Case 2:19-cv-00133-RGK Document 29

28



Docket #0029 Date Filed: 2/15/2019

1		TABLE OF CONTENTS	
2		Page CTION1	e
3	INTRODU	CTION	
4	ARGUME	NT4	
5	I.	The California Attorney General is Likely to Succeed on the Merits of the Appeal	
7		A. The California Attorney General's Conditions Were Issued Through State Statutes and Regulations4	-
8		B. The Attorney General Did Not Waive His Objections	
9		C. There Was No Intent, Reliance, or Injury Necessary for	
10		the Application of Equitable Estoppel7	,
11	II.	The People that the California Attorney General Represents Will	
12		Suffer Irreparable Harm Absent a Stay 8	;
13	III.	There Will Be Less Harm to Other Interested Parties if a Stay is	
14		Granted9	,
15	IV.	The Public Interest Is Served by Ensuring that the County Abide by the Clinical Conditions)
16	CONCLUSION		
17	CONCLOS	101	
18			
19			
20			
21			
22	*		
23	1		
24			
25			
26			
27			
28			

Cast	2.19-CV-00133-NGN Document 29 Theu 02/13/19 Fage 3 01 17 Fage ID #.2433	
1	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	
2	Page	
3	1 agc	
4	CASES	
5	Gabriel V. Alaska Elec. Pension Funa	
6		
7	(1064) 61 Col 2d 750 Cogo	
8		
9	196 B R 251 (1996)	
10		
11	In re Paloma Generating, Co. 2017 WL 5197116 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 9, 2017)	
12		
13	In re Tougher Industries, Inc. 2013 WL 1276501 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. March 27, 2013)	
14	To the Management	
15	(1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 50	
16	In re Veteran's Industries, Inc. of Long Beach v. Thomas C. Lynch	
17	(1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 90210	
18	In re Zahn	
19	(1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 10610	
20	Intel Corp. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.	
21	952 F.2d 1551,1559 (9th Cir. 1991)	
22	Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection	
23	474 U.S. 494 (1986)4	
24	Myers v. United States	
25	297 B.R. 774 (S.D. Cal. 2003)4	
26	People v. Whaley	
27	(2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 7794	
28		

Case	2:19-cv-00133-RGK Document 29 Filed 02/15/19 Page 4 of 17 Page ID #:2436
1	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2	(continued) Page
3	Phelps v. Stostad
4	(1997) 16 Cal.4th 234
5	Salyers v. Metro Life Ins. Co.
6	871 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2017)6
7	STATUTES
8	11 United States Code
9	§ 363(d)(1)
10	
11	Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 Amendments
12	
13	Bankruptcy Code § 959(b)5
14	California Corporate Code
15	§ 5914
16	§ 5919, subd. (a)
17	§ 5920-5923
18	
19	2017 California Legislative Service Chapter 782
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	

The California Attorney General files this reply to the oppositions filed by the Debtors, the Official Creditors' Committee, and the County of Santa Clara ("County") to the California Attorney General's Motion for Stay pending appeal [Dkt Nos 6, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 20 respectively], and respectfully states as follows:

INTRODUCTION

The Debtors own the hospitals in question because the California Attorney General gave consent pursuant to his statutory authority under Corporations Code section 5914, et seq. State law gives the Attorney General sole discretion to consent to a change of ownership or control, and to ensure the health and safety of the surrounding communities by requiring continued healthcare services. After careful deliberation, consultation with his healthcare expert, and consideration of public testimony, the California Attorney General issued a decision to consent with conditions ("AG Conditions") to the change in governance and control of Daughters of Charity Health System (now Verity Health Systems of California, Inc.). (*Ibid.*) The decision contained conditions for each of the hospitals, and the transaction closed December 14, 2015. (Appendix, Doc. 1 [AG Conditions].)

The health and safety protections within the AG Conditions clearly state that they are applicable to the County, as the successor in interest. As recently as 2017, the Legislature made clear that the Attorney General's authority to enforce conditions applies even when a hospital is no longer in operation. (2017 Cal. Legis.

