry, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. PRICE: And if I -- and if our papers didn't address that, I apologize, but it really is the core issue that we have.

And we're not saying that Boeing has no rights with respect to the lease. But by way of examine, Your Honor, the lease has a subleasing provision, which Boeing doesn't have a sublease, and there's a requirement for consent. And the entire purpose behind the designation is to decide if Boeing ultimately becomes the beneficiary of that lease. So there's just real questions about what does a designee have and what rights can they assert.

And then the next step, we believe -- let's say

they do have the ability to say you can't get in, it's our decision to make, we're a designee. Then the next question is: You know, at what level and at what point in time is somebody actually impairing, as the landlord, the quiet enjoyment by letting somebody else in to remove a piece of equipment, and has that quiet enjoyment been impaired?

There is a quiet enjoyment provision, we're not denying that. But again, they have not sublease -subtenant, there's no assignment of this lease to them; they have these designation rights. It's a -- it's purely an interpretation by Your Honor, we believe, as to what that designation actually means. And then, if you say that they stepped into the shoes of TECT, they have all the rights of TECT, we think that there's some questions as to whether TECT or Boeing, as their designee, is able to say you just -- you can't come in no matter what.

And that's just -- that's really where we stand.

And if we have to file a complaint to address all those issues, we'll file a complaint, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So you -- so, just so I understand, I mean, your client was aware that Boeing has been on the premises, operating or --

MR. PRICE: Your Honor --

THE COURT: -- conducting --

MR. PRICE: -- we are --

THE COURT: -- business on the premise.

MR. PRICE: We are fully aware that Boeing is there and has conducted production.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PRICE: And we have reviewed the papers filed by the creditors' committee, that have now been withdrawn, in the form of conversion. We had, as referenced in our motion, detailed discussions directly with Boeing/CKAM about what an extraction would look like and how we would do it in a manner that would not impair that extraction -- that production. So, yeah, we are aware, we know that they're there.

We're not here to say that they have no right to be in the premises, we're not here to say they have no right to operate in the premises. We're just trying to understand the length, the breadth, the scope of what their rights are to lock the gates in perpetuity for a party.

And if they -- and if they have that right, Your Honor, then, yes, we would have to file an action in replevin, whether it's with this Court or a court out in Kansas that you think is appropriate, and -- because we'd be mindful of the stay, even though this is -- the party with standing is not the beneficiary of the stay, they're stepping in the shoes of someone who has the stay, but we would be mindful of the stay first. And then we would analyze how do we go about getting the force of law to provide access to the

facility.

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But again, this is not something that we could just open the door and take out overnight. This is — the roof has to be removed, there has to be a sub-roof installed during that extraction, there has to be cordoning off to — and we believe that it can be done in a manner that will not impair the remaining production of Boeing, which we're not interested in creating damages against the estate or, you know, something that we would have — flow damages for us for causing harm to Boeing's production. We're not — that's not our goal here.

We simply have a piece of machinery that is large in nature, complex to remove. And there is some, you know, law school, foreign aid procedural, you know, jurisdictional questions here. So we start -- you got to start somewhere, and here we are in our first hearing.

THE COURT: Okay. Very helpful. Thank you.

Why don't I turn --

MR. PRICE: Thank you --

THE COURT: -- the podium --

MR. PRICE: -- Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- over to the -- I guess to Boeing because you are the formally -- former -- excuse me -- you have filed a formal objection to the motion. And I -- after I hear from you, I'm happy to hear from other parties-in-

interest, who may not have filed something, but wish to be heard in connection with the matter. So, Mr. Smith --

MR. SMITH: Yes.

THE COURT: -- how are you?

MR. SMITH: Thank you, Your Honor. Al Smith of Perkins Coie for Boeing and Central Kansas Aerospace Manufacturing, or "CKAM," as it is known.

The -- Your Honor, I disagree with what a lot of what Mr. Price just said, but most of it is on the -- frankly, on evidentiary grounds. We disagree with a number of things regarding the history here and so forth. But the fundamental disconnect here, I think, is that everything that Mr. Price just said, frankly, supports the contention we're making that this is an injunction proceeding and you need an adversary proceeding.