An independent healthcare consultant retained by the Attorney General pursuant to Corporations Code section 5919, subdivision (a) conducts a detailed analysis of the possible effects on the community, including conducting interviews with constituencies in the community, an analysis of financial, utilization, and service information provided by the Applicant and the California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD), an analysis of publicly available data and reports regarding the health facility's service area including: demographic characteristics and trends; payer mix; hospital utilization rates and trends; health status indicators; and market share. From that analysis, the consultant prepares the impact statement and makes recommendations for conditions to reduce or eliminate any significant adverse effect from the transaction. The conditions imposed by the Attorney General rely heavily on the expert consultant's recommendations.

Serv. Ch. 782 (A.B. 651) (WEST) [amended Cal. Corp. Code, §§ 5914-5917, 5920-1 2 5923, and added§ 5926].) 3 The AG Conditions require that the hospitals, regardless of successive ownership, continue to provide important healthcare services for at least ten years 4 from the closing date of the transaction, including: 5 24-hour emergency medical services, including a minimum number of 6 emergency treatment stations; Intensive care services; 8 Coronary care services; 9 Obstetric services; 10 Sub-acute care services; 11 Women's health services, including mammography, pregnancy and 12 delivery services, maternal fetal medicine, stereotactic breast biopsy, and bone density screening; 13 Reproductive health services, and expand such services to include those prohibited by the "Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health 14 Care Services" as determined by the United States Conference of Catholic 15 Bishops; and 16 Stroke services including telemedicine program for stroke patients and designation as a Primary Stroke Center; 17 And the following services for a period of five years: 18 Cancer services including medical, surgical, radiation therapy, and the Ambulatory Infusion Center for a period of five years; 19 20 Cardiac services, including the two cardiac catheterizations and designation as a STEMI Receiving Center for a period of five years; 21 Neonatal intensive care services; 22 Orthopedics and joint replacement services; and 23 Pediatric services; 24 25 (Appendix, Doc. 1 [AG Conditions], at 181-182, 267). These hospitals provide essential services to the uninsured, under-served 26 populations, and the elderly. (Appendix, Doc. 5 [O'Connor Healthcare Impact

27

Report] p. 715; Doc. 5 [Saint Louise Healthcare Impact Report] p. 811.) Given his obligation under state law to consider the accessibility of important health care services, the California Attorney General required these services continue to be provided for a term of years, even if the hospitals were later transferred. Appellees provide no authority that the bankruptcy law preempts a state statute designed to protect the public health and safety.

Without the AG Conditions, the County will not be required to continue to operate O'Connor or Saint Louise as general acute care hospitals, or provide the specific healthcare services the AG Conditions require. The Asset Purchase Agreement does not set forth any specific clinical services. The County has not committed to providing any of the services enumerated in the health and safety protections within the AG Conditions. Appellees have not identified any document that sets forth any specific medical service that it will guarantee. The Asset Purchase Agreement only states that it will provide services "consistent with the objectives of the current conditions of approval from the California Attorney General." (Appendix, Doc 2, [Asset Purchase Agreement], Section 13.3, p. 557.) Of course, this vague statement of intent does not bind the County to actually provide any of the clinical services required by the AG Conditions. Appellees' opposition does not set forth any document or declaration under penalty of perjury that the services will be continued.

Appellees want it both ways. They claim the Conditions need not apply because the County is a public entity that is required to provide health services. But Appellees also claim the sale will be jeopardized if the services required by the Conditions should apply. Appellees never identify which, if any, of the healthcare services it cannot maintain. Appellees ask the Court to trust that the County will provide all health services even though it refuses to commit to any of the health or safety conditions required pursuant to state law. Without the AG Conditions, the County is not required to maintain the properties as acute care hospitals with the

required healthcare services, and can use them for any other purpose. Therefore, a stay is essential.

ARGUMENT

- I. THE CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL IS LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL
 - A. The California Attorney General's Conditions Were Issued Through State Statutes and Regulations

Sales of nonprofit debtor corporation's assets are subject to applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. §363(d)(1) and § 541(f). Section 541(f) states:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, property that is held by a debtor that is a corporation described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from tax under section 501(a) of such Code may be transferred to an entity that is not such a corporation, but only under the same conditions as would apply if the debtor had not filed a case under this title.

Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Act does not preempt "a state statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety. . ."

Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,

474 U.S. 494, 507 (1986). Appellees cite to inapplicable cases dealing with unsecured creditors who wait until after a sale to sue the buyers. See Myers v.

United States, 297 B.R. 774, 784 (S.D. Cal. 2003). They further ignore language in Myers acknowledging that federal preemption is only likely where a state statute purposefully carves an exception to the Bankruptcy Code or where a state statute is more concerned with economic regulation rather than with protecting the public health and safety. Id., citing Baker & Drake, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm. of Nevada, 35 F.3d 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1994). Neither factor is present here.

On review, the court must consider the statutory language in the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part. *Phelps v. Stostad* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 23, 32. Moreover, the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole. *People v. Whaley* (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 779.

Here the various sections of the Corporations Code giving the Attorney General authority to review sales of nonprofit hospitals must be harmonized.

California Attorney General Harris exercised her police and regulatory powers under Corporations Code section 5914 et seq. in December 2015 when she issued a decision to consent with conditions to the change in governance and control of Verity and its affiliated entities. The terms of the AG Conditions were to remain in place for 15 years – and explicitly apply to future owners, without limitation. (Appendix, Doc 1 [AG Conditions], p. 181 and 266.) State law allows the Attorney General to enforce the health and safety protections within his conditions to the fullest extent provided by law. (Cal. Corp. Code, § 5926.) As such, the continued operation of the AG Conditions is a continuation of the California Attorney General's police and regulatory powers – akin to conditions that run with the land.

The Bankruptcy Court was required to apply non-bankruptcy law under Bankruptcy Code sections 959(b) and the amendments to the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 of sections 363(d)(1), 541(f), 1129(a)(16), and 1221(d) that specifically provide that applicable non-bankruptcy law applies to sales of assets by a nonprofit debtor.

Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. (In re Oyster Bay Cove, Ltd. 196 B.R. 251, 254 (1996). Here, the court abused its discretion by finding that state law did not apply to this sale transaction. A bankruptcy court's order authorizing a sale of property "free and clear" of all liens has no impact on restrictions that run with the land. (Id. at p. 255.) A sale of land 'free and clear' from these 'interests,' are not intended to sever non-monetary property interests that are created by substantive State law." (Ibid.)

Here, the health and safety protections were issued by the state Attorney General pursuant to state law and remain applicable to future owners for a period of fifteen years. These health and safety protections are non-monetary interests and more analogous to *In re Oyster Bay*, than the cases cited by Debtors. The cases

cited by Debtors dealt with such "interests" as a required payment of \$63 million for prior emissions under a cap and trade statute (*In re Paloma Generating, Co.*, 2017 WL 5197116, (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 9, 2017), and the calculation of unemployment insurance tax liabilities (*In re Tougher Industries, Inc.*, 2013 WL 1276501 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. March 27, 2013). In the current case, the health and safety protections within the AG Conditions are not reducible to a money satisfaction, and restrict the use of the property for the protection of the public.

B. The Attorney General Did Not Waive His Objections

"Waiver...occurs when a 'party's acts are so inconsistent with an intent to enforce the right as to induce a reasonable belief that such right has been relinquished." Salvers v. Metro Life Ins. Co. 871 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2017).

Under California law, waiver is a question of fact. Waiver is an affirmative defense, for which the party asserting it bears the burden of proof. *Intel Corp. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.* 952 F.2d 1551,1559 (9th Cir. 1991). Here, neither Debtors nor the County can meet the burden of proof.

The California Attorney General has not changed his position throughout this bankruptcy action - any sale of O'Connor Hospital and Saint Louise Regional Hospital to the County is subject to the AG Conditions. (Appendix, Doc. 3 [AG Bid Procedure Response], Doc 5 [AG Bid Procedure Sur-Reply].)

Assistant County Counsel was advised just prior to the filing of the AG Response on December 14 that the Attorney General did not object to the sale as long as the conditions as currently or subsequently clarified remained in place. (Appendix, Doc 11 [Declaration of Angela Sierra], p. 939-940.) The intent of the Attorney General was clear, and any argument that the Attorney General intended to waive his objections is without merit. In this case, Debtors submitted a proposed transaction to the California Attorney General in 2015, and thereafter implicitly and explicitly agreed that the AG Conditions would bind successors, and further waived any right to seek judicial relief with respect to each and every Condition.