That is, at most, what Mr. Price has articulated is the fact that they may have a defense to Boeing's arguments here, in that Boeing has -- he contends, we disagree -- limited rights to complain about what's happening out at the facility, in terms of removal of this. But he does not deny, and I don't think he can deny that the gravamen of their action is either turnover or injunction, it's one of the two, and those have to be adversary proceedings.

And the fact that there may be a defense that involves a legal issue, even a gating legal issue -- that is,

prior to -- that the Court has to rule on that isn't necessarily always going to arise in the context of an injunctive proceeding, such is life. But it does not affect the fact that this is an injunction proceeding, a turnover proceeding. That's what they're asking for, that's the -- that's what this whole case is about. And therefore, Your Honor, we just don't see this as a close case. Rule 7001 is really pretty clear about what's supposed to be in an adversary.

So I will stop there, Your Honor. I think that's all we have to address, as I understand the Court's initial comments.

THE COURT: Okay. Appreciate your -- appreciate that.

All right. Does anyone else wish to be heard in connection with this dispute?

(No verbal response)

THE COURT: Okay. I'm not hearing anyone voluntarily coming forth.

But let me ask you, Mr. Heath. The debtors are remarkably silent in this matter. I guess I would say not -- putting aside the substance, do you have a preference on how you wish to proceed in this matter? I assume you would be a -- you are a necessary party to this dispute.

MR. HEATH: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. I hope

you can hear me.

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The debtor -- the debtors did not take a position with respect to the motion. Your Honor, one of the -- I'm sure you can appreciate, having sold all of its assets, the debtor no longer has any operations, it has no employees, it has no presence in the Kansas facilities. And so being a party charged with coordinating an agreement or the logistics for removing equipment from the plant made no -- it really wasn't something that the debtors could participate in, in any meaningful way, because we don't have the ability to do it. We don't have any boots on the ground there. So, Judge, either way, whether it was preventing the removal of the equipment or consenting to it and agreeing to how it would happen, the debtors really weren't in a position with no presence in Kansas, we didn't think, to take that action.

As far as how we proceed, Judge, I guess I would just note the following. And I was hoping I wouldn't have to say anything on this issue. I will tell you I did not read Utica's papers as being a request for this Court to definitively determine the scope of designation rights when they're provided for in an asset purchase agreement. And I think Your Honor, of course, as we all are, is very familiar with designation rights, and they're used in lots of cases.

To the extent that questioning the scope of those designation rights were to expand to a point that it could be

come what I think it could become, which is the collateral attack on your sale order, which was entered many months ago, then I am concerned that the debtors would have concerns with proceeding in that fashion.

I don't know -- I'm not saying that we're there right now, but I do want to raise that because I think that those designation rights were a key part of the asset purchase agreement. I think it was a part of helping us determine, you know, value, highest and best bid. I'm not sure that we get the same value if we don't have designation rights for our winning bidder. And with full notice to all parties, and now challenging what rights can be asserted through its designation rights, I think, in short, the debtors may have to take a position on that.

As far as whether or not we proceed by adversary proceeding or motion, Your Honor, I know that I don't need to tell you the law on what's appropriate under Rule 7001. I cna't say that the debtors have a preference. I'm certain that, if Your Honor needs to hear evidence and needs to hear it from the debtors' position, we will, of course, provide you with that.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, there's been an allegation that there is a property of the estate interest here because, as Boeing has alleged, there could be a potential fraudulent conveyance action against the movant and, therefore, there's

a property of the estate interest. I don't believe -- and correct me if I'm wrong. In the sale order, you didn't sell the avoidance proceeds, correct? Or Boeing --

MR. HEATH: No, Your Honor --

as the DIP -- or excuse me, as -- well, I don't know if DIP -- actually, I don't know the state of play for that DIP lien because it was credit bid, correct? I'm not sure what the state of play is. But it seems as if you would have to be involved, if there's an allegation that the estate has a property interest in this asset in some way --

MR. HEATH: And --

THE COURT: -- relating to a fraudulent transfer.

Okay.

MR. HEATH: Yes, Your Honor. I think it may get a little complicated, but I think the way it works is we did not sell any causes of action pursuant to the Kansas sale transaction.

I do believe that Boeing, as DIP lender, has a lien on those causes of action and, as a DIP lender, I think has an interest. But as of right now, Judge, I do believe that the only party who would be able to assert that cause of action as an avoidance -- as an avoidance action or a fraudulent conveyance would be the estate because those causes of action remain with the debtor. Boeing has a lien

on proceeds, but it doesn't have a lien on the cause of action itself.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. That's very helpful. Thank you. Okay.

Mr. Posner, I don't want to put you on the spot, but when I see people on my screen, I assume they want to talk to me. So did you want to say anything or are you just observing?

MR. POSNER: I do want to make one point, Your Honor. For the record, David Posner, Kilpatrick, Townsend & Stockton, for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.

We didn't file any papers, so I'm not going to weigh in on the threshold legal issue. But I did want to alert the Court to one thing that I think, you know, it lurks in the background and shouldn't be lost on anybody. I know it's not lost on the debtors.

But CKAM is operating at the premises. That's generating revenue, that's helping reduce Boeing's deficiency claim, as well as their DIP claim. It's likely, unfortunately, that they're going to have a little bit of both left in this case when we get to the end of the road. And so anything that would happen that would disrupt their ability to continue to operate, obviously, is not a wonderful development from the perspective of unsecured creditors and the estate because their ability to operate is generating

revenue, and it's helping reduce those obligations. So I just wanted to make that point, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. That's helpful.

Mr. Ward, you popped on my screen. Did you want to say anything?

MR. WARD: No, other than, you know, I'm just here as local counsel for the creditors' committee, Your Honor.

And you know, I figured it would be appropriate for me to turn on the video as Mr. Posner was speaking.

THE COURT: Okay. I have trouble keeping track since we're in the virtual courtroom. I just indicate that as somebody stepping up to the podium. But it's nice to see you and it's always good to see your face on camera, so good to see you.

MR. WARD: Likewise.

everybody's candor in explaining the issues here. I do think that it's not appropriate to move by motion. In the past, I have been a little relaxed when it comes to motions that may seek relief that's covered under 7001 and, to be honest with you, I've run into some problems. Okay? I think because we run into some procedural problems that often arise when a party wants to allege a counterclaim and they can't necessarily allege the counterclaim in the context of a motion. And we may have issues related to that in connection

with this motion.

So, also, I do fund that what the movants are seeking is a mandatory injunction, essentially. You want an order from this Court requiring the debtor and Boeing to allow you access to the facility and permit you to remove the equipment by way of a process that would involve material time and effort and alteration of the facility, I don't think that's in dispute.

And I think obtaining an injunction before a trial on the merits is extraordinary, is drastic, and we can't do it by way of -- well, we either need to have an expedited trial on the merits of the action or we would need to have some sort of preliminary injunction obtained and we're not there. We haven't had briefing on those issues. I -- and we just -- I don't have briefing on all of the issues that are before me, quite frankly, whether it's a request for some sort of preliminary injunction or whether it's a request for interpretation of my sale order. I mean, I don't have full briefing on the issues it sounds like this case is going to present.

So I think we do need a complaint and I think you need to give the parties an opportunity to respond to that in however the parties see fit. It probably makes sense to bring Boeing and the debtors as the defendants for it, but I'll leave you to decide how you want to bring it. All

right?

I'm not going to put my finger on the scales here, but it seems like this is going to cost a lot of money, and I guess everybody should weigh whether it's worth it because, in the end, I think that, if you do achieve, Mr. Price, what you want to achieve, the parties still have to sit down and determine how you achieve it. And I think Boeing has made it very clear of what they expect to see, in terms of a proposal and insurance. I would think the debtors would expect to see the same thing, if it turns out that Boeing is not the one that's in control of the process.