(Appendix, Doc. 1 [AG Conditions], at 180, 190, 265, 276.)

Condition I, applicable to both O'Connor Hospital and Saint Louise Regional Hospital, provides that the conditions shall be legally binding on "any successor in interest" and "any and all current and future owners, lessees and owners of the real property on which the hospital is located." (*Id.*)

Moreover, Debtors further waived any right to seek judicial relief from each and every Condition. O'Connor Hospital's Condition XXI and Saint Louise Regional Hospital's Condition XXII state in relevant part: "[A]ll parties listed in Condition I...are deemed to have explicitly and implicitly consented to the applicability and compliance with each and every Condition and to have waived any right to seek judicial relief with respect to each and every Condition."

(Appendix, Doc. 1 [AG Conditions], at 190, 276.) Verity is expressly bound by the AG Conditions, and waived all rights to judicial relief with respect to the conditions. (*Id.*) As such, the only party that has waived any rights is the Debtors.

C. There Was No Intent, Reliance, or Injury Necessary for the Application of Equitable Estoppel

The doctrine of equitable estoppel requires: 1.) the party to be estopped must know the facts, 2.) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted on, 2.) the party asserting the right to estoppel must be ignorant of the true facts, and 4.) the party asserting estoppel must act in reliance and to his injury. *Gabriel v. Alaska Elec.*Pension Fund 773 F.3d 945, 955 (9th Cir. 2014).

Neither the County nor the Debtors have met the requirements for invoking the doctrine. The Attorney General informed the County that the AG Response was not a waiver of AG Conditions, thus there was no showing that the California Attorney General intended his December 14th filing be interpreted as a relinquishment of his rights. (Appendix, Doc 11 [Declaration of Angela Sierra], 939-940.)

Before the California Attorney General filed his AG Response on December

14, the County was advised that the Attorney General did not object to the sale as long as the conditions as currently or subsequently clarified remained in place. (Appendix, Doc 11 [Declaration of Angela Sierra], pp. 940.) The County "agreed to discuss, post-sale, how to address the other conditions" and that "ongoing discussions with the County about the other conditions were contemplated outside the Court process." (Appendix, Doc 12 [Declaration of Assistant County Counsel Douglas Press] p. 946.) As such, the County was in no way ignorant of the Attorney General's position.

Lastly, the County suffered no injury based on the AG Response filed December 14. There is no merit to the suggestion by the County that it would have "argued more strenuously" had they known of the California Attorney General's position. The County was aware of the California Attorney General's position, and their representatives argued their position strenuously. The Debtors provide no detail how they would have argued differently, and cite no legal authority that this is the kind of "injury" cognizable as estoppel against a public agency.

Because the County was aware that the California Attorney General was not waiving his AG Conditions, there was no reliance and no showing of injury to support the application of the equitable estoppel doctrine.

II. THE PEOPLE THAT THE CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL REPRESENTS WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE HARM ABSENT A STAY

O'Connor Hospital is a critically important provider of healthcare services to the local community and is "known for providing essential services to the uninsured, under-served populations, and the elderly," while Saint Louise Regional Hospital is "known for providing essential services to the uninsured and underserved populations." (Appendix, Doc 5 [O'Connor Healthcare Impact Report] p. 715; [Saint Louise Healthcare Impact Report] p. 811.) The California Attorney General's expert further noted that "[t]he Hospital's emergency and obstetrics services are very important for patient access, and play an important role in

preserving the safety net. (*Id.*) The services noted as especially important to the local community were the basis for the both O'Connor and Saint Louise's AG Conditions IV and V that required such services continue to be provided into the future. Appellees fail to contradict any evidence that these services are essential to the surrounding communities. And the County refuses to commit to providing any of them. The California Attorney General seeks to protect these vital services by seeking enforcement of his AG Conditions on appeal. The harm that would befall the community should the County fail to provide the essential services required by the AG Conditions is immeasurable.