So I guess I'm misunderstanding. But if Boeing is not the one that can assert a defense here, the debtors would be the one that could do it under the lease. So we'll go through this whole process, and I imagine the debtors would have a feel -- have a say about what they would expect to see when it comes to the removal of the equipment. So I just want to make sure that, if we go down this path and it's a lot of expense and energy of the people, that we -- of the parties, that we get you the relief -- all the parties get the relief that they need in the most efficient and expedited fashion. So, you know, file your complaint and tee it up as you see fit, but perhaps it just makes sense to work out a business solution to this situation.

MR. PRICE: Your Honor, William Price, just for the

record.

I appreciate your position on the issue, and will proceed accordingly. And I can assure Your Honor that it's our view that those discussions are necessary, no matter when we get approval to extract the equipment from the facility, that we would have to work through the business items, including insurance.

And at least in my experience, when there is an allegation of a cause of action that may loom over your head, that you -- when the underlying item is not being used by the party and not to be used by the party that is standing in the way, that you usually post forms of security to deal with those types of litigation, which I can't get into settlement discussions outside your Court. But we understand how parties deal with these issues, and we'd welcome an opportunity to resolve those issues. And we appreciate your Court's time today, and we will be back with the complaint to take it to the next step.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll just make one other preliminary comment, and this is more to Boeing. Mr. Smith, I am concerned about the allegation regarding the fraudulent transfers, I've always been concerned about them. But there's been no action that's actually been commenced. Okay? And so I think that, if this does get to a merits trial, I do need to understand more thoroughly the position of Boeing or

other parties-in-interest why a potential fraudulent transfer action could hold up return of a third party's property, if it turns out that it is properly the property of UEF. So I am -- I will tell you I am struggling with that concept. I'm not telling you I made a decision on it. But at the time that we resolve this issue, I doubt I'm going to have a fraudulent transfer action in front of me, and so I will not have a decision on the merits there. I'll have an allegation that there's a fraudulent transfer, but I'm not going to have anything more than that, I suspect.

So, like I said, I think a negotiated business solution is probably the right way to go here, but I'll leave it to the parties and I'll see how this unfolds.

So, Mr. Price, I look forward to receiving your complaint and how you wish to move forward. If you want to seek an injunction of some sort, you're welcome to, of course, do that, and you know how to do it. You're an experienced practitioner with experienced local counsel, so you know how to get me in front of the issues on a quick basis if you need to do it. All right?

MR. PRICE: Thank you very much, Your Honor. And if for nothing else today, I think it was a helpful exercise for you to know, when we filed what we filed, that -- what we're trying to focus on. So we will be back and we'll go from there.

THE COURT: Sounds great. Okay.

All right. Is there anything else that we need to discuss, Mr. Heath or other parties on the phone, before we part ways? I think we have, actually, a hearing it looks like coming up on the 28th. So maybe I'll just see you in a couple of days, ten days from now. Is that right?

MR. HEATH: We do have a hearing coming up on the 28th, Your Honor. I don't think there's anything left to discuss for today. The only matters that I will go forward at that hearing on the 28th are the debtors' request to extend under Section 365(d)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code and interim fees. Your Honor, I don't believe that there are any pending objections to interim fees, so that issue, to the extent Your Honor doesn't have any questions, it may go away before the hearing.

THE COURT: Okay. Sounds good. Well, then I look forward to that. And yes, we'll try to take the -- try to get rid of -- try to make a decision on the fees before the hearing, so we don't drag everybody into a court hearing and cause more time and expense for the estate.

So, with that, we will consider the hearing adjourned. Thank you all very much for your presentations today, and I look forward to seeing you all in the future. Take care.

MR. PRICE: Thank you --

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THE COURT: We'll stand --
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                MR. PRICE: -- very much --
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                THE COURT: -- adjourned.
                MR. PRICE: -- Your Honor.
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                THE COURT: Thank you.
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                UNIDENTIFIED: Thank you, Your Honor.
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           (Proceedings concluded at 1:34 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATION

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter to the best of my knowledge and ability.

Adufant October 20, 2021

Coleen Rand, AAERT Cert. No. 341

Certified Court Transcriptionist

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