III. THERE WILL BE LESS HARM TO OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES IF A STAY IS GRANTED

Debtors have provided declarations from Richard Adcock, John Mills, James Williams, and Paul Lorenz in support of their argument that Debtors and the County will be harmed by a brief stay of the Sale Order pending appeal. Mr. Adcock opines that if a stay is granted that the sale will be in danger of collapsing. (Adcock declaration, p. 3 [Dkt No. 15-1.) However, this is merely speculative, as the County has not provided such a declaration. Rather than state that the sale is in danger of collapsing in a declaration under penalty of perjury, County Counsel James Williams attaches a letter to his declaration. The letter constitutes hearsay and does not state any reason why the County would not simply accept those AG Conditions that require the continued provision of essential health services. Mr. Adcock further points to the hours spent devoted to the task of transferring the hospitals to the County, and provides no basis for his opinion of the financial risk of the stay. (*Id.*)

John Mills, as an employee of the County, notes that the County participated in job fairs. (Mills Declaration, p. 7-11 [Dkt No. 15-1.) However, County staff would have been paid regardless of the work performed in support of this sale.

This is not an appropriate measure of harm to the County.

While Paul Lorenz address certain costs expended by Santa Clara Valley Medical Center in seeking a consolidated license through the California Department of Public Health, and hours spent to attend planning meetings, these costs are not enough to overcome the tremendous harm that could befall the local communities should these hospitals fail to provide necessary medical care. (Lorenz Declaration, p. 17-22 [Dkt No. 15-1].)

IV. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IS SERVED BY ENSURING THAT THE COUNTY ABIDE BY THE CLINICAL CONDITIONS

The Debtors are nonprofit public benefit corporations that hold charitable assets. The Attorney General, as a representative of the public, is responsible for protecting assets held in charitable trust, and has primary responsibility for the enforcement of charitable trusts. Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons (1964) 61 Cal.2d 750, 754-755. Case law also establishes that the Attorney General represents the public beneficiaries of the charitable trust. In re Veteran's Industries, Inc. of Long Beach v. Thomas C. Lynch (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 902 [the Attorney General has the duty to protect the beneficiaries' interest in a charitable trust]; In re Ventura (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 50, 57 [the Attorney General has standing to protect charitable gifts]; In re Zahn (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 106, 114 [the Attorney General represents the public which benefits by a charitable trust].

As noted above, the 2015 AG Conditions were imposed after careful consideration of the factors provided in California Corporations Code section 5917 and 5923, including consultation with a healthcare expert pursuant to California law. The California Attorney General has the primary responsibility to ensure that the charitable assets proposed to be purchased by the County are used for their intended purpose and thereby protect the People of the State of California. Therefore, the Attorney General has continuing legal authority under state law governing charitable assets to enforce its Conditions.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Case Name:

XAVIER BECERRA,

California Attorney General,

v. VERITY HEALTH SYSTEM OF CALIFORNIA, INC., et al.

USDC Case No. 2:19-cv-133-RGK BK Case No. 2:18-bk-20151-ER

I hereby certify that on <u>February 15, 2019</u>, I *electronically filed* the following document with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system:

REPLY TO THE OPPOSITIONS OF DEBTORS, THE OFFICIAL CREDITOR'S COMMITTEE, AND THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA [RELATED DOCKET NOS. 6, 15, 17, 18, 20]

I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the CM/ECF system (see the attached Electronic Mail Notice List)

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on <u>February 15, 2019</u>, at Los Angeles, California.

Jane Miyamura

/s/ Jane Miyamura

Declarant

Signature

LA2018502412 53253034.docx

Mailing Information for a Case 2:19-cv-00133-RGK In Re Verity Health System of California, Inc.

Electronic Mail Notice List

The following are those who are currently on the list to receive e-mail notices for this case.

- James Cornell Behrens jbehrens@milbank.com
- Alicia Kathleen Berry Alicia.Berry@doj.ca.gov,jane.miyamura@doj.ca.gov,james.toma@doj.ca.gov
- Gregory Raymond Jones gjones@mwe.com
- James W Kapp jkapp@mwe.com
- Jessica Mariani jmariani@mwe.com
- Tania M Moyron tania.moyron@dentons.com,chris.omeara@dentons.com

Manual Notice List

The following is the list of attorneys who are **not** on the list to receive e-mail notices for this case (who therefore require manual noticing). You may wish to use your mouse to select and copy this list into your word processing program in order to create notices or labels for these recipients.

(No manual recipients)